

Edited by

Prof. Dr. ŞABAN HALİS ÇALIŞ
Dr. VANESSA TINKER

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY



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PREFACE

The Russian Federation is one of the great powers with the largest territory, rich natural resources, and nuclear armed forces. Undoubtedly, Russia is one of the most important players in world politics including the most heated regions such as Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Balkans and the Caucasus. It is also a member of the most important regional and international organizations. As one of the five permanent member states, it has veto power in the Security Council of the United Nations. Therefore, any analysis of world politics cannot be complete without making a reference to Russia.

Many valuable publications exist on modern Russia and its foreign policy, but most prefer to narrate it only from a historical perspective or to discuss the current situation in Russia. Unlike other books however, this book, provides fresh insight by its contributors from different universities and experts on international relations, who critically analyse modern Russian foreign policy by considering all socio-politic, ideational, material, and institutional reasons behind its continuity and change, while bearing in mind its historical bonds and unique contexts. In addition, this book includes a special chapter on Russia's relations with Türkiye in order to evaluate the background, structure, and bases of developments taking place recently under the leaders of both countries.

Therefore, this book, *Russian Foreign Policy*, stands out as a concise, well-structured, engaging, insightful, as well as accessible in terms of its writing style. It is our pleasure to publish this book at our university. I believe that this book will emerge as a reference work for both academics and students all over the world who have an interest in Russian foreign policy – in the past and present.

Prof. Dr. Muhittin Şimşek
Chairman of the Board of Trustees
Khoja Akhmet Yassawi
International Turkish-Kazakh University

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As with most academic books, this book began as a well-intentioned and ambitious project. However, unforeseen circumstances nearly brought this books journey to an end. Fortunately, the book endured, after finding a new home. It is with tremendous gratitude that we would like to thank Khoja Akhmet Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University and the Eurasian Research Institute, the Board of Trustees, and their esteemed governing members who decided to publish our book.

In particular, we would like to thank Prof. Dr. Muhittin Şimşek, the President of the Board of Trustees, Khoja Akhmet Yassawi International Turkish-Kazakh University. Without his understanding and support, the publication of the book would have been nearly impossible. We would also like to extend our appreciation to former and current heads of the Eurasian Research Institute, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Vakur Sümer and Dr. Suat Beylur, and deputy director Cengizhan Canaltay, who assisted us every step of the way.

As the editors of this book, we would especially like to thank all the contributors, with whom which this book would not be possible. We not only appreciate their knowledge and expertise, but also their unforgettable friendship that speaks many volumes. Furthermore, we are genuinely grateful for their perseverance and patience throughout this arduous journey.

Finally, we would like to thank our readers for choosing our book. Our aim and hope is that it provides them with fresh insight, a foundational understanding and a point of reference for those interested in Russian foreign policy.

Prof. Dr. Şaban Halis Çalıř
Dr. Vanessa Tinker
Editors

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA: FROM TSARS TO PUTIN

Prof. Dr. Şaban Halis Çalış

Introduction

To understand Russia's recent war on Ukraine under the leadership of Putin, this book argues that we need to know the constituent elements of Russian national and state identities emerging from the country's historical, cultural, and social background. Not only the war on Ukraine but also all Russian policies concerning domestic, regional, and international affairs are related with these constituent elements. For this reason, it is essential to make reference to its ideational and material foundations and appreciate the country's grandeur in terms of its size (the largest geographically in the world) and abundance in natural resources. All these factors need to be examined critically within a historical context starting from the very emergence of Russians as a nation and Russia as state. In addition, the concept of tsarism needs to be evaluated since it helps us to understand the role of leadership in Russian foreign policy making— from the time of tsars to present. Neo-Tsarism, as used in this book, refers to the contemporary governing style of Russian autocratic leaders, which is decorated with some democratic institutions. Putin is without any exception. When examining the current war in Ukraine for example, we argue that there are striking resemblances between Putin's style of policies and those of imperial tsars.

Therefore, we argue in this book, that any attempt to understand Russian foreign policy requires a deep knowledge of Russian history, beginning with the establishment of the first Russian principalities in the Middle Ages. For this reason, we begin this book with a chapter on the emergence of Russians as a distinct community, in order to locate modern Russian foreign policy in a wider historical context, one that produced a great empire that gradually expanded from Moscow to eventually encompassing the Eurasian region. This expansion, however,

came at a great cost. Russian leaders, otherwise referred to as tsars, from the onset, justified expansionism in the name of security. However, with expansionism came greater insecurity, causing each tsar to be more ruthless in foreign affairs in addition to domestic politics.

With the rise of the modern nation state, some of them adapted their rhetoric to contemporary discourses including concepts such as nationalism, national unity, integrity, and the interest of freeing Slavic people. Later, under communism, Russia adopted the discourse of communist comrades and socialist ideas influenced Russian politics. Nevertheless, we argue, the essence of the ideas concerning the tsarist and imperialist understanding to keep Russia as one of the great countries in the world has remained the same. Recent discourses about Eurasianism that supports Putin's policies further illustrate the persistence of imperialist understandings, developed to keep the idea of great Russia alive. Foreign policy, in this regard, remains one of the most powerful state apparatuses at the hand of Putin (Arbatova, 2019: 7-24).

As this book demonstrates, the essential characteristics of Russian foreign policy, and the style of Putin, reflects a combination of nostalgia for the Soviets and the Tsarist Imperial Russia. Krystel von Kumberg further reiterates this idea, arguing,

[N]ot much has significantly altered Russia's principle internal drivers and overall strategic mindset. Generally, symbols, narratives, and the ways in which the security discourse is framed largely mirror past ideas of greatness. While technological advancements in an increasingly multipolar and globalized system have accelerated the pace of international relations, Russia's behaviour still somehow mirrors its Tsarist roots. (Kumberg, 2022).

Vladimir Putin and The Rise of Neo-Tsarism

As previously discussed, while the occupation of Ukraine is an important issue, but racism is another. They should not be confused with each other. However, when we look at especially recent declarations of Putin, he prefers confusing the issues with each other in order to justify his Ukrainian policies. He looks

like a racist pundit as he is denying the borders, history, and even national identity of Ukraine. He does not hesitate in associating himself with ruthless tsars. Putin complains about historical imperialist approaches based on divide and rule policies, but he does not hesitate to employ the same policy towards Ukraine.

Approximately six months before the start of the Ukrainian war, he wrote an article, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, in order to explain his position towards Ukraine, he declared that “to have a better understanding of the present and look into the future, we need to turn to history” (Putin, 2021). He went on to add, “We know and remember well that it was shaped – for a significant part – on the lands of historical Russia. Ukraine was created intentionally by the Bolsheviks, and it was further fortified by the cold war conditions”. From these statements, Putin suggests that modern Ukraine is a product of the Soviet era. Later, he makes direct references to the tsarist Russian policies and reminds Russian people of their inherent responsibility to fight for their sovereignty. He states,

In order to claim some kind of leadership ... any country, any people, any ethnic group should ensure their sovereignty. Because there is no in-between, no intermediate state: either a country is sovereign, or it is a colony, no matter what the colonies are called... If a country or a group of countries is not able to make sovereign decisions, then it is already a colony to a certain extent. But a colony has no historical prospects, no chance for survival in this tough geopolitical struggle. There has always been such a struggle (I just want to make it clear); it is not that we are looking at what is happening around us and saying “Wow!” It has always been like that, you see, and Russia has always remained at the forefront of ongoing events... Yes, there were eras in the history of our country when we had to retreat, but only in order to mobilise and move forward, concentrate and move forward. (Putin, 2021).

Putin has also not hesitated from declaring the dissolution of the Soviet Union as the biggest mistake in recent Russian history. The demise of the Soviets was, in his words, “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the XX century” simply because the Soviet Union was in fact nothing more than a reincarnation of Russia with “a different name”. We argue in this text that Russia’s

recent invasion of Ukraine is another exemplary example of the use of historical tsarist-based ideas to justify invasion and part of a larger effort to establish another great state like the Soviets but with tsarist style and values. Increasingly since the 2014, following the Euromaidan protests that ousted pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich, Putin has not shied away from making his imperialist foreign policy intentions known and their connection to “Tsarist Russia” as evidenced in his public declarations (Blank, 2009: 1-43). A few months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, for example, Putin stated:

We visited the exhibition dedicated to the 350th birth anniversary of Peter the Great. Almost nothing has changed. It is a remarkable thing...Peter the Great waged the Great Northern War for 21 years. On the face of it, he was at war with Sweden taking something away from it... He was not taking away anything, he was returning. This is how it was. The areas around Lake Ladoga, where St Petersburg was founded. When he founded the new capital, none of the European countries recognised this territory as part of Russia; everyone recognised it as part of Sweden. However, from time immemorial, the Slavs lived there along with the Finno-Ugric peoples, and this territory was under Russia’s control. The same is true of the western direction, Narva and his first campaigns. Why would he go there? He was returning and reinforcing, that is what he was doing.../ Clearly, it fell to our lot to return and reinforce as well. And if we operate on the premise that these basic values constitute the basis of our existence, we will certainly succeed in achieving our goals. (Putin, 2022).

Therefore, to understand Russian foreign policy, it is important to pay attention to Russia’s leaders, and more explicitly in the case of Putin, their unremitting and specific references to Tsarist Russia’s imperialist past. However, as we have noted earlier in this chapter, we cannot understand the role of leadership without having a deeper knowledge of Russian history and society. Therefore, we begin in Chapter two of this book with a look at the rise of Russia to locate modern Russian foreign policy in a wider historical context that led to the development of a great empire with great tsars.

Russians and Russia: Society, State and Identity

In Chapter two of this book, Sezgin Kaya begins with an analysis on the emergence of Russians as a nation and Russia as a state within a long historical setting. Then, Kaya attempts to understand the process of Russian modernization and its impact on Russian national identity construction and imperial policy making process. In this context, the author focuses on the position of the Tsarist Russia in the European system of states. Following, he proceeds to evaluate the cornerstones of modern Russian history such as the Revolution of 1917, the emergence and break-up of the Soviet Union, and the establishment of the new Russian Federation.

In this chapter, we find out answers to basic questions concerning Russia and the Russians. For instance, we learn when and why Russian modernization began, and how this modernization affected its foreign policy. As the chapter demonstrates, although Kievan Rus is considered as the first Russian state in history, the foundations of the modernization period is traced back to the Grand Duchy of Moscow in the 14th century. Upon reading this chapter, we understand that modernization in Russia consisted of a contradictory and long enduring process. The main problem with reforms was their top-down imposition by autocratic leaders. They were often carried out by violence, but leaders did not always succeed in what they wanted to establish. Nevertheless, in the end, Russia was able to modernise to the point that it became a part of the European system of states. As the chapter informs us, the inclusion of Russia in the European system occurred in the post-Westphalian period. Only then, was Russia considered one of the five major powers in the nineteenth century to keep the European system in balance. This created more opportunities for Russia, and following the Napoleonic wars, it became the biggest land power in Europe.

After the Crimean War, however, Russia lost its status, and finally collapsed in 1917 when the Bolshevik Revolution succeeded. As the author of the chapter argues, the process leading to revolution in Russia started with the defeat of the Crimean War. Despite of the modernisation of tsars, the defeat revealed much about the backwardness of the country when compared to the West. This sparked many more new reforms, but the long-lasting and endless wars placed tremendous hardships on people.

At the beginning of the 20th century, it became more obvious that Russia was in a deep crisis both politically and economically. In response, the working class sought to obtain a better life, and Russian intelligentsia supported them with revolutionary ideas such as socialism and anarchism. In the end, the Bolsheviks won this struggle of power under the leadership of Lenin and his political ideas heavily influenced the Soviet Union, including its foreign policy.

At the beginning of the revolution, the Soviet Union did not have a comprehensive approach to foreign policy because of its ideological assumptions concerning imperialism. Therefore, the main mission of Soviet foreign policy was to encourage world revolutions and to exploit the contradictions between the capitalist bourgeois states. This revolutionary approach was changed essentially when Stalin came to power, but he also preferred using violence in domestic politics and resorting to war in foreign affairs. After the death of Stalin, Soviet foreign policy softened, and some steps were taken to reduce tensions in the world. The policy of “peaceful coexistence” developed by Khrushchev was important in this respect. However, this period did not last long. When Leonid Brezhnev took the control of the Soviets, he returned to Stalinist understanding not only in domestic politics, but also in international affairs. His preferences escalated conflicts and led to more wars as was the case in Afghanistan.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation (RF) was established. Initially, there were high hopes that the RF would make a peaceful transition to democracy and the market economy. However, it has increasingly become apparent, particularly under the leadership of Putin, that the RF has never forgone its imperialist worldview and ambitions of reclaiming its title as one of the leading world powers. The recent invasion of Ukraine further reinforces and illustrates Russia’s return of tsarism in Russian foreign policy.

Material And Ideational Bases

History and current developments demonstrate that there is a great deal of continuity in Russian foreign policy – one that connects the past to the present. As this book demonstrates, this connection is not accidental, but represents an intentional effort

on the part of Russian leadership, dating back to the rise of tsars. In the chapter three of this book, Vakur Sümer seeks to cover and comprehend the subject of foundations starting from the basic geographical features of the RF, which has kept its territorial position as one of the biggest countries (now the biggest) in the world since the times of tsars. In the case of Russia, size really matters. In this respect, it is important to draw attention to Russia's natural resources, consisting of a range of rich mines, gas and oil to forests and rivers. Russia has a very diverse topography. Due to the large size of Russia, there exists extensive variation from the north to south in terms of climate and natural conditions. Climate, in particular, is an important issue for Russia. As this chapter points out, Russia is in need of making drastic changes to its national policies regarding climate change and other global environmental issues.

After touching upon the importance of geography, the chapter goes on to analyse the current structure and composition of demography in Russia. It is a critical area to examine in order to understand the weakness and strengths of Russia's human resources. Despite the country's huge natural resources, it faces a range of demographic challenges such as an ageing population, outdated education system and poor infrastructure to ensure a greater quality of life. The Ukrainian war, for instance, demonstrates the RF's problem in recruiting extra soldiers, even after declaring national mobilization. This issue is further discussed in chapter three, when it looks at the defence structure and security issues facing Russia, with a special reference to the military sector of the country.

As chapter three highlights, the RF initially inherited about 85% of the Soviet Union's military system including manpower, equipment, and defence enterprises. However, as this chapter points out, the RF lacked economic resources, as well as motivation, to maintain this tremendous and awkward machinery. As a result, this led to a sharp decline of the army's combat readiness, as illustrated by the disastrous outcome of the First Chechen War for Moscow. Under President Putin, assisted by rising oil prices, Russia started to reform its military in 2008-2009, reducing the size of the armed forces, increasing budgetary support, and announcing a gradual transition to a professional army. Although there remain unresolved problems and shortcomings in the military, Russia is nevertheless a nuclear

superpower that must still be taken seriously in world politics.

In addition, Sümer also attempts, in chapter three, to critically analyse ideational foundations of Russian foreign policy with special references to beliefs and ideologies that affect principles and policy-making process in foreign affairs. The persistence of ethnic nationalism, for example, undermine the very foundation of the RF as a country with a considerable number of different ethnic people. Ideologically, Russian politics, since the end of the Cold War, has remained divided between two fractions – Atlantists and Eurasianists. The former initially gained substantial popularity. However, in recent years, Eurasianists, supported by intellectuals such as Alexandre Dugin, have been gaining strength, particularly after Putin came to power in 2000, with more pan-Slavish ideas. Russian nationalism that places emphasis on pan-Slavism, still plays a role great in domestic and foreign policy. In addition, the rise of Eurasianism has impacted the preferences of Russia in global politics. In this respect, the Munich Speech of Putin in 2007 signalled a new turn in Russian foreign policy after he openly rejected attempts to create a unipolar world order under the auspices of the United States. As Sümer notes, this speech is now considered to be the starting point of the widening gap between Russia and the West and former attempts to move towards a pro-Western orientation.

Domestic Politics, Administrative Structure and Decision-making Units

The Russian foreign policy decision making process consists of many diverse units, actors and factors. In chapter four, İrfan Kaya Ülger attempts to provide a complete picture of this complex process. The complexity is mainly related to the federal administrative structure of the RF that is comprised of 21 republics, 9 territories, 46 regions, 2 cities of federal significance, 1 autonomous region, 4 autonomous districts. Although this structure has been subject to many changes in the past, its complexity has remained unchanged in decision making including foreign policy. In order to understand the mindset behind the Russian state today, Ülger begins by analysing the founding principles and norms in the Russian Constitution that was put into practice in 1993 a well after the end of the Soviet Union. Ülger first provides detailed knowledge about the main structures

of the RF and the composition of Russian government together with essential institutions that play a role significant in the making of foreign policy such as the Russian Intelligent Unit. He then proceeds by analysing the political parties in order to understand their power, ideologies and impact in the policy making process. He also sheds light on the role of media and civil society in today's Russia. Perhaps more importantly, he underlines the importance of the Russian Orthodox Church as a religious institution that plays a key role in politics including foreign policy.

Chapter four enables readers to understand the state machine of Russia today. First, it draws attention to the complexity of the system, consisting of 85 federated units. Each unit is represented by equal members in the Council of the Federation. All federated units are represented by 2 representatives in the Council. However, the level of autonomy and status of the units differ from the others. The highest level of autonomy is granted to the Republics. Second place is kept for the Autonomous Okrugs. The types of federated units in Russia are as follows: Federated republic, Oblast, Krai, Autonomous Oblast, Autonomous Okrug, and Federal City. The present complex system stems from the Soviet heritage. Secondly, the president of Russia is the main actor of this political system. The president is not only the guarantor of the constitution, fundamental rights, and freedoms but also the guarantor of the citizens. According to the Constitution, the main task of the head of state is to ensure the harmonious functioning of the constitutional bodies, and to determine the general orientations of domestic and foreign politics. The president is also the supreme commander of the Russian armed forces. According to Article 87 of the Constitution, it has the authority to declare martial law and state of emergency on its own initiative. It is also within the competence of the President to chair the meetings of the Security Council, to appoint and dismiss the high command level of the armed forces and to approve the military doctrine which is an essential part of security and foreign policy.

Within this setting, other players of policy making such as political parties, the Federal Parliament, the State Duma, have some functions at least to make debates, but they are all subordinated to the will of presidents. Although the Russian constitution allows parties to be established and to participate in elections freely, but they do not have so much power to affect national policies in practice. Their power in the Duma has further been reduced since

the rise of Putin in politics. As for the other players of politics, media and civil society in Russia have not yet developed to the level of their counterparts in western societies. Concerning the Orthodox Church of Russia, it represents the mouth piece of pan-Slavish and nationalist politics as was the case in the time of tsars. In short, as far as foreign policy is concerned, media, civil society and the church in today's Russia are simply employed to provide public support or to make propaganda in favor of current presidential policies. As this chapter highlights, their function and impact in foreign policy making all function as part of the state apparatus under the strict control of Putin.

Great Power Connections

Foreign policy, just as with any other policy, is not made in a political vacuum. Rather policies develop between and among states as a means of affecting each other's preferences in world politics. However, it is important for students of International Relations to understand and make critical distinctions between states and great powers. In chapter five of this book, Tarık Oğuzlu begins his analysis on great powers by providing a definition of great power. Oğuzlu suggests it is critical to conceptualize what we mean by great power to understand Russia's position in this respect. The relations of Russia with other great powers, namely USA, China, and European Union depends on the description of the concept of great power. Although there is no clear-cut definition of the concept, he argues that the concept is used today to make reference to states whose military, economic and political capabilities are strong enough to shape world politics. Great powers are states that have capabilities to affect relations with each other as well as the choices of other states in the world.

In Chapter five, Oğuzlu provides a comparative analysis of Russia's relations with the USA, China, and EU. Unlike the United States, whose geopolitical interests spans across the entire globe, he argues that Russia's are confined to the larger Eurasian region. Even though Russia is the only country capable of annihilating the USA in a nuclear exchange, its overall military capacity is no match to it. On the other side, although Russia's nuclear power is much more than China, if current trends continue, China will soon overtake it. Economically, Russia is not a global power, let alone a great one. In terms of soft power, including for instance

ideas and global brands, Russia is no match of the United States, China or the EU.

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has increasingly become discontent with globalist trends in world politics and alarmed by unilateral American actions. This became more obvious after Putin came to power as president in 2000. Consequently, Russia has progressively become insecure, and neoconservatives in the USA have played a decisive role in this. For instance, the US administrations supported the coloured revolutions in the post-Soviet geography – in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, hoping that successful implementation of liberal democratic practices in those countries would bring power to pro-American regimes. Likewise, the United States supported the nomination of some post-Soviet countries in NATO. Notable in this context is the American support to NATO membership of Georgia and Ukraine. The NATO summit held in 2008 decided that Georgia would join NATO sometime in the future contingent of its transformation into a democratic and capitalist state. From the Russian perspective, such western policies aimed at nothing more than containing Russian influence in its near abroad. Then, Russia took a limited military operation against Georgia in the summer of the same year. Russia annexed Crimea after the pro-Russian regime Ukraine was ousted from power by demonstrations in early 2014. The idea of Ukraine and Georgia joining the EU and NATO is perceived as unacceptable by Russia and this policy has been strictly followed by Putin in particular. Putin now justifies his offensive policies in the current war in Ukraine in light of these developments.

On the other hand, as Oğuzlu evaluates, Russia and China are both realist actors that believe in the primacy of hard power capabilities and tend to define security from the perspectives of territorial integrity, national sovereignty and social cohesion. Both countries believe that the unipolar era between the early 1990s and the second half of the 2000s was a historical aberration and a multipolar environment is required to maintain global peace and stability. Similarly, Russian and Chinese leaders share the view that both Russia and China are entitled to have a geopolitical influence in their neighbourhoods as well as curbing the American penetration into their regions. A common view shared by both countries is that western claims to democracy and universal human rights serve as a smokescreen to hide their underlying imperialistic ambitions and when imposed on others has often led

to war. Accordingly, Russia and China openly support the idea that non-involvement in states' internal affairs and the recognition of their national sovereignty. In addition, Russian and Chinese societies are also inclined to legitimize strong state authority over society. Both countries are ruled by strong charismatic leaders and the scope of civil society participation in national politics is strictly limited.

Concerning Russian relations with the European Union, Oğuzlu argues that they are essentially shaped by Russian ideological orientations which revolves around pro-Europeanism, pan-Slavism, and Eurasianism. On the subject, he concludes in his chapter that “Russia’s relationship with Europe contains both a strong degree of historical legacy dating back to the modernization efforts of Peter the Great and the institutional interactions between Russia and the European Union”. However, Russian’s current war in Ukraine seems to have destroyed the choice of pro-Europeanists and empowered nationalist, pan-Slavist and Eurasianist circles and preferences while a new Cold War emerged between the West and the Russian Federation under the tacit support of China for Putin.

Russia in International Organizations

Following the end of World War II, international organisations mushroomed and were accelerated by the establishment of United Nations and since then they have reached tens of thousands in number. Not only have their numbers increased geometrically, but they have begun playing vital roles in world politics. The functions of international organisations also multiplied to cover many areas of international relations. While states are still the main actors, their power has been notably circumscribed by these organisations, whether they are members of them or not. To understand Russian foreign policy, it is important to comprehend its approach to international organisations. In the chapter six of this book, you will find a joint analysis of Demet Şefika Mangır and Ediliia Abdykadyrova about the subject of Russia and international organisations. Starting with Russia’s role in UN including the Security Council, they analyse its position in some important inter-governmental organisations such as the Council of Europe, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Mangır and Abdykadyrova's analysis demonstrate that the RF as great power perceives international organizations as an instrument to put its foreign and security policies in practice. For instance, Russia's attitude towards the UN Security Council is inextricably linked to its search for a new role after the end of the Soviet empire. Russia perceives the UN Security Council as the only arena in which it can express its power directly in world politics. Permanent membership in the UN Security Council not only gives Russia a unique status, but also the right of veto, which ensures that it will have a say on all major political issues. On the other hand, as we see in the case of Council of Europe (CoE), Russia seeks to undermine the function and impact of the organizations when it feels it cannot control it. Russia was very critical about the decisions and power of the Council from the very beginning of its membership. Not surprisingly, Putin withdrew Russian membership when the CoE decided to expel it soon after the start of the Ukrainian War. Before the war, Russia was one of the first on the list of the countries to violate the values and principles of the Council established by international agreements concerning for example human rights.

After the end of the WWII, Russia has increasingly turned away from participation in western established organisations and sought to establish alternatives to them in which it has strong control over such as COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. Russia has continued to establish similar regional organisations to keep its leading role, control, and great power claim alive. After the Cold War, for instance, Russia established the Euro-Asian Economic Union (EAEU) to coordinate and integrate economic policies of the old-soviet republics that remained outside of the EU. Through this organisation, Russia aims to counter the Western world's hegemonic status while at the same time create a barrier to China's growing economic dominance in the region. Similarly, the Russian membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is not only based on security concerns in Asia, but at the micro level, it considers friendship with China as strategically important for diplomatic means without military conflict. At the macro level, Russia views China as a key ally to prevent the global hegemony of the USA over the region, while at the same time seeking to balance China's influence in Asia as a whole.

Russia and Global Problems

As far as recent developments are concerned, Russia's policies towards international organisations cannot be separated from its history, national identity and experiences as a whole. No doubt, the stronger Putin feels about the power of the RF, the more he voices nationalist, xenophobic, and irredentist discourses. In many cases, he also challenges international organisations, law, and rules, and rejects any idea of being a part of global world order. However, despite being the biggest country in the world, any global crisis has the potential to affect it, let alone any other country in the world. Therefore, it is necessary to look at Russia's position concerning global issues including climate changes, environmental problems, global security, terrorism, nuclear weapons and arms control, energy supply, socio-economic fluctuations and technological developments to understand its foreign policy as a whole.

In the chapter seven, Arif Behiç Özcan and Upagul Rakhmanova analyse Russia's position concerning critical global issues. According to them, Russia's foreign policy on global social conflicts, for example, are shaped by a mixture of several economic and political factors. Accordingly, as it is known from different case studies, Russia does not always adhere to the same foreign policy on ethnic and religious conflicts in the world. Russia for example, responds differently to conflicts in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, perceiving them in the context of national security and regional dominance concerns, whereas the conflicts in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa, Russia considers then from the perspective of a global power, seeking to ensure its energy security, arms sale, economic impact, and global political balances.

As for global environmental problems, Russia in recent years has taken a stronger interest since they are aware of the fact that it is the largest country in the world, playing a significant role in increasing regional and global environmental problems. Therefore, from the 1990s onwards, Russia has played a critical role in international regulations about environmental protection, despite Putin's suspicions about the underlying intentions of the western world. In the same line, the Russian government preferred to engage in arms control talks with the USA prior to Putin's takeover of domestic politics. Russia's approach to arms control

negotiations with the United States, has remained dependent on its leaders, and are therefore changed frequently in accordance with developments in world politics.

Russia's Near Abroad and Neighbourhood Policies: The Case of Relations with Türkiye

On global issues, Putin's Russia has different ideas, which cannot be described by such concepts as friendship, dialogue and understanding. This line of policy is also true for Russian foreign policy regarding near abroad and neighbouring countries. Not only with Putin, but throughout history, Russia has followed an imperialist policy of "divide and rule". Alongside of this, Russia also adheres to the idea of "control and occupy" when necessary. It has resorted to a range of means to reach its final target concerning relations with neighbours, even if it ends in occupation. This approach did not change after the Bolshevik revolution, as we witnessed in the cases of Eastern Europe, and even in Afghanistan. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Putin has invaded Ukraine, and makes open threats, including nuclear ones, to any country who attempts to stand in his way.

Initially, Putin assumed RF was powerful enough to quickly takeover Ukraine. However, he not only miscalculated the power of the RF but also that of Ukraine. Most likely, he also underestimated the reaction of the global community, let alone those of the western countries. It is difficult to say what the long-term consequences of the war will be, but Putin's Russia is certainly losing ground as well as the image of a superpower. In addition, the RF is increasingly becoming isolated by the global community, forcing Putin to seek out alternative friendships and alliances.

Therefore, Putin has sought to establish closer relations with Türkiye as its neighbour, and keep a strong personal friendship with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The friendship represents one of convenience, as Erdoğan also needs Russia and Putin for many reasons including economy, trade, finance, tourism and energy. Their styles of leadership also create additional reasons for coming together as "friends". Also, the case of Türkiye is indeed very instructive from many perspectives to understand Russian foreign policy towards its neighbours. In the last chapter

(chapter eight) of this book, I discuss and analyse this case in detail together with the help of Harun Semercioğlu and Çağlar Söker. Considering the reality of a long history that shapes Russia's relations with Türkiye, this chapter seeks essentially to provide the factors and actors that affect reasons behind the dynamics of continuity and change in Russian foreign policy towards Türkiye.

As we note at the beginning of the analysis, Russia and Türkiye share some common features, but their relationship historically has not been a friendly one. Until very recently, they did not approach each other as a friend or an ally, but as a rival if not an enemy. Despite a few historical turning points that created conditions for cooperation in the past, they have generally fought each other since Russia's emergence as a nation-state after the sixteenth century. Both nations played the role of dominant other in the construction of each other's national identity. Even today, Putin makes references to the Turks as the enemies of Slavic peoples and reminds how the world how Russians saved Ukrainians from the yoke of the Ottomans in the past, to justify its occupation in Ukraine.

The main arguments of the final chapter of the book can be summed up as follows: The first and most important reason behind Russia's attitude towards the Turks is related to their historical encounters. First, they fought each other for many centuries to take the control of the region once habited by the Turks from Vladivostok to Moscow. Second, they have different religious identities. Third, Russia as the head of communist block and Türkiye as the member of NATO fell in different ideological camps during the Cold War, and this state of international politics imposed in a broad sense different foreign policies based on rivalry and conflict. The Soviet Union regarded Türkiye as a puppet of NATO. Certainly, the end of the Cold War helped in changing Russia's attitude towards Türkiye, and Ankara recognized the new Russian Federation soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

However, until the beginning of 2000s, Russian foreign policy towards Türkiye remained unchanged despite some positive developments in their relations. According to the authors of the chapter, since then Putin and Erdoğan have succeeded in coming together to solve bilateral and regional problems through summit diplomacy, and by focusing on issues that mutually benefit both nations – domestically and internally. This rapprochement is also

related to the personal friendship and direct relations between Putin and Erdoğan. In addition, common economic interests in foreign trade, finance, tourism, energy, and investments must be considered as factors that play roles in the development of closer relations. Thirdly, it has grown as a result of the attitudes of the Western world towards Erdoğan's Türkiye and Putin's Russia.

Conclusion

In closing, this chapter has underlined some key points about Russian foreign policy. First, Russia has historically been the state of tsars since the Middle Ages with grandiose expectations and expansionist policies. Second, Russia is the largest terrestrial country in the world with huge natural resources. Three, Russia is a great power with nuclear weapons. Four, Russian leaders, and more aggressively since the rise of Vladimir Putin, have sought to reassert and put into practice tsarist ideas and values in contemporary Russia. However, as this book notes, there are many actors and factors that play a role in the making of Russian foreign policy, some more prominent than others. In the following chapters, this book seeks to provide an in-depth analysis, one that is multilateral, multi-layered and multifaceted, to consider all of the material and ideational reasons and elements that play a role in the making of foreign policy.

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RUSSIANS AND RUSSIA IN WORLD POLITICS: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sezgin Kaya

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia emerged as the largest and most powerful successor state. However, Russia found itself in a completely changed strategic environment. For nearly 45 years, the strategic balance with the US collapsed and the Country faced deep economic and social crises. Another important problem the country faced was the fragmentation of decision-making mechanisms and thus leadership in its foreign policy. This problem remained until the mid-1990s. Perhaps the most important problem was Russia's adaptation to the changing international conditions and new environment going from a bipolar to multipolar system. In addition to the United States, Russia now had to deal with other global and regional actors such as Western Europe, China and Japan (Arbatov, 1993: 6–8).

Under these new conditions, Russian foreign policy during the 1990s had three main priorities. The first was to ensure political stability in the former Soviet geography through the prevention and resolve of armed conflicts. The second priority was to prevent the emergence of regional hegemony in Europe, South Asia, and the Far East, which could be used to spread to the regions that were once part of the Soviet Union. And the third priority was to preserve the globally inherited position from the Soviet Union and to maintain certain functions vital to its prestige and status to engage in world affairs (Arbatov, 1994: 13). Other goals, such as the realization of democratic reforms or economic revival, relations with the rest of the world, the maintenance of great power status, and survival as an integrated and sovereign state were dependent on these priorities.

Although Russia has managed to return to the international system as an important actor, it has not been an easy or quick process. Russia historically, and even today, has had to address

a range of security concerns, the three most important being occupation, domestic unrest and loss of national reputation respectively. These fears stem from Russia's geography, history, and former empire status, which have influenced the country's security policies. For this reason, Russia's foreign policies have remained preoccupied in preventing these dangers. The military policies pursued by the country have also been largely shaped within the framework of these dangers (Galeotti, 1995: 19).

For the remainder of this chapter, it will examine the factors that have guided the foreign policy of Russia throughout its history, showing continuity between the Russian Federation (RF) and its predecessor. Section one begins by retracing the emergence of the Russian nation and then the state, as both part of Europe and yet set apart from it due to historical circumstances. Then in section two it examines the rise of the Romanov Dynasty and how during the Tsarist regime, Russia underwent a contradictory modernization process that was imposed top-down, often through violence, illustrating discrepancies between the horizontal culture of the people and the vertical culture of the state that have remained constant throughout Russian history. Next in the third section, it explores how Tsarist Russia became involved in the European state system, which led Russia to be the most powerful actor, but later to its end after its defeat in the Crimean War and the onset of the Revolution of 1917. Section four analyses the overthrow of the Romanov Dynasty by the Bolshevik's in 1917 and the beginning of the Soviet rule in Russia that would last till 1991. Finally, section five concludes with the Break-up of the Soviets and the new RF, who would find itself in a new era, yet never abandoning its claim of a great power just as its predecessors.

The Emergence of Russian Nation

Different perspectives on the origins of the Russians and the Russian state can roughly be divided into two arguments – the Norman theory and the anti-Norman theory. The Norman theory, which is widely accepted by the West, traces the roots of Russian culture (e.g. religion, customs, political structure, law and art) to the Normans, and claims they arrived in the Russian lands in the 9th century and reigned until the mid-11th century. Slavs, from this perspective of history, are therefore given little credit of the

formation of Russian culture and state.

The anti-Norman theory however argues the Norman influence on Russian culture was minimal, instead suggesting the history of the Eastern Slavs as much older (Riasanovsky, 1947: 109-110). Among the different interpretations of anti-Norman theory that exist, the Eurasian perspective of Russian history is the most widely supported and accepted. Although Russia is located between Asia and Europe, the Eurasian history perspective argues that it is fundamentally different and set apart from the two regions. One significant feature of this historical understanding is the rejection of the Western civilization, referred to as the Roman-Germanic civilization (Mazurek, 2002: 108). The Russian nation is considered a mix of Eastern Slavs who settled in forested regions and nomadic Turonian tribes of the Eurasian Steppe. This perspective maintains that the Russian name dates back to the 4th century, 500 years before the Varangians (or *Varyag*) came. Eurasians claim the Norman theory is widely accepted in the West to diminish Russian history. Soviet history also adopted and supported this argument, claiming that the largest cultural centers at the beginning of Russian history was the Muslim world and Byzantium, not the Normans (Ataöv, 1968c: 216; Purtaş, 2005: 10).

Additionally, indigenous-nationalist movements in Russia support the Eurasian perspective, rejecting the idea of a radical break from the past, preferring instead to bring history and traditions to the forefront. As with other nations in the world, it is assumed that the longer back a nation can trace its historical origins, the more valid it will be (Ögün, 2000: 22-24). This often leads to an attempt to reinterpret history, involving the invention of a “golden age” that reinforces the sense of superiority (Ortaylı, 2004). The quest for the golden age is also important for renewing and reforming a culture thought to be threatened by the “other” (Jaffrelot, 1998: 69). For example, Russian historian Nikolay Mikhailovich Karamzin portrayed pre-15th century Russia, before the Mongol invasion, as a golden age that embraced democracy, equality, prosperity and happiness unlike medieval Europe (Thaden, 1954: 514). However, the accuracy of such claims is highly controversial since many historians identify the period between 1000 -1500 A.D. as dominated by people from the Eurasian Steppe, especially Turks and Mongols (Sander, 2000a: 48). It was only in the 18th and 19th centuries that the Russian

Empire achieved its great power status. The Moscow State formerly was a small principality that tried to spread to the south and east in the 16th century (Holden, 1994: 23).

Another problem with the Eurasian interpretation is Russia's historiography that has been inspired by three different sources of political inspiration, especially during the 19th and 20th centuries. The first glorified the state mechanism, the second glorified the peasant commune and the third glorified the Bolsheviks. These sources brought the concept of loyalty to the state (*gosudarstvennost*), the whole people (*narodnost*), and the communist party (*partiinnost*) into prominence. In this context, in the period of 1800-1850 Russia, the statist ideas were the main source of inspiration, in 1850-1900 period the populist tendency increased, and in the 20th century the history of the Party was brought to the fore. In short, from the 1800s onwards, Russian historiography discourse has either adopted a loyalty to the state, the people or the party (Sounders, 1984). The fluctuations in historiography discourse, although contradictory, reflect the changing power centers. Following this discussion about the origins of the Russian nation, this section turns its attention to the emergence of the Russian state.

The Formation of the Russian State

Beginning with the foundation and rise of the Grand Duchy of Moscow (Knyazhestvo Moskovskoye) in the 1500s, referred to as the modernization period, three different Russian states have been established on the same geographical area, with the same political culture, each representing in many respects the continuation of each other – Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation. Even though there are claims that Kiev Russia was the first Russian state, it remains historically debated.

Towards the middle of the 9th century, Eastern Slavs gathered around two cities, Kiev and Novgorod. Towards the end of this century, the Russians around Kiev established the first central state “Drevniy Russia”. In this period, under the rule of Vladimir I (980-1015), Russians were introduced to Christianity after he accepted Orthodox Christianity and the Cyrillic alphabet in 988, both of which have placed a decisive role in Russian identity. After the official adoption of Christianity, the Russian Church

became affiliated as a metropolitan to the Byzantine Patriarchate. The new religion was adopted as a means of bringing communities together that were scattered in different parts of Russia. However, the life of Kiev Russia did not last long, and the state collapsed with the Mongol raids that followed the internal division process that started in the mid-11th century. After the conquest that began in 1237 and took place in 1240, the Mongols reigned in the region which has represented present day Russia for approximately 240 years (Purtaş, 2005: 11; Ataöv, 1968c: 230–237).

During Kiev Russia, the Russians had close relations with European nations, and even adopted some of its social and political institutions. However, after the conquest of Kiev and the subsequent Mongol rule, Russia was completely separated from the West (Guins, 1963: 355). While Russia was preoccupied with the Mongol invasions, the “new Europe” took shape in the West with the Renaissance and Reform movements of which Russia was left out of (Kohn, 1962: 4). At the same time, trans-ocean discoveries began, followed by the scientific revolution (Szeftel, 1964b: 230–233).

The rise of the Grand Duchy of Moscow coincided with the beginning of the weakening period of the Mongol rule. In the 14th century, Moscow won the struggle to become the Great Principality of Tver, which was another Russian city-state. In 1328, Ivan I (1325-1340), known as Kalita, became the head of Grand Duchy of Moscow. Since then, Moscow has sought to unite Russian territory (Ataöv, 1969: 3). Moscow, which gathered scattered Russian principalities under its rule, now represents present day Russia (Kurat, 1999: 89). Over time, the Grand Duchy of Moscow became a political centre for all of Russia (d’Encausse, 2003: 51–52).

In 1480, Russia was completely freed of Mongol rule under the leadership of Ivan III (1462-1505), otherwise known as Ivan the Great. Until that time, most of the Russian territory was dominated by the Golden Horde state, the capital of which was Kazan. Grand Duchy of Moscow was also subject to this state, which was the successor of Genghis Khan Empire (McNeil, 2007: 458). Beginning with Ivan III, the Grand Duchy of Moscow used all of its power to bring the Slavic tribes under his rule and Russian expansionism continued for another 250 years. Russia, which was originally a small principality, became “a power that

turns into a giant by eating its neighbours” (Tilly, 1995: 261-266).

Ivan III declared himself to be the last of the Byzantine emperors and adopted the Byzantine double-headed eagle as the state coat of arms. After his son and successor to the throne Vasily III died (1533), Russia became a state and an important centre of power. Under the rule of Ivan IV (1533-1547) or Ivan the Terrible, he was the first among Russian rulers to use the title of Tsar. Moreover, the Tsar had this title approved by the Orthodox Church, making himself the Holy-Roman Germanic emperor (Tilly, 1995: 260-268).

After Ivan IV, Russia entered an important but troublesome period between 1598 to 1613, known as the “Time of Troubles”, where the country was the scene of constant power fights. Without a ruler to ascend to the throne, Russia’s national existence was placed in danger. Poland and Sweden wanted to take advantage of this situation to bring its Russian opponents to their knees. In 1609, the King of Poland Sigismund III declared war on Russia and demanded the Russian crown. However, the idea of a Catholic king ascending to the throne was too much for the Russian people to bear, triggering them to fight back. In 1612 the Russian nation was resurrected and defeated the Poles and the Swedes. Following this struggle, the Zemski Sobor, an advisory assembly of the land made up of representatives from the ecclesiastical and monastic authorities, the boyar council, the landowning classes, and the urban freemen, gathered on May 2, 1613 to elect Mikhail Romanov (1613-1645) as the tsar of Russia. This initiated the period of Romanov dynasty in Russia, which lasted until 1917 (d’Encausse, 2003: 71–73; Kurat, 1999: 213).

Modernization Movements and the Search for Identity

Following the end of the Mongol rule, Moscow began to re-establish relations with the Western world. However, for two reasons, it would not be possible for this country to reintegrate into the West and therefore to modernize. The first of these was the decision of the Florence Council in 1439, which forced the Russians and the Greeks to adopt the Pope’s authority. After the Byzantine Emperor made contact with the Papacy in Rome due to the increasing Ottoman-Turkish danger, it was decided with the consensus reached in Florence in 1439 to unite the two churches

under the superior authority of the Pope. The Russians however did not accept this decision and dismissed Isidore, the Metropolitan of Moscow, who approved it. In 1443, a council of Russian Bishops condemned the union with the Rome and establish the Union of Churches. Moreover, any contact with Rome was forbidden and the Russian Church left the Istanbul Patriarchate. In a way, the Russian Church became a national Church by breaking its ties with Byzantium, which was its main church (Kohn, 1962: 5). The second obstacle to Westernization was the conquest of Istanbul by the Turks in 1453, whereby Russians lost all ties with Byzantium and their activities in the Balkans. As a result of these developments, Russia's relations were once again broken with the West (Kurat, 1999: 102; d'Encausse, 2003: 52–53).

Despite Russia's disconnection and separation, historically it has sought to resemble Europe. The Russian rulers sought to modernize their countries socially, economically and technologically, especially under the influence of Western Europe (Holden, 1994: 23). The first modernization movement in Russia started in the period of Tsar Alexi I (1645-1676), who tried to reform and reorganize the Russian legal system with a law enacted in 1649 to coincide with developments in Europe.

Although all members of the Romanov dynasty were involved in the modernization process in way or another until 1917, it is Peter the Great (1682–1725) who is best known for his widespread reforms in an attempt to make Russia a great nation. After the Tsar came to power, he set two important goals. The first was to ensure the empire's power, and the second was to open up to Europe. Moreover, Peter was particularly determined to reform the privileges of the noble classes, the army, and bureaucracy, to end the complex relationship between the State and the ruler. The Tsar, who placed the state above the ruler, saw himself as the first of the state servants. On the other hand, past institutions such as the Boyars Assembly and Zemski Sobor were abolished, and a State Senate was established in their place. Through these reforms, the state was in fact intended to resemble its European counterparts.

Despite Peter's efforts, "old" Moscow traditions continued to persist in other parts of the country. The state people in Moscow and St. Petersburg encountered was not the same for people in other parts of Russia (d'Encausse, 2003: 104–117). This dual

structure remained one of the most important problems of the Russian modernization process.

Another hindrance to modernization was the disconnection between the elites and the people. Undoubtedly, Peter's reforms influenced the elite of the country and altered their behaviour and mentality to some extent. However, the church remained an obstacle, of which he considered a conservative, ignorant and outdated structure. When attempting to weaken the power hold of the Church, he faced resistance. For Peter, the Church symbolized ancient Russia, which the people had tried to eradicate. For this reason, he implemented a revolutionary reform in 1721 abolishing the Patriarchate and replacing it with a ministry of religious affairs, Sen Sinod. In the past, the Tsar and the Patriarchate were seen as authorities of equal weight, but with this reform, the ruler became the single authority (d'Encausse, 2003: 119–120).

In Russia, modernization efforts were continued after Peter I by Catherine II (1762–1796) otherwise known as Catherine the Great, who pursued reforms while also reshaping foreign policy to capture the West. Influenced by the Enlightenment, Catherine aimed to rule Russia with a constitutional system and develop a new society. During her lifetime, Russia made significant progress in terms of modernization efforts, even if inadequate. A new class called the intelligentsia emerged and concepts such as private property and liberalism gained acceptance in the minds of Russian elites. However, reforms during this period were imposed, representing an exceptional example of intellectual despotism.

Throughout Russian history, the modernization process has experienced periods of interruption, such as under the reign of Nicholas I (1825–1855). He ruled as a despot and came to symbolize militancy and oppression. Throughout his reign, he obsessively fought dissent and revolutionary thought inside and outside of his regime. He is remembered as reactionary and resistant to Western ideas, instead preferring to promote traditional Russian values and culture which implied the suppression of non-Russian nationalities and non-Orthodox Christian regions. Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationality were considered as the cornerstone for the stability of Russian history and the crown. Domestic political turmoil in the country and the 1848 riots in Europe also thwarted modernization in Russia (d'Encausse, 2003: 126- 144).

Reform processes regained speed under the reign of Alexander II (1855-1881). After the defeat in the Crimean War, the Tsar saw that the power of a state could only be achieved by internal development. The Tsar, who initiated a series of reforms, abolished the serfdom in 1861 by land reform. This was followed by other reforms, particularly in the area of law. The reforms initiated primarily aimed at alleviating Russia's backwardness vis-à-vis Western countries. Reform however was done selectively, as autocracy was preserved and protected under Nicholas II (1894-1917) believing it was the principal responsibility of the sovereign to maintain the system (d'Encausse, 2003: 151-184).

As illustrated, modernization in Russia has consisted of a contradictory process, whereby reforms have been imposed top-down by autocratic leaders, often carried out through violence (Holden, 1994: 28). The main problem with reform efforts was the failure of leaders to reach and receive support from the public. As Koyré (1994: 126) points out, "In Russia, the government was more enlightened than the people, the society and the nation". All kinds of 'civilizing' activity and forward-looking moves came from government. Therefore, modernization was perceived by the people in Russia as the external influence of the West carried out by elites, encouraging them to reject their ancestral traditions. As a result, discrepancies between the horizontal culture of the people and the vertical or high culture of the state has remained constant in Russian life (d'Encausse, 2003: 81-83, 95).

The European System of States and Russia

Although Russia progressed differently than the Western World, it remained part of the European states system during the Tsarist regime when Russia gained the great power status. Following the signing of the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, ending the Thirty Years War, the Westphalian system was established serving as a new system of international relations. It represented the end of dynastic wars, causing traditional ties in international relations to lose their effectiveness. Interstate relations were now explained by the concept of balance of power in both theory and practice (Sander, 2000a). Conflicts and cooperation between states would now be based on common interests and rational choices based on calculations, rather than on religious or dynastic ties (Hartmann, 2006: 245-246). With these treaties, *raison d'état*

doctrine became the guiding principle of European diplomacy, rather than moral rules (Kissinger, 1998: 50-51).

This system, born in Europe and then spread all over the globe, was initially based on a limited number of great powers, with Russia being one of them. It wasn't until the 17th century that other Eastern European states began to play an important role in the great wars in Europe. Since the Treaties of Westphalia, Russia, along with the Ottoman Empire, intensively participated in European wars. For example, Russia entered its first important alliance in Europe in 1680. By 1682, Russia began to cooperate with the Austrian, Polish, Venetian and German states against the Ottoman Empire. After the Ottoman's defeat at the Battle of Vienna 1683, Russia joined the anti-Ottoman "Holy League" formed between Polish-German states and Venice (Kurat, 1999: 237).

Under the leadership of Peter I (1682-1725) otherwise known as Peter the Great, Russia's mobility in Europe and participation in the international system as an active player increased. As an empire and great power, Peter's primary goal was to reach the warm seas. Peter's victory against Poland and Sweden in the Great Northern War (1700-1721), subsequent settlement in the Baltic region, and Poltava and the Nyastad opened up the pathway to Europe. When Peter died in 1725, Russia had already become one of the most powerful states in Europe (Kurat, 1999; Sander, 2000a). By the end of the 1730s, Russia was a state that regularly participated in most of the wars in Europe. With its enlarged and modernized army, Russia was now "a valuable ally and a terrible enemy" for the European states. This was in line with Peter's project, which sought to increase the role of his empire in Western European diplomacy and conflicts (Tilly, 1995: 275).

Following Peter I, nearly all of his successors involved Russia in European wars. Russia for example was involved in the Seven Years War (1756-1763), the last major conflict to involve all the great powers of Europe before the French Revolution (Armaoğlu, 1999: 26). Russia, with its allies France, Saxony and Sweden, and Austria, fought against Prussia, Hanover and Great Britain. The Russians defeated the Prussian army in 1760, and for a short time occupied Berlin. The war eventually was brought to an end with the Treaty of Paris in 1763 (McNeil, 2007: 549).

Like her predecessor, Catherine II prioritized Russia's foreign policy, focusing mainly on Poland and the Ottoman Empire, while aggressively pursuing imperialist policies. Catherine faced the Ottoman Empire twice in the 1768-74 and 1787-92 wars and was involved in the partitioning of Poland three times (1772, 1793, 1795) (d'Encausse, 2003: 132-133). After the Revolutionary or Napoleonic Wars, Russia along with Britain emerged as the most powerful European powers. Following the revolution, France's aggressive foreign policy in Europe and subsequent wars, caused Russia to take part in coalitions against it. Russia sent its famous commander General Suvorov to Northern Italy and then to Austria to fight against the French. In addition, a group of Russian soldiers, alongside of the British, struggled against the French in the Netherlands. For a short while, in the early 1800s, Russia and France came closer and agreed to fight against the British (Kurat, 1999: 295-296).

However, after Napoleon declared himself emperor in 1804 and attempted to become the hegemon of Europe, Russia went back to supporting anti-French coalitions of states. As Napoleon moved East, he defeated the Russian troops who were among the coalition forces in the Austerlitz war in 1805 and the Friedland war in 1807. With the Tilsit peace in 1807, the relations between the two countries were restored and they agreed to share domination over Europe with the French in Western Europe and the Russians in Eastern Europe. Moreover, these two countries acted together against England. Following his defeat at Trafalgar in 1805, Napoleon decided to implement a policy called "Continental System" against Britain. Russia, which was initially reluctant to participate, subsequently joined the system, but tried to disrupt it. Therefore, the agreement between Tilsit and the two countries did not last long.

Following these developments, Napoleon in 1812 started a Russian Campaign, a move that fatefully would bring his reign to an end. In the face of Napoleon, who invaded Moscow, the Tsar did not surrender and managed to defend itself against the French in the Smolensk and Borodino battles of 1812, which is of great historical importance in Russian history. The intense winter conditions, as well as the lack of replenishment of the French army, led Napoleon to withdraw his army unable to declare a decisive defeat, also called "Grande Armée".

In the period following these developments, Russians managed to completely remove Napoleon from their lands. In the Battle of the Nations near Leipzig in 1813, Napoleon was once again defeated by the coalition forces led by the Russians. In 1814, the Allied forces (Russia, Austria and Prussia) crossed the French border and entered Paris and defeated Napoleon March 31 at the Battle of Paris, leading to his dethronement and exile to the island of Elba (Hobsbawm, 1998a: 100; Kurat, 1999: 301–309; Armaoğlu, 1999: 71–73).

Following the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, emperors, kings, princes, ministers and representatives came together between 1814–1815 at the Congress of Vienna to negotiate territorial issues and the Great Powers went further by seeking to create a new political system in Europe, a ‘System of Peace’ that would last until the outbreak of World War I in 1914. Russia emerged as the most powerful state in continental Europe, both in terms of its military power and territory. Meanwhile, Russia had become a general source of fear for Europe (Kohn, 1962: 7). However, as this next section discusses, the process that initially made Russia the most powerful actor in the system came to an end with the Crimean War

The Fall of Tsarist Russia in World Politics

Following the post-Napoleonic era, the Holy Alliance was created upon the initiation of Russian Tsar Alexander I (1777 – 1825) and included the emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia with the aim of preserving social order and restoring European boundaries after the fall of Napoleon empire. In reality, the alliance of conservative rulers achieved nothing but rather it served as a vague attempt to base international relations on Christian principles (Sander, 2000a: 160–161; Armaoğlu, 1999: 100–104).

Additionally, the Concert of Europe emerged from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and included the Quadruple Alliance of powers – Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, who sought to protect the absolutist regimes in Europe and suppress the ongoing revolutions in Europe. Later in 1818 France would join making it the Quintuple Alliance transforming the structure and establishing a system that brought moderate and plausible

solutions and incorporated them into a network of mutual agreements (Schroeder, 2000: 159-160). The logic behind the order was based on the prevention any single power, such as Napoleon did between 1793–1815, to forcibly impose their will on the rest of Europe. The system aimed to preserve peace by concerted diplomatic action to deal with issues of mutual concern and maintain a balance of power to prevent any state from controlling the international system. For example, minor territorial changes had to be approved by the majority of the other states that were party to the treaty (Kennedy, 1996: 163). In reality, the system was characterized by two hegemonies of power – England in Western Europe and Russia in Eastern Europe. However, both allowed small powers to form areas of influence, therefore making their power hold less apparent (Schroeder, 2000: 161).

Despite its initial success of the system established after 1815, it did not prevent the formation of a series of military alliances over time. The Russian Tsar Nicholas I became known as a militant autocrat, who opposed ideologically rising liberalism and democracy, further reinforcing the fear of Russia in Western Europe. In addition, the ambitious policies pursued by the Tsar and the Pan-Slavic tendency in this country were perceived as a threat by the West. Panslavism advocated the unity of Slavic peoples under the leadership of Russia which meant its influence could spread all over Europe (Hammen, 1952: 27–31). Although Russia was one of the most important actors in the European state system in 19th century, it was also the biggest obstacle to European revolutions. During this period, Russia became a thoroughly militarized and bureaucratized autocracy (Skocpol, 2004: 165).

In many respects, Russia was at the forefront of the developments that resulted in the collapse of the Concert of Europe. Although the principles of the Holy Alliance supported monarchies against separatist movements, Russia backed anti-Ottoman rebellions since nearly all of the states set to be established in the Balkans were Orthodox and about half of them were Slavic. Russia considered itself the protector of the Christian orthodox Balkan peoples and hoped with the rise of the new states, they would come under its influence (Halecki, 1952: 19). Its long-term goal was to capture Constantinople, to control the Bosphorous, and the Dardanelles straits which would offer Russia direct access to the Mediterranean. Russia sought to expand its influence in the Black Sea region and the Caucasus.

With the slow disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th and 20th century, the Eastern Question increasingly became a concern and point of contention amongst European powers, as each feared the other might try to take advantage of the political chaos to expand its own influence. He sought to persuade the European powers to divide up the territory of the Ottoman Empire amongst themselves. However, he faced resistance, and the diverging interests came to a head in 1853 with the outbreak of the Crimean War where an anti-Russian alliance was formed by the British and French who chose to continue supporting the Ottoman Empire to keep Russia out of Europe and maintain the current balance of power by thwarting Russian expansion (Sander, 2000a: 273–275).

After the defeat in the Crimean War in 1856, it revealed the weaknesses of the Russian autocracy to modernize the country, despite later attempts of Tsar Alexander II to introduce land and legal reforms in 1861 (Hobsbawm, 1998b: 181) It also demonstrated the inadequacy of Russian development, providing a suitable environment for the regime's opponents within the country that later would lead to the Revolution in 1917 (d'Encausse 2003: 191). Although the regime survived for another 60 years, it was no longer the absolute power of Europe and the tsarist legend ended (Palmer, 1999: 244–245).

Taking advantage of Russia's apparent weakness, Austria invaded Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 which brought Russia and the Balkan Slavs closer to each other. The Balkan crisis of 1908–1909 emerged from Germany's attempt to make this fait accompli, which was already realized by Austria-Hungary, approved by Russia. In 1912, the Balkan coalition of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro took action against the Ottomans, the Russians maximized their diplomatic activities in the Balkans. At the outset of World War I, Russia declared that its main goal was to liberate all Slavs (Lavrin, 1962: 18–19; Kennedy, 1996: 295).

The main reason for Russia's entry into the war was due to its imperial aims. Although initially Russia seemed to act for the purpose of protecting Serbia, it had two other alternative aims –to conquer Constantinople and the Straits, and to regain control of Poland, including the lands left in Prussia and Austria in 1815 (Halecki, 1952: 19). From the beginning of the war, Russia fought in this region, known as the eastern front of Eastern Europe.

However, Russia was no match against Germany in this struggle. Although they initially managed to advance into the territory of East Prussia, Russian troops later had to retreat. The defeat of Russia at Tannenberg against the Germans would be its first major defeat in this war. Russia did not make any gains, and its situation only worsened in 1915–16 period. With the onset of the Revolution of 1917, Russia was forced to pull out of the war (McNeil, 2007: 695; Kurat, 1999: 413).

With the rise of Germany, Russia sought to join the alliances that emerged in Europe, perceiving Germany and the Central powers as a threat. The Russians, who turned to Western European states, joined the Anglo-French block, so that after 1907 there were two forces left in the European diplomatic game –the tripartite alliance and the German-Austrian alliance.

By joining this alliance, Russia inevitably became involved in WWI. Upon losing the war, Russia downgraded to a second-rate power (Kennedy, 1996: 294). For this reason, Russian Tsar Nicholas II turned to the West again to establish activities in the Balkans, restarting the Slav-Germanic struggle in the region. This issue was one of the most important tensions in the pre-World War I period (Sander, 2000a: 239; Armaoğlu, 1999: xxii).

The Revolution of 1917 and the Birth of Soviet Russia

Despite internal and external problems, the despotic and autocratic Russian Tsarism survived until the World War I. However, the Revolution of 1917 brought the end of Tsarist Russia. From the beginning of the 20th century, the country was already in a political and economic crisis. The Russian intelligentsia turned to socialist views concerning labour movements, the oppressive political environment, and the conviction that the public paid too much for the sake of progress. In addition, the intelligentsia was no longer content with the opposition it carried out in confined spaces, and therefore sought to teach its ideas to the working class (d'Encausse, 2003: 190).

By March 8, 1917 (or according to the Julian Calendar February), the opponents of the regime increased in numbers and strength with crowds of demonstrators joining striking industrial workers who took to the streets to protest sparking the revolution

that forced the Tsar to abdicate from the throne ending centuries of Romanov rule. Meanwhile the Duma formed a provisional government to maintain the war the country was in and develop a new constitutional order. However, unrest continued with a second coup d'état in November (or October according to the Julian Calendar) of the same year, overthrowing the provisional government, followed by the Bolshevik wing of the Social Democratic Party coming to power in Russia (McNeil, 2007: 696). Following this development, the Tsarist regime officially ended and Russia entered a new period in which it would move away completely from the West. Despite the Western ideas and modernist structure on which the revolution was built, the new regime and state shifted to an ideologically and politically anti-Western stance.

Vladimir Lenin's views were decisive in determining the foreign policy as the head of the new state. Both Lenin and Leon Trotsky, another important figure of the revolution, believed in the redundancy of foreign policy. No diplomacy or foreign policy would be needed if the state disappeared as the ideology predicted. The early Bolsheviks developed theories of war associated with class conflict and imperialism. However, they had little understanding on how to conduct foreign policy among sovereign states. For many of the first communist leaders, they believed a world revolution would take place immediately. Never would they have imagined they would live side-by-side with capitalist countries for so many years. Rather they assumed that if the revolution was delayed, only then would it be necessary to confront the capitalist countries. Therefore, the main task of Soviet foreign policy was not to maintain inter-state relations, but to encourage world revolution (Kissinger, 1998: 224; Macmillan, 2003: 79).

Despite the Soviet's approach to foreign policy, its ideology had little impact on it. Rather other variables such as capacity, perceived opportunities, personalities of leaders, internal groups and their interests, as well as excessive desires resulting from institutional and functional pressures influenced Soviet foreign policy. In many respects, the Soviet foreign policy was very similar to traditional Russian policy followed during the Tsardom, especially in matters of national security, borders and power (Gönlübol, 1968: 172).

The two most apparent similarities between the two regimes were in foreign policy and relations with the Western powers. Both perceived the West as a clear threat. However, the reactions of Soviet Russia to the West often differed depending on the circumstances of the state. For example, in the early years of the revolution, the Bolsheviks abandoned their nationalist mobilization during the civil war and accepted becoming smaller in terms of old imperial lands. The necessity of consolidating a revolution resulted from the defeat of World War I which led Russian leaders to pursue defensive, reactive and almost non-disseminating policies during the 1917-1921 period (Skocpol, 2004: 403).

Undoubtedly, one of the most important reasons for consolidating the revolution was the civil war that broke out in the country immediately after World War I. The Bolsheviks had withdrawn Russia from the ongoing war, but a bloody struggle had begun within the country from 1918 to 1920. During the civil war, some Western forces militarily intervened in the country and occupied some parts of it. While the Bolsheviks were conducting the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, many regions within the empire declared their independence initiated by Ukraine, Estonia, Finland, Moldova, and Latvia. After signing the agreement, Lithuania and Trans-Caucasus countries also declared their independence. In 1918, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan also declared their independence.

The Brest-Litovsk Agreement of 1917 was the first serious diplomacy test of the new Soviet state between the Central Power and Ukraine to end hostilities between each other during WWI. Although the Soviet government initiated the peace treaty, they attempted to stall the proceedings. German responded with demands, requesting independence for the Polish and Baltic territories formerly belonging to the Russian Empire and Ukraine. When the Soviet's again attempted to stall, Germany responded with an attack and the Bolsheviks had no choice but to make concessions to avoid a total defeat. Lenin aimed to preserve the very new and uncertain future of the revolutionary process in this way (Macmillan, 2003: 68). The agreement confirmed that the Soviet Union would exit WWI, breaking ties with the Allied Powers, and give up Ukrainian, Polish and the Baltic territories and Finland, given it was too weak to survive the continuation

of war. Despite Germany's strong position at the beginning of 1918, after the Soviet Union pulled out of the war, a few events changed the course of history in the Allies favour: Britain and France strongly attacked Germany after the "Michael Offensive" in March 1918, the German navy went on strike, and the USA joined the Allies in the war in April 2017. Germany was therefore forced to surrender on 11 November 1918 officially ending WWI.

When Lenin passed away in 1924, two different approaches emerged within the Party – the "permanent revolution" supported by Trotsky and "socialism in one country" supported by Joseph Stalin. Due to the backwardness of Russia, a dominantly agrarian economy with minimal industry, both Trotsky and Stalin agreed that it had been necessary to establish an alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry to overthrow the bourgeoisie which is however unorthodox according to Marxist theory. The two nevertheless diverged in their ideas on how to bring about the socialist revolution. Trotsky was less optimistic than Stalin about the Soviet's abilities to bring about the socialist revolution on its own. Instead, he sought to export and support communist revolutions in advanced capitalist economies to bring technologies to Russia and avoid capitalist hostilities. Stalin however, believed Soviet Russia had enough resources and technology at its disposal to defend itself and develop a socialist model along the lines of the bourgeoisie, however always maintaining the communist vision. It was assumed that once power and resources were consolidated, and security obtained, Soviet Russia would provide a socialist model that would revolt against the capitalist world and naturally attract other oppressed classes in other countries to follow suit and overthrow their capitalist classes. The theory put forth by Stalin in the end was accepted, determining the general framework of the foreign policy that Soviet Russia would follow in the period between WWI and WWII.

Under Stalin's rule, Russians gave up the idea of world revolution. Undoubtedly, the most important reason was that the Soviet Union, like Tsarist Russia, was located in the European state system which placed it geographically at risk of conflict. Instead, the Soviet leaders focused on carrying out rapid industrial development in the economy and military. The relative weakness of the country and the lack of material conditions supporting its ideological aims, made the Soviet Union pursue more moderate

policies in its relations with the West. Especially between 1925-1930, Soviet foreign policy made a significant contribution to the peace and was asked to join the League of Nations in 1934 as a permanent member on the council. Soviet decision-makers benefited from all the subtleties of its foreign policy, which they initially had believed to be unnecessary.

In the process leading up to World War II however, the Soviet Union appeared to be a “non-fighting ally.” Stalin’s greatest fear was the possibility that all capitalist countries would act jointly against the Soviets. When the danger of Hitler became clear, Stalin initially sought a policy of rapprochement with Germany to appease its ideological rival, signing in 1939 a non-aggression pact. With Stalin’s “master work” diplomacy, he made significant gains long before entering the war. Thanks to his secret alliance with the Germans, half of Poland was seized, three Baltic states were invaded, and then he pursued Finland however failing to capture the country. Finland, in response, applied to the League of Nations declaring the Soviet Union as an aggressive state and demanded it be removed from membership of the organization, which it later was.

Meanwhile, Stalin in 1940 took Bessarabia and Bukovina from Romania, succeeding to take back nearly all his country’s territories that had been lost at the end of World War I (McNeil, 2007: 706; Kissinger, 1998: 326). Then, Stalin signed a pact with Japan, like the one made with Germany. The Soviets sought to eliminate the danger of a two-sided war. The main purpose of this agreement, signed in Moscow on 13 April 1941, was to keep the war out of Soviet territory for the Russians (Kissinger, 1998: 335).

Despite Stalin’s attempts to stay out of war through strict diplomatic negotiations, neutrality in the Allied – Axis conflict, and secret protocols, tensions grew in German-Russian relations. One of the first triggers was the Triple Pact signed between Germany, Japan and Italy on 27 September 1940, increasing Stalin’s fears and suspicions that eventually Soviet Russia would become a target. Another important factor was Hitler’s invasion of France. Hitler, like Napoleon, believed that there were two major obstacles for expansion. The first was England in the west, and the second was Russia in the east. After dealing with France, Hitler became alarmed by Stalin’s expansion in the Baltics. For

this reason, Germany attacked Russia without even declaring war and began an operation known as Barbarossa (Kissinger, 1998: 327; Ataöv, 1985: 91).

After being attacked June 22, 1941, Russia joined the major Allied powers – Britain, France, and the USA against the major Axis powers – Germany, Japan and Italy. Between 1942-1944, World War II continued mainly on the Russian front. The Germans, who reached Stalingrad in 1942 with a massive attack, were able to move up to the Volga River. However, towards the end of 1942 and in 1943 Russians managed to repel the Germans and forced the occupation forces to withdraw from Russia. By the end of the summer of 1944, Russian troops now crossed the country's pre-war borders and moved towards Berlin, the decisive battle that brought an end to the war (McNeil, 2007: 708, 711).

Despite having the highest level of casualties and damage from the war, Russia nevertheless occupied nearly all of Eastern Europe. These developments brought an end to the good relations established with the West during the war. Poland, occupied by both Germany and the Soviet Union during the War, officially became part of the Soviet Union in 1948. The Soviets clearly indicated that it would oppose any intervention of the West in any region they saw within their domain of influence (Sander, 2000b: 186). Therefore, former allies – Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, and victims – Poland and Czechoslovakia of the Axis were placed under the Soviet Union's control. The Soviets managed to expand Russian power over Continental Europe to the west (Tilly, 1995: 309).

When the war ended, Stalin managed to shift the borders of his country with the territories he occupied up to 600 miles west of Elbe. The weakness of Western Europe and the planned withdrawal of American forces further widened the gap in front of the Soviet armies (Kissinger, 1998: 396). Stalin was given the opportunity to socialize almost all of Eastern Europe. The “sharing of Germany” that emerged towards the end of the war showed that the Soviet Union's intention to expand in Europe was not over. At the Yalta Conference, the European Advisory Commission adopted a protocol to divide Germany by the USA, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union military forces. It was also agreed to divide Berlin into occupation zones, with the USA, Britain and France controlling the Western sections and the Soviet

Union the Eastern sector. At the Potsdam Conference, held later, basic political solutions to the problems in Europe were provided. At this conference the Allies adopted four basic principles regarding Germany. It was decided that Germany should pay war compensation, be disarmed and completely de-militarized and ultimately managed as an economic unit with a democratic constitution (Reynolds, 1973: 133).

Shortly after however, the relations between Western Allies and the Soviet Union deteriorated over Berlin due to competing occupation policies. When the USA and Britain decided to unify their zones, tensions between the East and West increased. Later, the Soviet Union withdrew from the Quadratic Control mechanism after learning about the Western Allies secret plans to create a new German state made up of their three occupation zones. Then in June 1948, without informing the Soviet Union, the Western Allies introduced the new Deutschmark to try to free the city from Soviet Union's economic control and bring about economic recovery. The Soviet Union retaliated by introduction its own counter currency the Ostmark, and then blocked access to all major rail, road and water access to Western Berlin. In response Allies countered the blockade by delivering supplies to Western Berlin by airlift. Eventually, the Soviet Union agreed to end their blockade, however the Berlin Crisis between 1948 – 1949 solidified the divisions between the West and East. These divisions were further reinforced after the Western occupation zones united to form the Federative Republic in Germany and the Soviet Union transformed the Eastern sector into the German Democratic Republic (Kennedy, 1996: 443–445; Kissinger, 1998: 519). There was now no longer the possibility of finding any common ground between the Soviet Union and the West.

The new world order created after the Yalta Conference, shifted the balance of power of international relations outside of Europe for the first time in history, from a multi-polar to bi-polar system. The next part of the study assesses the historical process that led to the Cold War.

The Cold War Period

The Cold War lasted until 1991 between two rival ideologies with different views on the future culminating into a bipolar world

order – The USA and Soviet Union. The main distinctive feature of the Cold War was its zero-sum logic based on a “win or lose” principle. However, unlike other wars, the Cold War represented a time of peace, since the struggle remained “cold” but never became a “hot” conflict (Doyle and Ikenberry, 1997: 2).

The Soviet Union, especially in the 1950s, pursued an idiocentric policy towards the West, believing that the strategic balance was in its favour with the developments in the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the deployment of the Sputnik into space, both of which increased the Soviet Union’s prestige (Sander, 2000a: 280). The West, under the leadership of the USA, followed a policy that antagonized the Soviet Union. Winston Churchill for example drew the divide between the West and the East to everyone’s attention, using the term “iron curtain” in his speech on March 5, 1946, to characterize the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet Union (Kissinger, 1998: 411).

The iron curtain discourse marginalized the communist bloc and the subsequent containment strategy formed the basis of the West’s Cold War policy. As the Soviet Union kept to itself under the iron hold of Stalin, few in the West had any experience with the communist state and therefore had little understanding what motivated it. George Kennan, known as the architect of the containment policy, provided the US government with first hand insight he had obtained while serving as Chargé d’ Affaires in Moscow, warning the US Government about the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union. He described the Soviet Union’s foreign policy as a mixture of the zealotry of communist ideology and old-fashioned Tsarist expansionism.

Later in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* under the pseudonym Mr. X in July 1947, Kennan outlined his containment strategy which became the premises of US President Harry S. Truman’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. In the article he warned, “The main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” The Truman Doctrine, declared March 12, 1947, represented the first application of the containment policy with the aim of countering the Soviet Union’s geopolitical expansion (Ataöv, 1968a: 206). The Document stated that the US Government will provide political, economic, and military aid to any democratic nation

facing any external or internal threats from an authoritarian power, although it was mainly directed towards Greece and Türkiye.

Later in 1947 a more elaborate and extensive economic recovery plan was initiated by US Secretary of State George C. Marshall named after him The Marshall Plan, otherwise referred to as the European Recovery Program (ERP). The aim was to provide substantial aid to help rebuild European economies that were severely damaged during the war and remove trade barriers to enhance commerce between the countries and the USA. Included in this initiative was economic aid to restore Germany, an idea well received by France and Britain but adamantly rejected by the Soviet Union. Additionally, the Soviet Union placed pressure on its Eastern European allies to reject any Marshall Plan Assistance, convincing them that it was a ploy by the USA to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries and impose its economic imperialism. The Marshall Plan was nevertheless passed in 1948, and over \$15 billion in economic aid was given to restore the economies of Western European countries as well as prevent the spread of communism. The Marshall Plan also served as a catalyst to establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, to provide collective security between the USA, Canada and several Western European countries against the Soviet Union (Kissinger, 1998: 441). Together the Marshall Plan and NATO were viewed by the USA as vital in preventing communist expansion across the continent.

In retaliation to the Marshall Plan, perceived by the Soviet Union as a US ploy to impose its economic imperialism, it created COMECON (Mutual Economic Assistance Council) January 25, 1949 with the aim of economic cooperation and unification of the communist bloc countries in Eastern Europe (Ataöv, 1968b: 276–81). Following the establishment of NATO and the adoption of Western Germany into the organization on October 23, 1954, the Soviet Union issued a memorandum declaring NATO as “weapon of the aggressive Anglo-American Bloc” and contrary to the Yalta and Potsdam conferences aims to establish peace and international security (Ataöv, 1968b: 300–301). For this reason, the Soviet Union took immediate action, establishing the Warsaw Pact (WP) May 14, 1955, formed together with the eight Eastern Bloc member countries.

Contrary to Soviet expectations, the communist movements in the Western countries weakened in the post-1948 period.

Revolutionary Marxism did not occur in the countries where the proletariat population was high, but rather succeeded in countries where the majority were villagers. Furthermore, communist countries were not willing to cooperate with Russia, contrary to what Marxist internationalism predicted. The new revolutions did not create a brotherhood between the communists, but rather conflicts emerged such as in Yugoslavia, when Stalin failed in 1948 to control the Country. Another unexpected development was the withdraw of colonial powers from their colonies rather than by revolution as formerly predicted (McNeil, 2007: 725–728).

After Stalin's death, Soviet foreign policy softened to reduce East-West hostility, especially between the two blocs. Soviet statesman Nikita Khrushchev, for example, in 1956 declared the principle of "peaceful coexistence" as the foundation of Soviet foreign policy in the post-Stalin period. Peaceful coexistence however did not mean the reconciliation of socialism and bourgeois ideologies, but rather it was to point out that despite the ideological and political disagreements between states they did not necessarily have to end in a war. The West nevertheless remained sceptical of this policy change and saw it as a tactical maneuver.

The policy change however was not tactical but out of practical necessity given that both systems contained nuclear weapons (Gönlübol, 1968: 171). Although the atmosphere of mistrust did not completely disappear, the USA was aware of the dangers of nuclear war and understood that cautious steps were needed which came to represent the *détente* period. Following the Cuban Crisis in 1963, Khrushchev sought reconciliation with the US to develop a unity of understanding between the two global powers that could protect the world from a thermonuclear war. Khrushchev also thought long-term stability with the USA would both strengthen his position and his country's external interests. Another expectation of Khrushchev was to establish a Soviet-American diarchy through the *détente* policy in the international community (Aspaturian, 1969: 604–607).

Unfortunately for Khrushchev he was never able to realize his goals since he was expelled from power in the Soviet Union in 1964 and replaced by Leonid Brezhnev who brought forth a period referred to as "stable Stalinism" (Purtaş, 2005: 30). Initially Brezhnev pursued the *détente* policy of the Khrushchev period,

contributing to the Helsinki Conference as the highest point of this policy. This approach however was short-lived after the Prague Spring. In response to the Prague Spring, the Brezhnev doctrine was introduced August 3, 1968 calling upon the Soviet Union to militarily intervene in countries where socialism was under threat (Cooper, 1999: 26).

Three weeks later, the Doctrine was put to the test when Soviet armed forces invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia August 20 disposing Dubček and replacing him with hardliner communist leaders who halted the reforms (Sander, 2000a: 403). For the ensuing decades, Soviet-bloc members were severely restricted by the Doctrine, and its principles were so broad that it justified and legitimized Soviet intervention in non-Warsaw Pact countries such as in the case of Afghanistan in 1979. Although the premises for intervention was for the ideological preservation of socialism, it reflected Russia's traditional understanding of "great power" and determination to maintain its sphere of influence (Aspaturian, 1969: 595).

The End of the Soviet Union

These developments also brought the end of the détente period, accelerating the US and its allies' hostilities towards the Soviet Union and its communist allies (Doyle and Ikenberry, 1997: 1). The Doctrine remained in effect until 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. With Gorbachev, sweeping transformations were made in Soviet political life. First, glasnost, the liberalization in politics, and then perestroika – the restructuring programs in 1987. Although in the early years of Gorbachev's rule he followed similar policies to his predecessors, he began to make changes following the 27th Congress of the Communist Party held in February-March 1986 (Kramer, 1989–90: 28-30).

Gorbachev's democratic reforms and the new understanding of foreign policy weakened the legitimacy of the party administration and the very idea of the Soviet Union. At the same time, it paved the way for the emergence of opposition movements organized within the country according to both liberal-democratic and nationalist principles, even though he himself did not wish to do so. Starting in 1989, at least four

different political movements within the Soviet Union began to make themselves felt. The first was reformist communists. The international aim of this movement, led by Gorbachev, was to integrate with Western economic and political systems. The second group consisted of liberal democrats led by Boris Yeltsin. They shared Gorbachev's vision of the international role of the Soviets but demanded the country's rapid transition to a market economy and democratization. The third group consisted of orthodox communists, and according to them the Soviet Union should remain a Marxist-Leninist state. The fourth group of nationalist separatists in other Soviet republics, particularly in the Baltic states, explicitly rejected the Soviet identity (Chafetz, 1996–97: 670).

The reforms initiated by Gorbachev also extended in the Soviet Union's foreign policy. In this context, a new era began with the West no longer defined as the absolute enemy. According to Gorbachev, ideological differences should not be transferred to inter-state relations, and foreign policy should not be subordinated to them. Rather Gorbachev emphasized that there should be more openness, more clarity, less tactical maneuvers and talk-and-play in international relations. The most important aspect of this new approach was the way in which the Soviet Union saw itself as a part of Europe. According to Gorbachev, Europe was a cultural and historical whole, extending from the Atlantic to the Urals, where the common heritage of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment was united (Gorbačov, 1988: 166, 210).

Gorbachev's reform process in domestic and foreign policy, even if he did not foresee this, brought an end to the Cold War that had been going on for more than 40 years between the two blocs. As a result of the political, economic and social transformation of glasnost and perestroika policies within the country, the characteristics of the Soviet system, such as Party monopoly, closedness and national unity were eroded. Several foreign political steps also led to the end of the Cold War. For example, Gorbachev terminated Soviet aid provided to the strict communist administrations of Eastern Europe since the 1950s. This also paved the way for reform initiatives in the region. On October 28, the Soviet Union declared that the member states were free to leave the alliance if they wished. This development served in many regards as the declaration of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact

(Cooper, 1999: 36).

In parallel with Gorbachev's reforms, significant internal political developments took place in Eastern European countries between 1989 – 1991. These developments affected the disintegration process of the Soviet Union. The anti-communist movements which started in Poland, then spread to other Central and Eastern European countries. The pro-Soviet governments in these countries fell and the governments changed hands. These changes primarily took place peacefully through elections as in the case of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. However, in some cases they resulted in bloodshed as in Romania and Bulgaria. The inaction attitude of the Soviet Union against these developments was encouraging for the republics of the Soviet Union (Purtaş, 2005: 47).

The eventual collapse of the Soviets came December 8, 1991 when the Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus agreed that the Soviet Union as a political and legal entity no longer existed. A few days later, Gorbachev resigned as the last president of the Soviet Union. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had very tragic consequences for the Russians. Firstly, there was a significant decline in the borders of the country in the post-disintegration period. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the land it owned was almost the same size as the one it reached at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Not only did Russia lose land but also its international position, becoming a state the international community tolerated with pity. Russia lost its central position in foreign policy, effectively becoming a peripheral country in terms of economic and financial relations (Trenin, 2001: 286).

Foreign and Security Policies in the New Russian Federation

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the new RF faced social, political and economic crises and a completely changed geopolitical environment and international system. Seeking to find a new role and identity in this changed geopolitical environment, Russia turned to its historical past to find answers. This helps explain why the Russians began to reuse imperial symbols in their flag, street or city names soon after their independence in 1991 (d'Encausse, 2003: 17).

Although Russia found itself in a new era, there has been historical continuity between the RF and its predecessor. Although it did not directly assume responsibility for Soviet policies, the Russians inherited its international status, obligations under international treaties, position in the UN Security Council, diplomatic institutions, nuclear capacity, and a majority of its conventional arms were transferred to Russia. What did change was its size and superpower status (Light, 1996: 36–37). However, the new Russia, like its predecessor, did not abandon the claim of a great power. Despite the changing international environment, Russia remains an important country, especially in terms of international security. Russia has become a decisive actor not only in the former Soviet region but also in Europe and Asia.

Russian foreign policy also faces many of the same concerns as its predecessor such as the fear of occupation, internal unrest, and loss of national dignity, all of which stem from Russia's geography, history and the formation of an empire. Throughout its history, these and similar fears have profoundly influenced both foreign and security policies of Russia. Therefore, the country's primary role in foreign policy has always been defined as preventing such dangers. The military policies pursued by the country are also shaped within the framework of these dangers (Galeotti, 1995: 19). The measures Russia has taken to avoid these threats have remained relatively consistent for centuries. For example, during the Tsarist and Soviet period, both sought to ward off external threats and maintain internal stability by surrounding itself with buffer states and harmonious allies.

However, unlike the past, Russia returned to the international system as a single actor, proving extremely challenging when seeking to overcome security concerns while also attempting to take a new direction in its foreign policy. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign and security policies have undergone transformations reflected in the following three doctrines: Kozyrev, Primakov and Putin.

The Kozyrev military doctrine was adopted in the first term of President Yeltsin in 1993. The new democratic leader of Russia sought to integrate into the West/US-centered systems on the one hand, while trying to protect its security and national interests on the other. The Doctrine prioritized the creation of a security zone around its borders of Russia and establishing a

line of good neighbours with the “near abroad” or in Russian “blizhneye zarubyezhe” used to refer to those states neighbouring the RF which previously formed part of the Soviet Union. In geopolitical terms, it covers the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and also the Baltic states. The Doctrine has been nicknamed the “Russia’s Monroe Doctrine” since it takes a defensive stance, declaring the post- Soviet region an area of exclusive Russian interest and suggests that if threatened, it has the right to defend it. Russia perceived itself as the political and military guarantor for stability in this region. Realizing that it could no longer be a global actor in the new era, Russia turned to Eurasia with the hopes regaining and consolidating its superiority as well as influence in the region (Peter and Rubinstein, 1997: 100; Light, 1996: 54; Dağı, 2002b: 192).

The détente period, defined as an intermediate period in the Cold War, started after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and steps were taken to reduce the hostility between the Eastern and Western blocs. Comprehensive disarmament talks were also held between the parties during this period, whose main motivation was to avoid the possible consequences of a nuclear war. As a result of these negotiations, it was possible to make agreements in areas such as preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, limiting and reducing strategic weapons. This period was closed however, with the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.

Another distinctive aspect of the new military doctrine was that it saw the violation of the rights of the Russian minority in the former Soviet republics as a major cause of conflict. For this reason, the Russian diaspora became one of the main issues of Russia’s foreign and security policy. Russia later would use this issue as an instrument of intervention against former member countries of the Soviet Union such as Estonia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, who have a dense Russian population.

Upon the arrival of the new foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov in 1996, Russian Foreign Policy made a stark change. In 1997, the Primakov doctrine was adopted, replacing the Kozyrev Doctrine, dramatically transforming the strategic direction of the country’s foreign policy. His idea was based on the assumption that Russian national interests and security would best be served best in a “multi-polar world” (Klepatskii, 2003: 11). The Document underlines four priorities: strengthening

Russia's territorial integrity, promoting peaceful integration between CIS states, stabilizing regional conflicts in the CIS and the former Yugoslavia, and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The first two priorities made it clear that Russia would turn its attention to the CIS, rather than the far West (Peter and Rubinstein, 1997: 102).

The Primakov doctrine was also an attempt to balance, not replace, American hegemony (Trenin 2003: 34), signalling a return to 'realism' in Russia (İşyar, 2004: 24). Russia's diplomatic and military significance in the international arena had rapidly lost value, just like the ruble. He therefore advocated the creation of a Moscow-Delhi-Beijing axis, a flexible geopolitical formation referred to as the "big triangle," with the aim of balancing America's geopolitical position, the influence of NATO, and the multipolar world demand. Russia's new geopolitical approach also sought to reconstruct regional power balances which stabilized relations with the former Soviet republics. To secure the absolute sovereignty and to re-establish the international status as a "great power," the Doctrine emphasized the need for Russia to re-nuclearize and to use its unique position as a basic energy exporter (Fedorov, 2006: 4). This idea was reiterated in 2000 after Vladimir Putin became the ruling party.

Immediately after Putin became president in 2000, he introduced three new doctrines concerning security, military and foreign policy (Öztürk, 2001: 19). Although the doctrines were similar to their predecessors in terms of their definitions of internal and external threats and foreign policy priorities, they embodied some differences reflecting Putin's original political understanding. The most distinguishing feature of the relevant doctrines was that they were more realistic and practical (İşyar, 2004: 70). They also reflected Russia's reaction to the events in the Balkans and NATO's intervention. Russia openly declared its intention to resume the development of nuclear weapons to offset these and possible future threats. In the event of a possible attack with conventional, nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction targeting itself and/or its allies, the doctrines made it clear that Russia would not hesitate to respond with its nuclear weapons. The principle of "no first use", in effect since the Brezhnev era, was now abandoned. In the revision of 2000, Russia was now clearly building its military policies on nuclear deterrence (Dağı,

2002a: 190). Using its nuclear trump card, Russia both maintained its 'great power' claim and tried to deter potential threats to itself (Freedman, 1999: 30).

Conclusions

There are different views in the literature regarding the origins of the Russians and the Russian state that consist of two categories –the Norman theory and anti-Norman views. The Norman theory, which is widely accepted by the West, traces the roots of Russian culture to the Normans, and claims they arrived in the Russian lands in the 9th century and reigned until the mid-11th century. Slavs, from this perspective of history, are therefore given little credit of the formation of Russian culture and state. The anti-Norman theory however instead suggested the history of the Eastern Slavs as much older. The most prominent anti-Norman consider Russians a mix of Eastern Slavs who settled in forested regions and nomadic Turonian tribes of the Eurasian Steppe. Leaving aside the theoretical discussions, the foundation of modern Russia began with the Grand Duchy of Moscow, which succeeded in gathering other Russian city-states around itself during the 15th century and which lasted for almost 240 years on Russian soil.

Russian modernization was executed by tremendous reforms imposed top-down by autocratic leaders, often with violence. Neither the reforms nor the leaders did receive a voluntary support from the public. In Russia, as it happened to many other modernization movements that took place in non-western societies, modernization was carried out by a small circle of ruling elite for the state against the will and traditional values of the society. These elites acted as a civilizing force and forced the people to follow what they imposed from above without any critics. Therefore, the people in Russia perceived modernization as an external project and initially rejected it.

The Tsarist Russia has been one of the major powers of Europe since its establishment. Russia began to spread its influence over Europe, which was initially limited to Eastern Europe, but gradually became one of the great powers of the European system of states that emerged in the post-Westphalia period. Russia, which lost its status and its influence in Europe after the Crimean

War, was destroyed by the Bolsheviks after 1917 Revolution. Only after World War II did Russia become once again one of the most powerful actors of the bipolar international system, with the status of “superpower”. The Iron Curtain elevated it to the most dangerous power of the European continent during the Cold War.

Opponents of the Tsarist regime took to the streets to protest sparking the revolution on 8 March in 1917 forcing the Tsar to abdicate from the throne ending centuries of Romanov rule. Despite efforts of the Duma to form a provisional government while the Country remained in the war, and develop a new constitutional order, unrest continued and a second coup d'état in November of the same year overthrew the provisional government. In its replacement, the Bolshevik wing of the Social Democratic Party came to power in Russia, officially ending the Tsarist Regime and entering Russia into a new period away from the West. Despite the Western ideas and modernist structure on which the revolution was built, the new regime and state shifted to an ideologically and politically anti-Western stance.

Gorbachev's reform process in domestic and foreign policy brought an end to the Cold War. As a result, the characteristics of the Soviet system, such as Party monopoly, closedness and national unity were eroded. Foreign policies including the termination of Soviet aid and the provision of member states to leave the Warsaw Pact also led to the end of the Cold War. Additionally, internal political developments in Eastern Europe between 1989-1991 affected the disintegration process of the Soviets such as the anti-communist movements which started in Poland, then spread to other Central and Eastern European countries. The eventual collapse of the Soviet Union came in December 1991 when the Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus agreed that the Soviet Union no longer existed. Its successor, the new RF found itself in a new era. Still, there has been historical continuity between the Russian Federation and its predecessor, inheriting its international status, obligations under international treaties, position in the UN Security Council, diplomatic institutions, nuclear capacity, and a majority of its conventional arms were transferred to Russia.

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MATERIAL AND IDEATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

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Introduction

The Russian Federation (RF) is the largest country in the world. The territory of Russia covers an area of about 17.1 million square kilometres, nearly 1/10 of the total land mass of the world. The total length of the borders is almost 60 thousand km – 14.5 km land, and 44.5 km sea (maritime borders). The great length from north to south provides a big variation in climatic and natural conditions. Similarly, the topography of Russia is very diverse. The administrative structure of the Russian Federation is comprised of 21 republics, 9 territories, 46 regions, 2 cities of federal significance, 1 autonomous region, 4 autonomous districts.

The population of Russia as of 1 January 2019 equals 146.7 million. Most of the population lives in three regions: The Central Federal District with 26.83% of the population, Volga Federal District with 20%, and the Northwestern Federal District with 11.21%. According to statistics, 189 ethnic groups live in Russia, of which Russians have the majority with 80.9% in the 2010 census, followed by Tatars and Ukrainians with 3.9% and 1.4% respectively.

Russia features a diverse cultural and religious heritage, thanks to the multinational structure of the country. For centuries Russia was influenced by the cultures of other nations, which made it more versatile, as well as rich. There also exists four main religions: Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia transitioned from a command to a market economy after reforms were introduced in early 1990s. As of 2017, the Russian Federation has a total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of \$1,577,524 million, which makes it the 11th largest economy in the world. In terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) however, its GDP amounts to \$3,783,139 million, placing it 7th place among all other countries.

Additionally, Russia has one of the world's largest and powerful armed forces. According to Global Firepower's 2019 world military strength rankings, Russia is ranked 2nd out of 137 countries. Of the 69.640 million available manpower cited, 46.659 million are considered fit-for-service. The total military personnel are estimated at 3.586 million, including 1.014 million active personnel and 2.572 million reserve personnel. Russia is one of the few countries which holds nuclear weapons, along with a strong navy and state-of-the-art conventional weaponry.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy has undergone many transformations over the last 30 years and faced many new challenges related to the changing international political environment. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, many ideas and values embedded in contemporary Russian foreign policy are deeply rooted in Russian history and culture. The aim of this chapter is to explore the material and ideational foundations of Russian foreign policy. In the proceeding sections, this chapter examines the geography, demography, culture, religion, economy, military, and ideas.

Geography

The Russian Federation (RF) has a unique geographical and geopolitical position. It occupies 30% of the territory in the eastern part of Europe and about 70% in the northern part of Asia. In the north, the extreme continental point of the country is Chelyuskin Cape, located on the Taimyr Peninsula. The southern boundary of the continent is located on the crest of the main Caucasian ridge, the site that borders Dagestan and Azerbaijan. In the west, the frontier point is the Sand Spit, located in the waters of the Baltic Sea, close to Kaliningrad. In the east, the extreme point related to the mainland is Dezhneva Cape in Chukotka. The furthest point relating to the islands is located on the Rotmanova Island. This island is in the Bering Sea, near the border with the United States (Black, et al, 2015). Given the enormity of the Russian territory, the country has ten-time zones determined by the meridians. In areas with a high population density, these boundaries are determined by the administrative subjects of the federation.

As previously stated, the total length of the borders is

almost 60 thousand km – 14.5 of them are land borders and 44.5 km of Russian territory is covered by the sea (maritime borders). The water border (the end of territorial waters) is located 22.7 km from the coast. The marine economic zone (exclusive economic zone) of Russia is in the seawaters stretching 370 km off the coast. The sea borders of the country pass through the waters of three oceans. In the north, the RF's sea borders are located in the Arctic Ocean. From the north, the country is surrounded by the Arctic Ocean, and from the east, by the Pacific. From the west, Russia has access to the Azov, Black, and Baltic seas of the Atlantic Ocean. There are five seas in the north: the Barents, Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, and Chukchi. The territory located from the north coast of the country to the North Pole is the Russian sector of the Arctic. Within this space, all the islands, apart from a few islands of the Svalbard archipelago, belong to Russia. In the eastern part of Russia, it borders the Pacific Ocean and the smaller seas of the Pacific basin, located very close to Japan and the United States. Russia is separated from the territories of Japan by the Strait of Laperuz, located in the Sea of Japan between Sakhalin Island and Hokkaido Island. In the west, the maritime boundary is in the waters of the Baltic Sea. Through these expanses of water, Russia is associated with several European countries: Sweden, Poland, Germany and the Baltic states. The southwestern sea border of Russia includes the Azov, Caspian, and Black Sea. These water borders separate Russia from Ukraine, Georgia, Bulgaria, Türkiye, and Romania. Through the Black Sea, Russia has access to the Mediterranean Sea (Blinnikov, 2011).

Along with extended sea borders, Russia has extensive land borders that separate it from 14 countries, extending 1,605 km. 990 km of these border falls on the Baltic countries, and 615 km on Azerbaijan and Georgia. Russia has land borders with China, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Finland, Norway and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Semenov 2015, 19).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the border with Poland decreased. Currently, only the Kaliningrad region is associated with this European country. Changes have occurred on the border with China, decreasing by half. Borders with Norway and Finland are designated by international agreements, and with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries they

are condition. Currently, there are no special treaties defining these boundaries. Russian troops monitor the security of the borders of many countries of the former Soviet Union. Currently, several countries have territorial disputes with Russia, and many have complained of Russia’s advancements on their borders e.g., Japan, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland. Japan for example, argues four Kuril Islands (Kunashir, Shikotan, Khaboshan, and Iturup) are part of its territory, while Estonia has claimed the Pechora region, the Pytalovsky district of Latvia and the lands of Karelia in Finland are part of its territory. In addition, as a result of the Crimea annexation by Russia, Moscow gained convenient access to the sea and well-equipped ports in the west. Since 2014, Crimea has remained a disputed territory between Russia and Ukraine, with both sides officially recognizing it as part of their countries.

Additionally, Russia also has 7 large lakes as shown in Table 1. In the European part, each lake has an area of more than 1,000 km², and in the Asian part, the largest lake in Asia – Lake Baikal located, has an area of 32,000 km². Russia has numerous strong and long rivers. The main volume of the water flows from the biggest rivers of Volga, Don, Amur, Lena, Yenisei, Ob, Northern Dvina, Pechora, which are formed within the country and only about 5% comes from the territories of neighbouring states.

Table 3.1:
Medium-Year Reserves of Water in the Largest Lakes and Water Reservoirs

Lakes	Cubic km	Reservoirs	Cubic km
Ladoga	911	Tsimlyanskoe	23.7
Onega	292	Rybinskoe	26.3
Hanka	18.3	Sayano-Shushenskoye	31.3
Baikal	23,000	Kuibyshevskoe	58.0
		Krasnoyarskoe	73.3
		Volgogradskoe	31.5
		Bratskoye	170

Source: Federal Service of State Statistics, (Rosstat 2017).

Russia is situated in 4 climatic zones, providing the country with enormous variation in climatic and natural conditions – the arctic, subarctic, temperate (temperate continental, continental, sharply continental, monsoonal) and subtropical. The physical geography of Russia as illustrated in Table 2 consists of: the arctic semi-deserts and deserts, tundra and forest-tundra, taiga, mixed and deciduous forests, forest-steppes and steppes, hard-leaved evergreen forests and shrubs, and high-altitude zones.

Table 3.2:

Land Area of Russia (1000 Km)

	2001	2006	2014	2015	2016
Total land	1,709.8	1,709.8	1,709.8	1,712.5	1,712.5
Agricultural land	221.1	220.7	220.2	220.2	222.1
Forest land	871.5	870.6	871.8	871.8	870.7
Surface waters (including swamps)	12.8	13.2	13.2	13.2	13.2
Other lands	398.2	393.4	392.8	392.9	392.9
As a percentage of the total area					

Source: Federal Service of State Statistics, (Rosstat 2017).

The topography of Russia is very diverse, which is also due to its vast territory and peculiarities of the tectonic structure. Most of the country is occupied by the East European, West Siberian, Central Siberian Plateau plains. The mountains are located mainly along the southern and eastern borders of the country. The Caucasus Mountains are located between the Caspian and Black Seas, along the southern border stretched ridges of the Altai, Sayan Mountains, and the Stanovoi Range. Along the east coast are the ridges of Chersky, Verkhoyansk, and Sikhote-Alin.

The geographical position of the country causes significant severity in some cases as with permafrost, which spreads over 64% of the country's territory causing difficulties in the country's connectivity and economic development. Russia is placed in the most severe northeastern part of Eurasia. The rural locality of Oymyakon for example has the coldest recorded records in the Northern Hemisphere. 65% of Russian territory lies north of

60° N. and only 5% of the country is south of 50° N. About 140 million people are concentrated in the northern territory, making Russia the only country in the world that has a population in such high latitudes.

These northern specifics of Russia leave their mark on the living conditions of people and the development of the economy. It requires the creation of technology and equipment to remove snow from the roads and additional fuel reserves for the operation of equipment at low temperatures. All of this involves not only the organization of special industries, but also enormous material resources such as energy and huge monetary investments.

The climate of Russia also causes restrictions in the development of agriculture. The country is in the zone of risky farming. There is not enough heat for the development of crops in the north and moisture for them in the south, so crop failures and crop shortages are common in domestic agriculture. This required the creation of significant state grain reserves. Severe conditions limit the ability to grow high-yielding forage crops. Instead of sufficiently heat-loving soybeans and corn in Russia, it is necessary to grow mainly oats, which do not produce high yields. These factors, together with the cost of stalling cattle, affect the cost of livestock production. Therefore, state subsidies are vital for sustaining the farming population as well as sustaining food-security of the country.

Russia possesses huge reserves of natural resources, constituting about 20% of world reserves. This predetermines the raw material orientation of the Russian economy. The country needs to use significant portions of its energy resources for its own purposes. To maintain the same standard of living as in Western Europe, Russia needs to spend 2 to 3 times more energy than most of the European countries. In order to survive one winter without freezing, each resident of Russia, depending on his/her region of residence, requires from 1 to 5 tons of fuel per year. For all residents of the country, it will be at least 500 million tons (\$40 billion at current world fuel prices).

Demography, Nationalities and Minorities

Historically, the Soviet Union did not have an issue with its demographic status, and the population continuously rose until

the end of the 1980s. The population of Russia reached its peak in 1992 with 148.6 million people (World Bank, 2019). Since 1993, the number of the population has continuously fallen. To understand this dramatic population decline, it is important to examine the last two decades, where we can observe two shock periods – the first in the early 1990s, and the second at the end of the 1990s. Just before the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was an increase in economic and political uncertainty which sharply affected the decisions of families to have children.

The demographic situation of the Country has been influenced by several factors which have affected the population growth. One of the most important aspects is the balance between birth and death rates. The birth rate in Russia, during the 1986-1994 period, drastically fell from 17.2 people per thousand people in 1986 to 9.4 people in 1994; while death rates increased from 10.4 people per thousand people in 1986 to 15.7 people in 1994 (World Bank, 2019). Another important factor is the total fertility rate. According to the United Nations, countries need to have at least a 2.1 fertility rate per woman during their lifetime to have sustainable population growth. During the Soviet Union era, the fertility rate did not fall under this threshold until its collapse. In the late 1980s, the total fertility rate was above 2 until 1986, with a fertility rate of 2.15. Then it decreased to 1.4 in 1994, losing almost one-third of its growth level. This falling trend continued until 1999, dropping to 1.15, one of the lowest levels in the world at that time. During this period the life expectancy also decreased from 69.3 years in 1986, to 64.4 years in 1994 (World Bank, 2019).

Despite these negative trends, population figures started to recover and stabilize between 1994-1998. However, the economic conditions between 1998-9, negatively affected the population growth in Russia. 1998 was recorded as one of the lowest figures in different aspects of the economy, effecting the population dynamics in Russia. For instance, birth rates were at their record low with 8.3 people per thousand followed by the death rates at 13.5 people per thousand. The total fertility rate fell to 1.15 in 1999, one of the lowest levels in Russia's registered history (World Bank, 2019). The age dependency ratio, which started at 50.8% in 1994 and dropped to 46.8% in 1998, also continued to fall until 2010 dropping to 38.8%. According to experts, any ratio below 50% is considered alarming for the labor market and

economy since it increases the weight of the workforce on the shoulders of the younger generation. The increase in the number of people above 65 years old and the fall in the number of new birth rates have caused a reduction in the age dependency ratio (World Bank, 2019).

The second demographic shock was associated with the economic crisis in Russia due to the Russian Ruble crisis and fall in the price of oil in 1998. In 1998 oil prices were at a record low level where the price of the oil per barrel dropped to \$17.3 (Macrotrends, 2019). The fluctuation in oil prices had a significant macro-level effect on the Russian economy since oil a major source of income. This helps explain the decrease in birth rates in Russia as a correlation has been found between the economic conditions of a country and the decision of families to have a child.

To further illustrate this correlation, the demographic growth rates sharply increased from 2005-2010 after oil prices hiked up from 2004 - 2008, reaching a historical record of \$162.6 in June 2008 and has since then continued to gradually grow. This trend has been supported and even reached a surplus by the decrease in the number of death rates and with the support from permanent immigration to Russia (Rosstat, 2016).

In addition to the recovering economy, the Russian government attempts to improve the conditions of migration and birth rates have had a positive effect over population numbers in the country. 2007 was a turning point for the population statistics when immigration and work permit regulations were eased and simplified for the Post-Soviet Union countries' citizens which allowed more migrants to arrive including permanent migrants who settled in Russia. The Government also introduced a family program initiative offering financial aid for families to encourage them to have children. The Program was successful in reaching its goals in a short period of time, enabling the total fertility rate to rise from 1.3 in 2006 to 1.75 in 2014, covering most of the losses that occurred in the 1990s (Kashina and Yukina, 2009).

The main aim of the family program was to encourage families to have more than one child by providing additional financial assistance. Surveys found that families were hesitant to have additional children due to economic reasons (Arkhangelsky et al., 2015). One survey for example shared 50% of the

participants showed a desire to have a second child, but only 15% of them had one. To help families fulfill their desire of having a second child and providing a solution to its demographic problem naturally, the Russian government initiated the family support package program (Arkhangelsky et al., 2015).

One of the key features of the program was the maternity capital assistance. Families for example, in 2007 received financial assistance in the amount of 250,000 rubles which was equivalent to around \$9,800. However, families only received these funds when their child reached the age of 3 (Kashina and Yukina, 2009). The program has since then been modified and developed, contributing to the financial situation of families by allowing them to benefit from certain tax reductions. As of 2014, the amount of maternity capital has also risen to 429,000 rubles equivalent of \$12,300 (Pension Fund, 2014).

In terms of the geographical distribution the most populous areas include big cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg and regions like Krasnodar Krai, Tyumen Oblast, Dagestan and Chechnya. Migrants tend to gravitate towards the bigger cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg. In the bigger regions, most of the population includes ethnic minorities, especially Muslims, who have significantly contributed to the growth rate of the population. For instance, in Chechnya and Dagestan, Muslims make up 14.93% and 6.2% of the population respectively, with larger growth rates than in the other regions.

The demographic dynamics of Russia can in part be explained by the role of ethnic groups (Rosstat, 2010; Rosstat, 2018). Although ethnic Russians make up the majority of the population, their numbers have declined for the past three decades. In the 1989 census, it indicated that the share of Russians was 81.5% which fell in 2002 to 80.6% however slightly making some gains in 2010 reaching 80.9%. Moreover, the Slavic group is also decreasing, declining by 2.3% between 1989-2010 which includes Tatars, Ukrainians, and Russians. On the other hand, smaller minority groups such as Bashkirs, Chechens, Armenians and Avars have increased 0.23%, 0.43%, 0.5% and 0.29% respectively (Rosstat, 2010; Rosstat, 2018).

Chart 3.1:

Russian Federation’s Ethnic Structure after the Soviet Union (mid-1990s)



Source: Eurasian Geopolitics website: <https://eurasiangeopolitics.com>

For the foreseeable future, Russia’s policies aiming to boost the growth of population needs to be practical and not politicized to reach their full potential. Future forecasts of the Russian demographic statistics indicate the population in the country will continue to decrease unless there is a significant increase in the number of natural growth rates and the immigration flows into the country. To give the growth process of the population another push, as was done during the 2007-2014 period, government initiatives, regarding the demographic situation in the country, needs to be revitalized under the current circumstances and aim to solve the problems of the stagnation that started to occur after 2014.

Economy and Natural Resources

The Russian Federation was proclaimed as an independent country on December 25, 1991. During the 5th Congress of the People’s Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) held October 28, 1991, Boris Yeltsin, who had been elected as the first President of the Russian Federation on June 12, 1991, proclaimed a program of fundamental economic reforms aimed at transition from a planned economy to a market

economy starting on January 1, 1992. The transition began on January 2, 1992 with the liberalization of prices followed by the liberalization of foreign trade and massive privatization of state-owned enterprises. Liberalized trade conditions, low tariffs, and price differentials on tradable goods between domestic and foreign markets quickly increased the amount of exports of many important primary commodities and allowed cheap imported consumer goods to rush into to the domestic market changing the prices. Rapid growth of the exports of primary commodities such as crude oil, natural gas and metals ensured a large inflow of foreign currencies essentially important for balancing the current account. On the other hand, a wide range of manufacturing industries that previously existed under the planned economy instantly turned out to be uncompetitive and collapsed under the pressure of the market conditions.

Privatization was another important economic reform in Russia that began in 1992. All enterprises, except for large enterprises of special strategic importance e.g. natural resource deposits, pipelines, roads and other infrastructural facilities of common use, were subject to transfer from state ownership to different forms of private ownership. As of 1990, the total price of stock on privatized enterprises exceeded \$1.0 trillion. From 1993 to 2003 over 145,000 state enterprises were sold to private ownership for a total sum of \$9.7 billion (Dzutseva and Khalyava, 2017).

One of the most important and urgent reforms for economic transition, was the monetary reform carried out from July 26 to December 31, 1993. The reform aimed to stop the circulation of bank notes issued by the State Bank of the Soviet Union and those of the Bank of Russia within 1961–1992 and replace them with new bank notes in 1993. It was important to carry out the reform as soon as possible since many post-Soviet countries had already begun to issue their own currencies and old bank notes could have flooded the Russian economy causing high inflation rates.

The radical structural economic transition reforms of the first half of 1990s brought dramatic changes to the economy of Russia establishing the basics for market conditions that served as a base for subsequent transformations. However, these economic reforms were implemented improperly under extreme conditions and within short periods of time. 40% of the GDP

declined between 1991 and 1996 and a massive contraction of many industries caused an unprecedented crisis with severe socio-economic consequences (EBRD, 1997). The share of the population living under the poverty line rose from less than 5% in 1989 to over 33.5% in 1992 (Rosstat, 2018).

At the same time, the privatization reform of 1992 was non-transparent and many enterprises were sold to private ownership at prices much lower than their market value. As a result, huge amounts of wealth were accumulated in the hands of a few billionaires that became owners of large privatized enterprises. Consequently, privatization and the devastating deterioration of the welfare system led to a tremendous income stratification of the households. Although there were certain signs of recovery after 1992-1993, the number of households living below the poverty line reached 11% by 1995 (Klugman and Braithwaite, 1998).

The liberalization of trade in 1992 benefited the Russian economy, as it ensured the inflow of foreign currency and contributed to the establishment of the fundamentals of the market economy. For instance, in 1992 Russian exports more than quadrupled, reaching a record high of \$286 billion. Despite this positive trend, poor trade regulations, shortages of many consumer products and similar crisis in neighbouring post-Soviet countries, caused illegal trade activities to increase, contributing to the shadow economy. The situation was highly aggravated by hyperinflation, which never fell below 100% per annum between 1991 and 1995, and in 1992 hit the record high of 2,500% per annum (World Bank, 1998).

Although the rates of inflation gradually decreased after 1992, this did not improve the investment climate. Therefore, fighting inflation was the priority task of the Central Bank and one of the main objectives of the Government of Russia. Strong measures aimed at reducing the inflation such as excessive monetary cuts and fixing the ruble exchange rate above its market value. This however led to detrimental side effects such as the decline in competitiveness of domestic products, non-cash exchange of goods and services, widespread delays of wage payments and social benefits.

By 1997, the Russian economy became highly dependent on financial borrowing on foreign capital markets. Weak institutions and the devastated real-estate sector of the economy

was not capable of attracting capital investments at interest rates comparable to developed markets. At the same time, the period before 1998 was largely a failure in terms of investments, and during the 1993-97 period, Russia had a Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow of only 0.38% percent of the GDP (World Bank, 1998).

Moreover, oil prices continued their decline between 1997-1998, reducing the essentially important foreign currency inflows into the economy. The government responded by increasing the interest rates so that by the second quarter of 1998, the sovereign rates on short-term government bonds went as high as 49.2%. The interest rates kept increasing to the point where the government was no longer capable of paying its liabilities. Then on August 17, 1998, the Central Bank of Russia announced a technical default on government bonds, which marked the beginning of the economic crisis in Russia. Soon after, a switch to a floating exchange rate of the ruble was announced, fixing it within a corridor of 6-9.5 rubles per US dollar. However, by the end of 1998 the exchange rate broke the established corridor going beyond 15 rubles per US dollar.

The economic crisis of 1998 that hit Russia was a serious challenge that revealed the main weaknesses and failures of the macroeconomic policy that had been implemented since 1992. The liberalization measures taken by the Russian government before 1998, vague achievements in the structural reforms, and excessive exposure to external factors together led to a sharp crisis. As a result, the GDP of Russia in 1998 was - 5.3%. The effects of the crisis fortunately did not last long, and in 1999, the economy started to recover showing a GDP growth rate of 6.4% by the end of the year. The crisis of 1998 in Russia made the government reconsider its economic policy, conduct certain structural reforms and establish necessary conditions for economic growth in subsequent years.

The year 2000 marked a new period in the economic development of the Russian Federation, when the most painful and necessary economic transitions were finished, and new global economic trends were instead put into place to start shaping the economic evolution of the country. The year 2000 also marked the end of the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, and the beginning of the presidency of Vladimir Putin, who took the office May 7, 2000.

The period from 2000-2010 was characterized by a booming economic growth in Russia, during which the GDP of the country grew by 85%. The period of rapid economic growth was only temporarily interrupted during the crisis of 2008-2009. The driving force of the economic growth was the increasing oil prices and gas that became the main export commodity of Russia. Several important trends characterized the economic trajectory of Russia. Firstly, the Russian economy gradually became highly dependent on exports of primary commodities such as crude oil, natural gas and metals. Secondly, exports of large amounts of oil and its rising price ensured rapid growth of the average oil productivity and income of households in the economy, turning Russia into a high middle-income economy. From 2000 to 2008 for example, the income from the annual export of primary commodities was more than 20 times greater than the yearly income from manufactured exports (Gaddy and Ickes, 2010). Thirdly, Putin, during his first presidential term, implemented various reforms increasing the retirement funds, reducing the share of government in the economy and decreasing the overregulation in the private sector that helped to bring forward the economy after the crisis (Cooper, 2009).

However, many of these reforms were reversed in several years' time. From 2004 to 2006, the government restored its control over previously privatized companies in some important sectors of industry and finance. As a result, the share of the government in the oil sector alone, increased from 16.0% in 2003 to 33.5% in 2005 (OECD, 2006). This measure to diversify exports was ineffective and predetermined the vulnerability of the Russian economy to external shocks that occurred in 2008-2009 as well as in 2014.

The paradigm that dominates the economic evolution of Russia since 2009-2010 is the Eurasian integration. On November 28th, the heads of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan Dmitry Medvedev, Alexander Lukashenko and Nursultan Nazarbayev met to create in the territory of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan as a single customs area starting from January 1, 2010. On July 1, 2011, the customs control between the three countries was eliminated and they started to function as a single customs zone. After tedious trilateral cooperation on the harmonization of the economic policies, starting from January 1, 2015, the Customs

Union was converted into the Eurasian Economic Union. Armenia became the fourth country to join the union January 2, 2015 and later August 12, of the same year Kyrgyzstan became one of the members of the EEU. On May 29 of 2015, EEU member states signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Vietnam that came into force in July of the same year. As of today, negotiations on FTA are with Iran, Cuba, Serbia, Egypt, Thailand and several other states are underway.

Currently, Russia has the largest natural gas reserves of around 47.8 trillion cubic meters or nearly 23.7 % of the world's natural gas reserves (IES, 2018-a). Russia also has the 8th largest oil reserves of about 80 billion barrels, which is roughly 5% of the world's total oil reserves (IES, 2018-b). Apart from that, Russia accounts for the 4th largest coal reserves of about 70 billion tons (knoema.com). Russia also ranks in the top position of many other essentially important metals, non-metal minerals, timber etc. Abundant natural resources play an important role in the Russian economy. From the early 1990s onwards, the export of natural gas, oil and other minerals have become the main drivers of the Russian economy. In 2017, the share of the extractive sector in the total export of Russian goods reached 62.4%, oil and the gas sector provided 36% of the revenue growth of the budget system and over 70% of the federal budget (Stolypin Growth Economy Institute). High dependence on oil and gas exports, however, continue to make the Russian economy highly sensitive to the volatility of prices of these primary commodities.

Military Power, Defence and the Sector of Security

Russia possesses one of the world's largest and powerful armed forces. According to Global Firepower ranked Russia 2nd out of 137 countries in world military strength (2019). Of 69.640 million available manpower, 46.659 million are considered fit-for-service. The total military personnel are estimated at 3.586 million, including 1.014 million active personnel and 2.572 million reserve personnel (Global Firepower, 2019). The President of Russia is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Military service is mandatory for all male Russian citizens between 18 and 27 (with a few exceptions), and the draft is implemented two times a year – in the spring and autumn (Russian Federation, 2019; Isaeva,

2016). Although the Russian army has a mixed conscript-contract recruiting system, conscription remains the main mechanism for staffing the army. As announced by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in March 2019, since 2012, the number of contract soldiers in the Russian armed forces has more than doubled and reached 394,000 people (GlobalSecurity.org, 2019). The term of military service which used to be two years was reduced to 18 months in 2007 and to 12 months in 2008 (Barany, 2008).

The Russian Armed Forces were formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1992, President Yeltsin signed edicts establishing the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and placed all former Soviet military units stationed on the territory of Russia under its control (Schmemmann, 1992). It is estimated that Russia inherited about 85% of the Soviet Union's overall military strength, including manpower, equipment, and defense enterprises, but it lacked economic resources, as well as motivation, to maintain this military machine. As a result, in 1990s, the Russian army did not receive sufficient financial and technical support, and the situation was aggravated by draft dodging, desertions, poor morale, incompetence, corruption, and resistance of the officer corps to reform attempts. This led to a sharp decline of the army's combat readiness, as illustrated by the disastrous outcome of the First Chechen War for Moscow. Under President Putin, assisted by rising oil prices, Russia started to reform its military, reducing the size of the armed forces, increasing budgetary support and announcing a gradual transition to a professional army, but this initial effort was largely a failure (Hays, 2008) The major structural reorganization of the Russian Armed Forces began in 2008-2009, accelerated by Russia's military operational shortcomings revealed during the August 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and included the reform of the army's structure and chain of command, the reduction of its strength to one million, and weapons modernization (Nichol, 2011). Russia was able to demonstrate the full range of its renewed military power capabilities during the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria (Baev, 2015; Lavrov, 2018).

Currently, Russia possesses 21,932 combat tanks, 50,049 armored fighting vehicles, 6,083 self-propelled artilleries, 4,465 towed artilleries, and 3,860 rocket projectors, as well as 4,078 military aircraft, 1,485 military helicopters, and 352 naval vessels (Global Firepower, 2019). In terms of structure, the Russian

Armed Forces under the Ministry of Defense are divided into three branches – the Ground (Land) Forces, the Aerospace Forces, and the Navy. In addition, there are two separate arms of service – the Airborne Troops and the Strategic Missile Troops (Ministry of Defence, 2019a). There are also other military entities, such as the National Guard directly subordinated to the President of Russia and the Border Service under the Federal Security Service.

The Ground Forces consist of the Motorized Rifle Troops, Tank Troops, Missile Troops and Artillery, Air Defence Troops, reconnaissance formations, Engineer Troops, Troops of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence, and Signal Communications Troops. The Motorized Rifle Troops are the most numerous components of the Ground Forces formed by motorized rifle brigades with high operational autonomy, versatility and firepower. The Tank Troops are the main strike force of the Ground Forces, which are mainly used to support the Motorized Rifle Troops and are composed of tank brigades and battalions. The Missile and Artillery Troops provide fire support during combined-arms operations and consist of missile, rocket and artillery brigades, including high-power mixed artillery battalions, rocket artillery regiments, separate reconnaissance battalions, and artillery of military bases. The Air Defence Troops are intended to cover troops and facilities from enemy air attacks and equipped with anti-aircraft missiles, anti-aircraft artillery, anti-aircraft gun-and-missile systems and portable anti-aircraft missile systems, supported by radio-technical units. The reconnaissance formations provide the military command with information about the enemy, terrain and weather conditions, while the Engineer Troops render engineering support to combat actions, such as the construction of fortifications, installation of minefields and water purification. The Troops of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence are tasked with protecting military units from radioactive, chemical and biological contamination, and the Signal Communications Troops are responsible for the deployment and technical support of communications and automated control systems (Ministry of Defence, 2019b).

The Aerospace Forces consist of the Air Force, Air and Missile Defence Forces, and Space Forces. The Aerospace Forces are tasked with preventing aggression in the aerospace, protecting command and control posts, cities, industrial and economic areas, important facilities, infrastructure, and the armed forces from air

attacks, providing air support and destroying enemy troops and objects using both conventional and nuclear ordnance, as well as carrying out spacecraft launches and controlling satellite systems. The Air Force's aviation is divided into the long-range, front-line, military transport and army aviation, which in turn can be composed of the bomber, attack, fighter, reconnaissance, transport and special aircraft units (Ministry of Defence, 2019c).

The Navy consists of the Surface Forces, Submarine Forces, Naval Aviation, and Coastal Troops. The Surface Forces perform various combat missions, such as searching and destroying enemy submarines, striking enemy surface forces, landing amphibious assault forces, suppressing coastal fire, mine laying and mine clearing, and protecting transport and landing ships. The Submarine Forces that include strategic missile nuclear-powered submarines, general purpose nuclear-powered submarines and diesel-electric submarines are tasked with striking important enemy ground facilities, searching and destroying enemy submarines, aircraft carriers and other surface ships, landing units, convoys, and transport vessels. The Naval Aviation, divided into the deck-based and land-based aviation consisting of aircraft and helicopters of various purposes, is designed for conducting aerial reconnaissance, covering ships from enemy air strikes and destroying enemy forces at sea. The Coastal Troops, consisting of the Coastal Missile-Artillery Troops and the Marine Infantry, are responsible for defending the naval forces, land troops, population and facilities from enemy surface ships, as well as air and amphibious assaults. The Marine Infantry is also designed to conduct amphibious landings for capturing the enemy's naval bases, ports, islands, and other coastal facilities. Geographically, the Navy is divided into the Northern Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet, the Baltic Fleet, and the Caspian Flotilla (Ministry of Defence, 2019d).

The Airborne Troops are the elite and one of the most important combat elements of the Russian Armed Forces. They serve as a rapid reaction force for local conflicts, supporting special operations or striking behind enemy lines in a conventional war. For example, they played a crucial role in the 2014 annexation of the Crimea. The Airborne Troops consist of two parachute divisions, two air assault divisions, four independent brigades, along with a signals brigade and a reconnaissance brigade.

30,000 servicemen and sergeants, or 70% of the Airborne Troops' personnel, serve under contract (Kofman, 2019).

The Strategic Missile Troops control Russia's land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and consist of three missile armies and 12 missile formations (Ministry of Defence, 2019e). At present, Russia modernizes its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces replacing Soviet-era weapons with upgraded systems. As of 2019, Russia is estimated to have a total inventory of around 6,490 nuclear warheads, including a military stockpile of 4,490 nuclear warheads assigned for use by long-range strategic launchers and shorter-range tactical nuclear forces. Of these, 1,600 strategic warheads are deployed on ballistic missiles and at heavy bomber bases, 1,070 strategic warheads are in storage along with about 1,820 non-strategic warheads, while about 2,000 retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement (Kristensen and Korda, 2019). Russia justifies its increased reliance on and modernization of nuclear weapons and its plans for the deployment of a global anti-ballistic missile system by the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and Washington's recently announced unilateral withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

The range of new weapon systems presumably developed by Russia, as presented by President Putin, includes a new heavy (200 tons) intercontinental ballistic missile called Sarmat with multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads that can attack targets both via the North and South poles and an air-launched cruise missile powered by a small nuclear propulsion unit, with President Putin claiming that both systems are invincible against all existing and prospective missile and air defence systems. Other weapons mentioned by Putin include a dual-capable unmanned, nuclear-powered submersible vehicle that can operate at extreme ocean depths and has an intercontinental range, a high-precision, hypersonic air-launched missile system called *Kinzhal* (Dagger), a strategic missile system with a gliding wing unit called *Avangard* (Avant-garde), as well as laser weapon systems (President of Russia, 2018).

Ideas and ideologies in the Tsarist and the Soviet Periods

As the names of the periods suggest, Russian foreign policy was made in accordance with the types of regimes and ideologies: Tsarism during the reign of tsars, and Marxism/Socialism between the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the end of the Soviet Union in 1991.

1. Tsarism as the foreign policy of tsars: Russia began its expansionism policy under the reign of Tsar Ivan IV (or Ivan the Terrible). Constant raids from Kazan and Astrakhan Khanate however caused him significant foreign policy obstacles. After solving this problem, it was possible to take over control of Siberia. Ivan the Terrible was also interested in access to the sea, and therefore sought approval in the Baltics. Thus, foreign policy was divided into southern, western and eastern directions. After Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates fell; the Nogai Horde, wandering east of the Volga, recognized its dependence on Russia. Also, most of Bashkiria and Chuvashia on voluntary terms were attached to Russia in 1577. Then, in 1584, parts of Siberia were conquered. At the same time, the policy in the Northern direction for the breakthrough to the Baltic ultimately did not bring success.

After the death of Ivan the Terrible in 1584, Russia's medieval Rurik Dynasty fell and caused political turmoil for 15 years. It wasn't until 1613 that expansionism resumed, when the Romanov dynasty took over the power. Russia continued to expand over the next three centuries till the imperialist dynasty was toppled by the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.

In the earlier years of the Romanov dynasty, it became apparent that the country technically lagged far behind European powers and needed to modernize. Peter I, (or Peter the Great), the grandson of the first Romanov Tsar Mikhail I, launched large-scale transformations that increased the country's capabilities and strengthened Russia's foreign policy. First, he attempted to improve Russia's access to the southern seas and make Russia a maritime power. To succeed with this goal, his first military efforts were directed at the Ottoman Turks. At the end of the 17th century Ottoman Turks waged war on many European countries. To take advantage of the Ottomans' weakened position, Russia launched the Azov campaigns in 1695 and 1696 and succeeded to capture the Fortress of Azov, although only temporarily. Russia's

occupation of Azov in 1696 was symbolic, as it was the first time it had access to a year-round usable port. Access to the Baltic Sea became one of the key directions of his foreign policy. Following Peter, the Great's victory in the European fronts, he decided to explore Asia. Russia sought to establish closer ties with Central Asia. However, efforts were put on hold for another 150 years, after his expedition against Khiva was destroyed by the Khan's troops.

Catherine II (or Catherine the Great), empress to Russia for over 30 years (1762-1796), focused on establishing friendly relations with other states. By establishing contacts with leading international powers, she tried to elevate the position of Russia in the international arena. Despite attempts to peacefully resolve conflicts, for example, the partition of Poland, she was always ready to use war to achieve her goals. Returning the partition of Poland under Catherine II, the Russian foreign policy gradually began to manifest a factor in the protection of the Orthodox population, which it used to expand its territories. The formal reason for interfering in the internal affairs of Poland was to equate the rights of the Orthodox with Catholics. The same applied to Georgia, which sought the protection of the Orthodox population from Türkiye and Persia, after the country signed an agreement under which the kingdom became a protectorate of Russia. The most striking manifestation of the protection of the Orthodox would be the period of Alexander II and his military in the Balkans to expand its influence and again increase the territory.

In general, Catherine's foreign policy was imperial in nature and was characterized by expansionism, neglect by the interests of other nations, and to a certain extent was aggressive. The foreign policy results of Catherine's 34 years reign were significant territorial acquisitions and the final consolidation of the status of Russia as a great power.

The foreign policy of Russia as a great power did not undergo any fundamental changes until the end of the reign of the Romanovs. The Russian Empire gained power after the victory against Napoleon (1812) and became the main continental power in Europe. However, after the Crimean War (1853-56), it gradually weakened. Despite Russia's need to modernize, its lack of reforms resulted in a decisive defeat from Japan. The humiliating defeat later served as a reason of the Russian Revolution 1905-1907.

In the end, Russia was dragged into WWI, which devastated and destroyed its resources and ended the 300 years of the Romanovs Dynasty rule. Russia became the main engine of the Soviet Union (1917-91). The Soviet Union's "superpower" status following WWII (1939-45), up until late 1980s, contributed to the continuation of Russia's self-image of "great power". However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent economic plight of Russia left a widespread legacy of self-perception of weakness across the population, which was only overcome in 2000s.

2. *The Soviet Union and Marxism/Socialism*: The Soviet Union (1917-91) embraced Marxism, a form of socialism, as its main ideology. As the victors of the 1917 Revolution, Bolsheviks rejected all forms of nationalism and instead embraced a progressive, revolutionary discourse. According to the founding father Vladimir Lenin, the corrupted capitalist-imperialist western world was entering a phase of collapse and was destined to be replaced by socialist governments around the globe. For this reason, Soviets supported revolutionary and anti-colonial struggles in other parts of the world.

However, by 1922 it became apparent that the Soviet Union had failed to trigger a world revolution. Therefore, Soviet diplomacy had to change and compromise its revolutionary aspects and instead it sought diplomatic recognition and acceptance from foreign powers as equal to the world's great powers. Additionally, it wanted to create opportunities to develop economically by expanding and continuing channels for international trade.

Once power was again conciliated, particularly during Joseph Stalin's time, the Soviet administration turned into a so-called "slavophile". Following the World War II, Stalin used communist solidarity instrumentally to build an Eastern bloc. Therefore, starting from Stalin, Soviet statesmen used the communist ideology as a rather loose guideline for their pragmatically oriented foreign policy.

Post-Soviet Foreign Policy

After 1991, the Russian Federation's foreign policy entered an era of flux, where several strands of thought resurfaced to find a viable replacement for Marxism. Since the collapse of the

Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy has undergone a number of transformations and several stages of formation. At the same time, it has faced new challenges related to the changing international political environment. Russian foreign policy can be divided into three phases: 1991-1996, 1996-2007, and 2007-2014. The post-2014 period remains uncertain, as it is unclear whether it represents the continuation of the third stage, or a fourth new stage.

Before discussing the recent developments in Russian foreign policy, it is important to examine three strands of thought that existed in the post-1991 era: Westernizers (Atlanticists), Slavophiles (Nationalists), and Eurasianists (Geopolitical) and how they continue to influence Russian thinking about the Russian identity and the orientation of the state (Nugraha 2018).

1. Westernizers (Atlanticists): In the early 1840s and 1850s, two intellectual movements emerged in Russian thinking about the Russian identity and orientation of state. They were called the Westernizers and Slavophiles. Westernizers argued that Russia needed to follow the steps of the “Western civilization” and adopt the Western socio-political system, civil society and culture as models for its development. The reforms undertaken by Peter the Great served as an example. Pioneers of westernizers included the poet Konstantin Batyushkov, and writer and journalist Ivan Panayev. Moscow and St. Petersburg were the main centers where westernizers gathered (Sputnik, 2010).

For Westernizers, establishing a bourgeois-based democratic system by peaceful means was possible. They rejected feudalism and serfdom in the economy, political life and culture, and called for Western-style socio-economic reforms. They focused on the commonalities between Russia and rest of Europe, rather than on disagreements. Russia’s socio-economic backwardness could be overcome by imitating the progress-embracing European system, rather than through unique elements of Russia’s national culture. Westernizers were basically influenced by theorists like Johann von Schiller, Georg Hegel and Friedrich Schelling, Ludwig von Feuerbach, Auguste Comte and Henri de Saint Simon (Sputnik, 2010).

Westernizers later became one of the political approaches in the post-Cold War Russian foreign policy. The Kozyrev doctrine, adopted in the first term of Yeltsin era, defined Russia’s

identity as the new liberal democracy and market economy along with the Western architecture. The Doctrine, named after Yeltsin's Foreign Affairs Minister Andrey Kozyrev, was presented as the re-joining to the West and proclaimed Russia's support in the transition to democracy and market economy (Smith, 1999, 482, cited in Nugraha, 2018). It proclaimed the idea of a strategic union of the Russian Federation and the United States, implying a gradual integration of Russia into the economic structures and Western values in exchange for assistance in the implementation of liberal reforms. Russia however failed to create a meaningful partnership with the USA and China which was a major setback to the westernizers.

Nevertheless, the Westernizer input is still evident in Russian foreign policy as Russia continues to try to build strategic partnership with the European Union in order to overcome the marginalization it faced in 2000s onwards and to secure uninterrupted oil and gas exports. It also hoped that a more independent European security re-structuring can undermine the US supremacy in European affairs. However, the Crimea crisis seemed to have caused a further fragmentation of Russia from the EU, which contributed to raise of doubts about the Russian identity as a western country.

2. *Slavophiles (Nationalists and Pan-Slavists)*: The Slavophile movement which started in the 1840s, sought to restore the role of Russia's Orthodox Church as the "Third Rome" (Nugraha 2018). Slavophiles criticized the Westernization efforts, arguing that Russia's destiny was not a European one. Instead, they called for a unique Russian way. Slavophile thinking was largely supported by educated people and landowners. However, the defeat of the Russian Empire in the Crimea war in 1854-56 highlighted the reality that it was not as strong as they thought. This led to the emergence of the Pan-Slavic movement. Pan-Slavic thinking called for the unity of Slavic people despite their religious, linguistic and geopolitical differences under Russia leadership (Nugraha, 2018).

The influence of Slavophile and the Pan-Slavism movement became more visible at the beginning of the 20th Century when the Russian Tsar devoted more attention to Asia. His interest in the Far East was demonstrated in "The conquest of Siberia, the construction of Trans-Siberia railway from Moscow to

Vladivostok, and the sending millions of peasants” (Nugraha, 2018, 99). The underlying aim of Pan-Slavists thinking, was to gather all people in Eurasia region that fell within the borders of the Empire and reinforce specific values of Eurasia.

3. *Eurasianism*: Eurasianist ideas resurfaced in the Soviet Union in late 1980s within Parniat, an organization that formerly encompassed most of the Russian nationalist movement (Laurelle, 2008). Eurasianists opposed Gorbachev’s New Thinking. They argued that the Russia-Western interdependence concept of Gorbachev weakened the country and made Russia dependent on other countries, especially Western ones. The term “Eurasianism” was rediscovered (often called as Neo-Eurasianism) during the final years of perestroika, particularly around the figure of Alexander Dugin. Dugin supported Eurasianism as a member of the Den’s editorial board: “Dugin argued that throughout the history two types of states or empires have existed and opposed each other; the continental that associated with Roman Empire, German and Russia empires and the maritime that associated with Carthage and British Empire that nowadays evolved as the so called atlanticist. The continental empires according to Dugin described as a benevolent force that uniting vast lands and multicultural people in non-exploitative basis, and promoting virtue, tolerant and harmony as has been claimed by Russian empire in the nineteenth century. Meanwhile the atlanticist is portrayed as greedy, exploitative and self-interested driven by mercantilist/capitalism and materialistic culture” (Nugraha, 2018, 101). According to Dugin, to balance the supremacy (unipolarity) of US, Russia should create a Eurasian alliance as a grouping of the continental power against the sea power represented by US and its allies.

At the beginning of 1996, the former head of the Foreign Intelligence Service, Yevgeny Primakov, replaced Kozyrev as head of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Primakov’s appointment was seen as the symbolic refusal of the Russian authorities from the course of rapprochement with the West (Lukin, 2018). For many, this was a Neo-Eurasianist turn of Russian foreign policy. The new foreign minister announced the main focus of his activities with the “near abroad” or rather those from the former Soviet Union. Since 1998 under Primakov and under his successor Ivanov, Russia has withdrawn from the path of concessions to the West. The policy of

the Primakov-Ivanov period was that of “selective partnership.” This concept, focused on the preference of cooperation with the United States and the EU, but not in all areas and retained the right of Moscow to choose when to be aligned or distant from them. This represented the first stage in Russian foreign policy.

Since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, he has demonstrated an affinity to Neo-Eurasianism. The Russian foreign policy concept of 2000 declared Russia’s concern with the rising unipolarity of international affairs under the United States’ superiority. However, when reading Russia’s foreign policy, it exemplifies a compromise between westernist (Atlanticist), nationalist and Eurasianist, abstracting from them their pragmatic elements.

In the 1990s and 2000s Russia faced an unstable economic situation and state weakness, causing foreign partners to doubt the Country’s ability to pay off huge external debt. Creditors, primarily the International Monetary Fund (IMF), doubted that Russia would be able to pay its debts on time. From 2000 to 2006, the solution to the debt problem was the main focus of Russian foreign policy. Nevertheless, thanks to high energy prices, Russia managed to pay off its debts before the deadlines, which significantly increased the level of trust of the Country in the world. Besides, the huge revenues from oil and gas greatly expanded the capabilities of the Kremlin for a more active foreign policy. The activities of Russia have dramatically increased, not only in the development of cooperation with countries of the West and near abroad, but also with the states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The highest priority of Russia’s concept of foreign policy, however, was to ensure strict compliance with the rights of Russians and the Russian-speaking population in the near abroad and the preservation of unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. These priorities were clearly manifested in the second Chechen war and the conflict with Georgia in 2008. Russia sought to attain these objectives by first agreeing to accept the norms of international law, the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and to treat other countries as equals and partners in the global world order (The concept of foreign policy, 2013). Second, Russia aimed to form good neighbor relations around its borders, by helping to eliminate existing and or prevent the emergence of

potential hotbeds of tension and conflicts in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation (The concept of foreign policy, 2013). Third, Russia wanted to promote a positive perception of itself in world, by popularizing the Russian language and the culture of its people in foreign countries (The concept of foreign policy, 2014). Forth, Russian foreign policy prioritized strengthening relations with the CIS countries and the Baltic States, as well as the European Union, the US, China, Japan and other states (The concept of foreign policy, 2013). The doctrine has helped the Russian Federation to reorient to pragmatism and independence in world affairs (Khmylev, 2010).

Following the United States decision to unilaterally act in Iraq, disappointed Russian political elite began to make significant changes in its foreign policy. In June 2006, Vladimir Putin spoke in Moscow to the diplomatic corps stating, “Russia as a major power should be more actively involved in shaping the agenda and be responsible for global development” (Putin, 2006). It was the first time when the president of Russia declared global ambitions of the country. The next step was Vladimir Putin’s Munich speech in February 2007, in which he rejected attempts to create a unipolar world under the auspices of the United States (Putin, 2007).

Today, this speech has come to symbolize Russia’s break from the West, the departure from the second stage of Russian Foreign Policy, and the embarkment on a new third stage (Ioffe, 2018). Statements by the President of Russia led to the creation of a new concept of the country’s foreign policy and it was approved in 2008 (Kremlin.ru, 2008). One of the most important principles that emerged in the new concept of Russian Foreign policy is non-interference in internal affairs of other nations. The Kremlin is tough on upholding this principle, and this position has attracted many non-Western leaders, significantly strengthening the image of Moscow in the non-Western world. However, the actions of Moscow aiming to protect the Russian-speaking population contradicts with this. At the end of 2013, Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s turn to the Pacific Ocean, which can also be called a turn to the East (Putin, 2013). Therefore, the Kremlin has adjusted its priorities in the Asia-Pacific. Later, unfolding events in the Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea led to the complete rupture of Russia and the West, and the complete reorientation of Moscow to the East. It remains to be seen whether the Kremlin will focus more on creating favourable external conditions for

the development of Russia or to challenge as well as change the world order.

Conclusions

The Russian Federation is the largest country in the world in terms of territory. The territory of Russia covers an area of about 17.1 million square kilometres. Russia is located on the mainland of Eurasia and occupies around 1/3 of its territory. The territory of the country is situated in the northern and north-eastern regions of the mainland and has a unique geographical and geopolitical position. It occupies the eastern part of Europe and the northern part of Asia and about 30% of the territory of the RF is located in Europe and about 70% in Asia. Along with extended sea borders, Russia has extensive land borders. The land borders separate Russia from 14 countries, extending 1,605 km. 990 km of these border falls on the Baltic countries, and 615 km on Azerbaijan and Georgia. Russia has land borders with China, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Finland, Norway and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The population of Russia in 2022 equals to 146 million. Looking at the last two decades, we can observe two shock periods where the number of the population has dramatically reduced. Substantial reforms may be needed in order to maintain a population increase in the country. Most of the population is living in three regions: The Central Federal District takes the lead with 26.83%, Volga Federal District follows with 20%, and finally North-western Federal District follows with 11.21%. According to the statistics although 189 ethnic groups live in Russia, the ethnic kin group Russians has the majority with 80.9% in the 2010 census followed by Tatars and Ukrainians with 3.9% and 1.4% respectively. Looking at the last two decades, we can observe two shock periods where the number of the population has dramatically reduced. The first period is the early 1990s and the second period is the end of the 1990s for different reasons.

The Russian Federation now has a market economy with a total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) size of \$1,577,524 million as of 2017, which makes it the 11th largest economy in the world. According the latest estimates, Russia has the largest natural gas

reserves of around 47.8 trillion cubic meters or nearly 23.7 % of the world's natural gas reserves (IES, 2018-a). Russia also has the 8th largest oil reserves of about 80 billion barrels, which is roughly 5% of the world's total oil reserves (IES, 2018-b). Apart from that, Russia accounts for the 4th largest coal reserves of about 70 billion tons (knoema.com). Russia also ranks in top positions in terms of many other essentially important metals, non-metal minerals, timber etc. Abundant natural resources play an essentially important role in the economy of Russia and through the period from early 1990s and especially after 2000 exports of natural gas, oil and other minerals became the main drivers of the economy of Russia. Thus, in 2017, the share of the extractive sector in total exports of goods of Russia reached 62.4%, oil and gas sector provided 36% of the revenue growth of the budget system and over 70% of the federal budget. High dependence on oil and gas exports makes the Russian economy highly sensitive to the volatility of prices of these primary commodities.

Russia possesses one of the world's largest and powerful armed forces. According to Global Firepower's 2019 world military strength rankings, Russia is ranked 2nd out of 137 countries. Of 69.640 million available manpower, 46.659 million are considered fit-for-service. The total military personnel are estimated at 3.586 million, including 1.014 million active personnel and 2.572 million reserve personnel. In terms of their structure, the Russian Armed Forces under the Ministry of Defence are divided into three branches – the Ground (Land) Forces, the Aerospace Forces, and the Navy. In addition, there are two separate arms of service – the Airborne Troops and the Strategic Missile Troops (Ministry of Defence, 2019a). There are also other military entities, such as the National Guard directly subordinated to the President of Russia and the Border Service under the Federal Security Service.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Russian Federation's foreign policy was in search for a viable replacement for Marxism. In this context, several strands of thought resurfaced in the post-Soviet era: Westernizers (Atlanticists), Slavophiles (Nationalists), and Eurasianists (Geopolitical). Westernizers argue for the need for Russia to realign itself with the West, where it rightfully belongs, while Slavophiles reject this claim stating that Russia's destiny is not a European one. Slavophiles seek

to restore the role of the Russian Orthodox Church and to unit Slavic people despite their religious, linguistic and geopolitical differences under Russia leadership. Finally, the Eurasianists promote the idea of uniting vast lands and multicultural people in non-exploitative basis, and promoting virtue, tolerant and harmony as formerly claimed by Russian empire in the nineteenth century. Since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, he has demonstrated an affinity to Neo-Eurasianism. The Russian foreign policy concept of 2000 declared Russia's concern with the rising unipolarity of international affairs under the United States' superiority. However, Russia's foreign policy exemplifies a compromise between westernist (Atlanticist), nationalist and Eurasianist, abstracting from them their pragmatic elements.

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THE MAKING OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

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Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation (RF) adopted a new constitution on December 12, 1993, being the first in its history to adopt a multiparty political system that includes universal values. To adapt to the new post-Cold War environment and international political system, RF's Constitution includes divisions of power (see Chapter 1, Articles 1-16) and provisions on fundamental rights and freedoms (see Chapter 2, Articles 17-64) comparable to Western Democracies. The Constitution includes 9 chapters based on five basic principles: the integrity of the state, the unity of the state power, the sharing of power between the RF and the federal units, the equality of the peoples living within the borders of the country and the understanding of an egalitarian state (Tellal and Keskin, 2003:405-406). Those living within the borders of the country have the right to self-determination in terms of internal self-determination and federated units are also granted a high level of autonomy.

The 1993 Russian Constitution elaborates on the type of government model Russia adopts, declaring it as “a Democratic federal law-bound State with a Republican form of government (Chapter 1, Article 1),” comprised of federal units – republics, krais, oblasts, cities of federal importance, an autonomous oblast, and an autonomous okrug. The Constitution is defined as the supreme law of the land that will be applied directly to all units of the RF. It goes on the state that laws and other bindings regulations in federated units shall not be contrary to the Constitution.

Furthermore, the Constitution pledges the RF will respect and incorporate universally recognized norms of international laws, international treaties and agreement into its legal system. It goes on to mention the rights and freedom of citizens in Russia are guaranteed by the state within the framework of the general principles of international law. The Constitution defines Russia

as a secular and social state that grants equal rights to all of its citizens, irrespective of their ideological and religious differences, and maintains that the Russia state does not have an ideology but rather supports political diversity and the multi-party system (Chapter 2).

Equally important, the Constitution elaborates on how power will be distributed. Russia, as this chapter will discuss in greater detail, represents a blend between a presidential and parliamentary system inspired by France's semi-presidential system model. The model is based on a two-headed executive principle – the President of the state and the Prime Minister of the government. Like most democratic systems, the Russian Constitution recognizes three branches of power – the executive, legislative, and judicial. All three branches of power are defined as independent and separate from each other (Chapter 1, Article 10). In terms of state power, the Constitution states “the Russian Federation shall be exercised by the President of the RF, the Federal Assembly (the Council of Federation and the State Duma), the government of the RF, and the Court of the Russian Federation” according to the authority granted to each (Article 11).

Apart from the provision of rights and division of powers, the Constitution specifies the foreign policy actors and decision-making process in detail. Within the framework of the Constitution and federal laws, the President is the leading foreign policy actor in Russia. The President sets the basic rules in this field, manages foreign policy, represents Russia on international platforms, and is the commander of the armed forces and the President of the Security Council of the RF. The Federal Assembly, within the jurisdiction of their power, is the second major foreign policy actor who forms the legal framework of foreign policy decisions and fulfil international obligations. The Ministries and Ministry of Foreign Affairs are mainly responsible for the implementation of the overall strategy on Russian foreign policy. It is the duty of Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate information among the foreign policy actors and to make a uniform foreign policy proposal. Intelligence organizations such as Federal Security Services (FSB) and Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), which assist the President, are invisible actors of the process.

In addition, the Security Council of the RF and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Federal Agency

are critical actors. The Security Council determines the basic principles of foreign policy, makes threat assessments along with the recommendations to the President about the policy to be followed and coordinates all these activities while the CIS Federal Agency is obliged to form a uniform foreign policy on cooperation with former Soviet countries. Some Federated Republics, such as Tatarstan, have the right to establish direct economic relations with foreign countries, provided that they remain within the borders of the Russian Constitution.

Other critical actors that influence foreign policy, although not specified in the Constitution, include the Russian Orthodox Church, the Presidency of the Russian Armed Forces and institutions that have public institution status such as Gazprom, Rosneft, Rosatom, and Rostec. Non-governmental organizations that support the foreign policy design and implementation process are composed of various foundations and think tanks. These include Russia's World, the Comrades Foundation, the Gorchakov Foundation, and the Moscow Fund for International Cooperation.

As demonstrated from this brief overview of the 1993 Russian constitution, there exists a range of critical actors involved in both Russian domestic and foreign policy, although the distinction between the two has increasingly blurred in recent years as international issues have become intertwined with domestic ones. For the aim and purpose of this chapter, the focus will remain on the making of Russian foreign policy, examining each of the actors' roles and the internal political environment that influence the formation of foreign policy in the RF. As this chapter discusses, Russia's domestic political order has a significant impact on foreign policy actors and the decision-making process. However, as this chapter exhibits, it is the President and his close circles that mainly determine foreign policy in the RF, especially those of the former Soviet Union. This chapter is divided into the following five sections: the structure of the RF, the Russian Government, political parties in Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church, and Civil Society and media. Each section provides insight on the critical role actors play in shaping and influencing Russian Foreign Policy.

The Structure of the Russian Federation

Federal states are typically established by unification or separation. For example, while the United States was established by the unification of the states, Canada was the result of separation. The federal system in Russia however is complex, made up two types of states: the federal state and the member state. The constitution gives the federal state power over the member states. While member states have independence in their internal affairs, they have no defence, security and foreign policy powers of their own, and are prohibited from leaving the federal states. The present complex system stems from the Soviet heritage and is based on the project of allocating the republics to ethnic groups under their own names. (Ağır, 2015:42-48; Dejevsky, 2009:238-342).

The Russia Federation comprises of federal subjects made up – republics, krays, oblasts, cities of federal importance, an autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs. In Chapter three, Articles 65-79, the Russian Constitution officially names and explains the legal status of the all the subjects, states and territories of Russian Federation. Until recently, there was 83 administrative units consisting of 22 republics, 46 oblasts, 9 krajs, 1 autonomous oblast, and 4 autonomous okrugs, and 2 cities of federal importance. More recently however, this number increased to 85 with Russia's annexation of the Crimea and Sevastopol in 2014, although most states still refer to them as part of Ukraine. On the other hand, after the Russian Federation's attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, 4 more Ukrainian territories were annexed. Russia occupied the Ukrainian territory of Zaporidja, Kherson, Donetsk and Luhansk regions in September 2022. Uncertainty remains about the final status of these regions. The situation of the mentioned regions will become clear when a ceasefire or peace agreement is signed.

The Russian Constitution considers federal subjects as equal subjects of the Russian Federation. Each federal subject has their own leader, legislative body and constitutional court backed by their individual constitution and legislation. Two delegates represent each federal subject in the Federal Assembly but vary according to the degree of autonomy permitted to each of them.

The highest level of autonomy is given to the republics, which consist of regions with non-Russian ethnic groups, although

many republics have a Russian majority. A republic originally received its name after the indigenous ethnic group common in the area. However, with internal migration, the indigenous ethnic group may no longer be the majority in the population of the republic. Republics maintain the right to establish their own official language and enjoy extensive powers. Despite the executive's powers granted to executives, the federal government will quell any contradictory laws that support any secessionist ideas and movements. Although the Federal government represent the republics in international relations, some are allowed to establish economic and commercial relations directly with foreign countries. Ranked from highest to lowest in terms of population, the 22 republics in the Russian Federation include: Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Dagestan, Republic of Udmurt, Chuvashia, Chechnya, Komi, Buryatia, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Kabardian Balkar Republic, Mordovia, Mari El, Karelia, North Ossetia (Alania), Khakass, Ingushetia, Republic of Adygea, Karachay Circassian Republic, Tuva, Kalmykia and the Altai Republic.

The *oblast* is the highest administrative unit in the Russian Federation. The name oblast refers to the largest city in the region and is formed where there is a Russian majority. Managers of this category are appointed at the federal level and the legislature is determined by federated elections. The city is also the administrative center of the oblast. Of the 85 federal subjects, there are 46 oblasts in Russian Federation, some of the more influential include Astrakhan, Chelyabinsk, Khalingrad, Kurgan, Leningrad and Moscow.

Kray, represents another federal unit of the Russian Federation, which differs significantly from the oblasts. The number of Krays are 9, including Altai, Kamchatka, Stavropol, and Zabaykalsky (formerly known Chita). There is also one autonomous oblast in Russia, which is called the Jewish Autonomous Oblast in Birobidzhan region.

Autonomous *Okrug*, represent an additional federal subject, where ethnic groups are dominant in the population – Chukotka, Khanty-Mansi, Nenetsiya, and Yamaliya. Autonomous Okrugs have less autonomy than Republics and more autonomy than Oblasts. Finally, Moscow, the capital city of the Russian Federation, St. Petersburg, and the city of Sevastopol after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, have a special status as cities of federal importance.

Yevgeny Primakov, who was prime minister in the 1990s, initiated a study for uniformization and simplification of federated units in Russia, but this study was not concluded. Vladimir Putin, who assumed the new presidency in 2000, also carried out efforts to uniformize the asymmetric federated units. In 2005, Perm oblast and Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug were merged and the new unit was named Perm Krai. Evenkiya and Taymyriya autonomous oblasts were also connected to the administrative boundaries of Krasnoyarsk Krai. In the same year, the Kamchatka Oblast and the Koryak Autonomous Okrug (Korkakiya) merged and became the Kamchatka Krai. In 2008, Ust Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug was connected to Irkutsk Oblast. Chita Oblast and Agin Buryat Autonomous Okrug were also united as Zabaykalsky Krai. As a result of his efforts, Russia was divided into 7 regions. The rulers of the so-called super-regions are appointed by the Russian President. Region administrators are held responsible for national security as well as the economic, social and political strengthening of their territories. The 7 regions originally created were Central, South, Northwest, Far East, Siberia, Ural, and the Volga. Later, the Caucasus was added as a new region, now making the total number of regions 8.

Although the 85 administrative units have many legal rights, Moscow remains the main decision-maker in the political system. The political and economic autonomies of administrative units are limited compared to Western countries. Federalism, according to the Western understanding, refers to a form of governance where sovereignty is shared, between the federal and federated governments. However, the practices of federalism in Russia differ significantly, and the implementations of federalism remains within the framework of a unitary state. This is in part due to Russia's unique historical developments and no former experience with federalism. Existing practices are more experimental and are open to the intervention of the central government when it is necessary. The relations between the centre and the federated units did not change the position of the centre's prescriptive structure.

The Russian Government: The President and the Prime Minister

The Russian President is the main actor of the political system. The President is not only the guarantor of constitution, but also of fundamental rights, and freedoms of citizens. As outlined in Chapter 4, Articles 80-93 in the 1993 Constitution, the main task of the President, as head of the state, is to ensure the harmonious functioning of the constitutional bodies and determine the general orientation of domestic and foreign policies. However, as this section highlights, the rights and powers granted to the President by the 1993 Constitution go far beyond classical presidential powers given in most Western states. Typically, a president acts as a symbolic authority to create a balance between institutions, directs executive and legislative bodies and takes basic decisions. However, Article 80 grants the Russian Presidency with “Super Presidency” powers.

Initially the presidential term was set for four years with the possibility of re-election for one additional term. However, in 2008 an amendment to the constitution was made that extended the presidential term to six years that went into effect in the 2012 elections. To qualify for the presidency, Article 81 of the Constitution states candidates must be over 35 years of age and have permanently resided in the Russian Federation for a minimum 10 years. Members of the State Duma have the right to nominate candidates for the head of state as do political parties. However political parties can only nominate candidates after collecting over 2 million signatures from federated units. This rule also applies to those who wish to participate in an independent candidate in elections. According to Article 77 of the Constitution, to be elected as President, it is necessary to obtain more than fifty percent of the votes in the first round. If no candidate can reach this rate in the first round, a second round of voting is held between the two candidates who received the highest number of votes. The president is then elected based on the highest number of votes received.

The President can be dismissed only by the Federation Council based on the opinion of the Federal Court of Russia on the crime of treason and subsequently upon approval by the Constitutional Court. One-third of the members of the State Duma must propose this request and the dismissal must be taken

by a two-thirds majority in both the Federation Council and the State Duma.

The President is responsible for a broad range of activities. One of the main activities include appointing and dismissing the Prime Minister. The President exercises his/her authority only with the approval of the State Duma. However, as Article 109 of the Constitution states, the President has permission to terminate the State Duma if it rejects the President's nominee for Prime Minister three times, making the checks of Presidential power dubious. Furthermore, Article 83 of the Constitution entitles the President to appoint and dismiss federal cabinet members and deputy prime ministers. The President also has the right to reject the resignations of Prime Minister or cabinet members who would like to leave the office according to the legal provisions, and to ask them to reconsider staying at their current posts. To date this right has not been applied, but legally such an option exists, illustrating the extensive powers the President has.

Additionally, the President is obliged to determine the basic preferences of the country's domestic and foreign policy in accordance with Article 80 of the Constitution. Therefore, the main orientation in the implementation of policies are determined by the President rather than the cabinet members and the Prime Minister, and the President directs political decisions through statements and speeches on various platforms. The statements of the president, which can be assessed under the annual address, reveal his/her main political preferences. Similarly, the president can raise a national or international issue through budget talks. The president also has the right to propose laws to the legislative body and to send draft legislation as well either through the government or through its own bureaucracy. Thus, the president indirectly affects the legislative process.

All federal laws must be approved by the President before they become enforced. The President has the right to veto a federal law. If a law is vetoed by the President, it is readmitted to two-thirds majority of the State Duma and must be ratified within 7 days. The president also has the right to issue prevailing and binding decrees throughout the country, provided it is not contrary to the Constitution and the federal laws in force.

The president's powers in defence, security, and foreign policy are also broad. It is the constitutional duty of the President

to protect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian state. The President is entitled to appoint and dismiss the high-level command as head of the armed forces. He/she is also the director of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and chairs the sessions, regulates military doctrine and activities. He/she has the right to declare martial law either in whole or in part in the country in case of an attack or threat against Russia. In such a case, the president must inform the legislative body. The President has the authority to also declare a state of emergency, provided he/she notifies the legislature when it is deemed necessary. He/she has the authority to appoint and recall diplomatic representatives to foreign countries and international organizations in consultation with the relevant committees and commissions of the legislative body. And the President has the right to conduct international negotiations and become a party to the agreements binding on Russia (Henderson, 2011:124).

One more point worth mentioning, is the President's work with bureaucrats in the fields of defence, security, and foreign policy. The unit consisting of bureaucrats, also called the Presidential Block, does not have a legal basis. Thus, the President, through his/her contacts with the elite, can direct political developments and cabinet members. Apart from the official staff, the Block may include former KGB personnel or police chiefs. The Government is obliged to coordinate with the Presidential Block in carrying out its ordinary duties. This relationship between the Presidential Bloc and the government represents a derivative or reflection of the practices of the Soviet Union.

Although the Government has the constitutional right to bring any issue to the judiciary against the President's decisions, in practice it complies with the attitude of the Presidency. When the powers of the President are examined as a whole, the diversity of duties and obligations given by the 1993 Constitution and its weight on the political system are remarkable. Indeed, some Western experts considered the Russian political system as a dictatorial presidency. In the Russian political system, the personality characteristics of the president and attitude towards exercising powers directly affect the implementation of the system. The strong powers of the President, which did not attract much attention during the reign of Yeltsin, have attracted attention

during Putin and Medvedev periods. To illustrate one example, as previously as noted, the constitution only allowed a president to serve for two terms. However, after having served from 2000 to 2008 as President, Putin had to stand down and Dmitry Medvedev was elected as President. Putin alternatively assumed the prime minister post. Although Medvedev was legally in power during his presidency, the political practices were shaped by Putin's preferences while he served as prime minister (Henderson, 2011:106). Then the Constitution in 2008 was amended extending the presidency from 4 to 6 years enabling Putin to be elected a third term as president March 4, 2012 with an official count of 64 % of the vote.

Putin's first months in office were marked by attempts to quash or marginalize the protest movement and those entities that did not lend their support. Under the newly enacted laws, the organizers and participants of unauthorized demonstrations were subject to dramatically increased fines, and nongovernmental organizations that received funding from outside Russia were forced to declare themselves as "foreign agents." Lastly, Russians went to the polls on March 18, 2018 which non coincidentally served as the fourth anniversary of Russia's forcible annexation of the Ukrainian autonomous republic of Crimea, an event that marked a spike in Putin's domestic popularity. In line with public expectations, Putin outperformed his rivals and was elected President of Russia till 2024.

Parliament has no authority to appoint or dismiss cabinet members. In Russia, the President decides the resignation of the government, and chairs the cabinet meetings when it is deemed necessary. However, the appointment and dismissal of the chairman of the Central Bank depends on the approval of the State Duma. The head of state also has the authority to propose laws and to veto them. The laws adopted by the State Duma must be signed and published by the President in order to enter into force.

The State Duma cannot be terminated in cases of martial and emergency situations and 6 months before the end of the term of office. The State Duma can vote of no confidence against the government. This requires a majority vote of the full number of members. After the vote of no confidence, the President has the right to declare the resignation of the government if he/she wishes or to rejects this decision.

If the vote of no confidence arises for the second time in three months, the President will either declare the government resignation or use the power to terminate the State Duma. The president has the authority to issue decrees and orders. Legislation in this category should not contradict the constitution and federal law. The limits of the decree authority are extremely narrow. In Russia, the federal budget, taxes and fees, financial obligations, customs, and monetary issues with the acquisition or loss of citizenship, administrative structure, fundamental rights and freedoms, rules of election are regulated by the basic legislation. The President does not have the authority to issue a decree on a matter regulated by law.

The President has the right to propose candidates for the president of the Constitutional Court and the President of the Supreme Court along with the membership for the High Arbitration Court and for the Attorney General's Office. Appointment to these positions is carried out after the approval of the Federal Council. In contrast, it has the authority to appoint judges serving in federal courts.

As for the dismissal of the president, there has to be a crime related to treason or similar sanctions against the president action and the State Duma's approval by a two-thirds majority. If the Council of the Federation approves the decision by a two-thirds majority, the President is removed from office and becomes subject to the legal proceedings before the Constitutional Court.

The presidential system in Russia today is largely based on Putin's popularity. Putin is the coordinator who eliminates the differences of opinion within the Russian state and directs them to a single option. The rights and powers granted to the President by the Constitution and various laws have facilitated Putin's struggle with the oligarchs and the success in this field has led to an increase in public support. Putin was trying to realize a project that was accepted by the vast majority of the Russian people. In other words, he wanted Russia to be a strong international political actor as it was during the USSR. Putin has put into practice the idea of alliance and cooperation with China to reinforce Russia's power in global competition. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization has served as an important tool in this regard.

Russia's relations over the former Soviet countries through the CIS, the attitude towards NATO enlargement in Ukraine and

Georgia have led to the strengthening of Russia in global politics, while the main impact has emerged within the country. Putin's foreign policy preferences and his policies in Ukraine have strengthened his political support within the country and led the society to turn towards nationalist national goals.

The Prime Minister

Although the prime minister is the head of the government, and thus the head of the executive body, he/she and the cabinet in practice are obliged to put into practice the policies the President decides. The Prime Minister negotiates with the President in advance to avoid vetoing the cabinet members. Cabinet members cannot be appointed from among the representatives of parliament e.g. the State Duma and the Federation Council. The President may dismiss the Prime Minister or one of the cabinet members at any time. The Prime Minister's main task is to organize government activities in accordance with the Constitution, federal laws and Presidential decrees. In this context, preparing the budget and fulfilling state policy obligations in the fields of economy, culture, finance, education, science and social security is the main task of the cabinet. It is also the duty of the cabinet to take the necessary measures to carry out the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, protection of property rights and public order are within the scope of government's mandate. The Government is also obliged to fulfill the duties assigned to it by the Presidential decrees.

The Government may be dismissed by the President if political non-compliance arises. It may also be overthrown by a simple majority vote of the total number of members in the State Duma. The President has the right not to accept the resignation of the government, which received a vote of no confidence in the State Duma. If the president does not want the resignation of the government, which has received a vote of no confidence, then the second round of the voting takes place in the State Duma. If a no vote of confidence is reached in the second vote, the President will either ask for the government's resignation or dissolve the State Duma. The same method is used during the confidence vote. If the cabinet prepared by the Prime Minister appointed by the President cannot receive a vote of confidence from the State Duma within

7 days, the President has the authority to appoint a new prime minister or to terminate the State Duma. The State Duma has no authority to dismiss the ministers. In the Russian administration system, which has its own peculiar features, the government is not the primarily a decision-making body, but an organization that implements the decisions. Without the President's approval, it is not possible for the government to implement any policy. Because of the President's broad power, the government is careful to work in harmony with the President rather than in conflict. The authority of the President to dismiss the Prime Minister and members of the Cabinet and to dissolve the State Duma limits the mobility of the Cabinet.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Bureaucracy

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is the federal executive body that outlines government policies and implements foreign policy decisions. All activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are supervised by the President. Former Soviet Republics, now members of CIS, are the most important units in the organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Russia defines CIS countries as its "backyard" in the "Near Abroad Doctrine" following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Aron, 2013).

The main task of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to ensure coordination in Russia's foreign policy. The Ministry shapes data from federated units, legislative councils, and non-governmental organizations within the framework of policies adopted by the Security Council of the Russian Federation. The priority of Russian foreign policy is to protect Russia's national interests. The basic principles guiding Russian foreign policy includes the maintenance of the country's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. Within this framework, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs operates from a strategic perspective to be a global power again.

On the official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, it states that Russia is trying to establish a contemporary international political order that is fair, stable and democratic and in compliance with international law. These statements however coincide with reality, as revealed in the events of 2008 in Georgia and 2014 in Ukraine. The President and his team, who guide the foreign

policy, have not hesitated to act contrary to these principles when it was deemed necessary.

During the Soviet Union, the main decision-makers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries were the Soviet elite from the Communist Party: The Secretary-General, Politburo, Council of Ministers, Central Committee, and the Secretariat. This group, also called *Nomenklatura*, controlled the entire Soviet system. Youth organizations called *Komsomol*, leaders of regional party organizations and high-level bureaucrats were also included in this group. Society was excluded from participation in debates due to the totalitarian nature of the Soviet system. The public instead accepted the official discourse to get rid of the oppression.

Consequently, totalitarianism and the cult of leadership abolished society's belief in the system. When Gorbachev came to power in the mid-1980s, his efforts to restructure the system opened the door to the political participation of the masses.

Today however, it is apparent that the strong bureaucratic structure of the former Soviet Union has carried over into Russia's current political system. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bureaucracy quickly adapted to the capitalist system. Unlike the past, where the bureaucracy derived its power from the adherence to the official ideology of the Communist Party, now it is through Putin's leadership and membership in the United Russia Party, making the bureaucracy untouchable within the system.

Russian Parliament: Federal Council and the State Duma

In the December 1993 referendum, the Constitution amended the Russian Parliament, termed the Federal Assembly which is the legislative branch of the government. The Constitution gives explicit details about the Federal Assembly and its function in Chapter 5, Articles 94-109. The Federal Assembly has two branches: The Federation Council (upper house) and the State Duma (lower house). The Federation Council includes two representatives from each subject of the Russian Federation – one from the legislative and one from the executive body of state authority, who have the duty to approve draft laws. Unlike the State Duma, the members do not have links to political parties. The Federation Council approves draft laws after first having

been discussed in the State Duma. The Federation Council has no right to make changes to these drafts, but rather has two options: to approve or reject the bill. If the Federation Council does not approve the proposals from the State Duma within 14 days, the proposed law is renegotiated with the participation of an equal number of representatives from both chambers and a text of conciliation is drawn up based on these negotiations. The jurisdiction for the Federal Council includes several areas such as the approval of the President's decrees of the introduction of martial law and the state of emergency, the approval of changes in borders between subjects of the Russian Federation, the impeachment of the President, deciding on whether to use the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside of its territory, and the right to propose candidates for the high court judges and prosecutors to name a few (Article 102).

The State Duma was established in 1993 after the dissolution of the Congress of People's Representatives of the Russian Parliament during the constitutional crisis. Members of the State Duma, the main body of the Russian legislative process, are elected through federal elections. The State Duma has 450 members and the term of office of deputies is 5 years. To be elected as a deputy, the candidate must be at least 21 years of age. According to the new regulation introduced by the 2004 election law, the election to the State Duma membership is based on political party lists. Before this change, half of the State Duma members could independently apply for candidacy based on the narrow zone selection system. The candidate who received the highest number of votes in the narrow zone system was elected as a member of the State Duma. To send representatives to the State Duma, political parties must pass the 5% election threshold throughout the country. Due to the election threshold, it is not possible to represent small parties in the State Duma. The OSCE has criticized the new regulations, arguing that Russian elections are not held under equal and fair conditions (Busyigana, 2018: 57-64).

The jurisdiction of the State Duma, as stated in the Constitution, includes the vote of trust of the President's selection of Prime Minister; the appointment or removal of the President of the Central Bank, the Chairman and half of the auditors of the Accounting Chamber, and Commissioner for human rights; proclamation of amnesty; and discussing charges of treason

against the President for his impeachment (Article 103). Federal laws shall be adopted by the State Duma, approved by the Federation Council and signed by the President. The State Duma may overcome the Federation Council veto by re-adopting the law by two-thirds of the votes. The President's veto can be overcome only if the law is re-adopted by both the Federation Council and the State Duma by a 2/3 majority vote of the total number of members of both chambers.

Political Parties in Russia

Until 2000, there was no law on political parties in Russia, and political party activities were conducted according to various laws remaining from the Soviet period. The emergence and development of the concept of a political party has shown a different development from other countries. In the early 1990's, various social and civil activities such as trade unions, retiree associations and women's associations were expressed as "parties". These unions and associations had the right to participate in the elections. 258 social organizations and 15 unions participated in the 17 June 1995 elections under the name of parties. To participate in the elections, category organizations had to register with the Central Election Commission and identify themselves as "socio-political organizations".

The most radical changes in political parties were made in 2000 under Putin's rule. The definition and responsibilities of the political party were determined with a law passed in 2001. According to the new law, only political parties can participate in the elections. The participation of professional organizations in elections was prevented within the frame of the respective law. To have the status of a party, political organizations now need to have at least 10,000 members and be organized in more than half of the country. The law also prohibits the establishment of political parties at the regional level and stipulates that political activities should be conducted at the federal level. It is also forbidden to establish a political party based on gender, language and ethnicity (e.g. Christian Democratic Party).

Due to the weakness of political parties, independent distinguished candidates came to the forefront in the regional parliamentary elections held in 2002. In these elections, the ratio

of political party candidates in total was 14.3% and only 9.6% of them were elected. The party lists were used in 4 regions and the others were based on the majority system. The number of political parties decreased to 44 at the end of 2003. Since 2004, the proportional representation system has been used for the elections of the regional parliaments.

The structure of political parties in Russia is based on the authority of the party leader. The party candidates who are going to participate in local elections have been determined by the leadership of the party. Due to the political power of the party leader, the strengthening of the opposition within the party is prevented. Consequently, today's leading Russian political party leaders have maintained their positions since 1990s.

The political parties are forbidden from forming an election alliance based on the amendments that entered into force in 2005. Only registered political parties can participate in the elections. The national election threshold is 7% for representation in the State Duma.

Based on the ideological classification in Russia, political parties are divided into two categories – the left and right. The parties in the center consist of a mix of two different ideologies. When considering the economic policies of Russian political parties, it is possible to classify them as left or right and whether they are pro-Western, or Eurasian based on foreign policy preferences.

Table 4.1:
Ideological Trends of Russian Political Parties

Left Wing	Left of the Centre Range	Right of the Centre Range	Ultranationalist
Communist Party	Russian Women	Choice of Russia	LDPR
Agriculture Party	Diversity Party	Civil Union	
Union of Bolsheviks	Yabloko	Democratic Party of Russia	
Russian Social Democratic Party	Republican Party	Russian Union Party	
	United Russia	Right-Wing Union	

Source: Chenoy, Anaradha M & Kumar, Rajan, Re-emerging Russia Structures, Institutions and Processes, Palgrave Publication, New York 2017, p.128.

The only party in Russia that remains on the left of the ideological range and maintains its existence is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). On the far-right side of the ideological spectrum, is the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). These two parties have been represented in the State Duma in all elections from 1993 to present. In the last election, held in 2021, political party United Russia won 326 seats, securing a supermajority that allows it to change the constitution without the support of other parties. The other three main opposition parties – CPRF, LDPR, and A Just Russia, won the remaining seats, taking 58, 24, and 29 respectively. At the other hand, the New People's Party won 16 deputies and independent candidates won 2 deputies. (Duma, 2022). The other parties with a similar ideological structure were not as successful. For the remainder of this section, it will briefly retrace the historical origins and discuss the ideological differences of the six most powerful political parties.

The United Russia Party (BRP) is also known as Putin's party. It was founded as a result of the merger of the Union Party and the Fatherland Russian Party. One of the founders of the party is the former Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov. Today, the United Russia Party is known as the champion of ethnic nationalism and patriotism. The United Russia Party argues that Russia is a major political force in history and that it should be the same today. This idea is expressed in the Russian language with the word *Derzhavnost*. The party advocates hard competition against NATO in foreign policy and defends the ideas of limiting the powers of regional administrations. The practices of the Yeltsin government against corruption, privatization and oligarchs were criticized by the founders of this party in the 1990s. The establishment of the party was possible as a result of a series of alliances. In 1999 Luzhkov formed an alliance with Yevgeny Primakov called the All Russia Party. Later, the Agricultural Party and the Women of Russia joined to this alliance. The Alliance received 23% of the vote in the 1999 elections. In 2003, the alliance was reorganized with the convergence of all these political parties and became the United Russia Party. The party derives its strength from the strong leadership of Putin starting from 2000. It won the majority of the seats in 2003 during the State Duma elections. In all subsequent elections, the United Russia Party has dominated the State Duma. While Yeltsin used violence to control the Parliament, Putin has

used legal regulations, decrees and the United Russia Party.

BRP is generally known as the party of the regime with its support by the majority of the voters, preventing the possibility of representation of the central parties in the parliament. BRP supports state capitalism, nationalism and national sovereignty, while advocating limitations of the federated units' powers and local administrations, preferring instead to strengthen the center rule. As for foreign policy, BRP supports Eurasianism, close relations with China, diaspora, protection of the rights and interests of the Russians are among the priorities of the party.

The ideological successor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (CPRF), has been the strongest opposition party in the State Duma since 1993. The history of the Party dates back to 1898, during the Tsarist period (CPRF Website, 2019). In Russia, after the coup attempt in September 1991, the party's activities were suspended and then the party reorganized in 1993, and it was registered with the Ministry of Justice. The main founding text of the Party is based on Marxist Leninist ideology. The party's organizational structure consists of the Central Committee and the Secretary-General. It has 570,000 members and is organized in 81 regions of the country. In the 2016 the State Duma elections, the party won 42 seats. The official publication of the party is the Pravda newspaper. The party argues that economic activities should be in public ownership. The propaganda activities carried out by the Party under the name of "Renewed Socialism in the 21st Century" differs from the Soviet period. The most noticeable difference is that CPRF is more nationalistic and patriotic (Kudryatsev, 2017).

The political practice of the CPRF has been somewhat contradictory. On one hand, it has consistently offered a negative view of the introduction of the free market in Russia and of cooperation with the West. On the other, the CPRF leadership has gradually been integrated into the post-Soviet political elite, and the party also has created stable contacts with many businesses, advancing their interests at the federal and local level. Among its core supporters are those who suffered politically and economically as a result of the changing economic order. Particularly prominent among its supporters are elderly voters, which has prompted some observers to question whether the party's success in elections will gradually diminish over the

long term. In 2018, the selection of Pavel Grudinin as the CPRF candidate in the presidential election, and of Vadim Kumin as the party's candidate in the Moscow mayoral election, indicate distinct attempts to update the party's flagging political image. Both candidates had made their careers in business and were outsiders as far as the party's traditional ideologically oriented cadres were concerned. To attract younger voters, the party supports various *Komsomols* (youth organizations).

Following the appearance of the United Russia Party, the political support of the party has remained limited due to changing internal and external political developments. While in 1999 it won a landslide victory in the State Duma election with more than 24% of the votes and 113 seats, in 2003 it managed to win less than 13% of the votes and only 61 seats. In the last parliamentary election in 2016, political support of CPRF was 12% and won 42 seats in the State Duma (Kudryatsev, 2017)

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDRP) has an extremely right leaning, claiming that Slavic nations are selected nations (Chenoy, 2001). This party originated in the *Pamyat* (Memory) movement founded by Dmitry Vasiliev during the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. Although the *Pamyat* movement was ideologically xenophobic and anti-Semitic, it was accepted by the rulers as a patriotic association. During the communist era *Pamyat* worked for the restoration of churches and national monuments in Moscow, and Vasiliev generally supported the Communist Party and praised Lenin, Stalin, and the KGB for defending national traditions.

After 1989 however, the *Pamyat* movement increasingly supported the Russian Orthodox Church and began to advocate monarchism. Later attempts were made to revive Russian nationalism. The organization over time was transformed into the LDRP political party by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Despite the party's name, it is anything but liberal, supporting authoritarian, racist and Islamophobic attitudes and supported the annexation of the Crimea. The supporters of the party are generally low educated and unemployed people living in rural areas or towns. The Party in the 1991 elections received 8% of the vote. Then in 1993 the Party received 70 seats the State Duma elections, the party's highest achievement. Voter support, which was 12% in the 2011 elections, increased to 16.5% in the 2016 elections. LDRP

is currently the third most powerful party in the State Duma. This party supports the Putin administration on all important issues. Some political analysts claim that LDRP strongly opposes other political parties but is now an ally of the United Russia Party.

The fourth largest party represented in the State Duma is the Only Russian Party. The party, which positions itself as a social democrat, defends fundamental rights and freedoms and supports the market economy, however with strict controls. It supported Putin in the 2018 presidential elections.

The final remaining two parties represented in the State Duma are the Motherland Party (Rodina) and the Civic Platform Movement. The Motherland Party was founded in 2003 by Aleksey Zhuravlyov and supports the state's strength in the economy and the strengthening of Russia's power in the contemporary world. The Civic Platform Movement was established in 2012 and was founded by Mikhail Prokhorov, one of Russia's most famous and richest representatives of the industry and business world in the political system. Both parties supported Putin in the 2018 Presidential elections.

Russian Orthodox Church

The Russian Federation state is a secular state. Article 14 of the Russian Constitution states, "No religion may be established as a state or obligatory one" and that "[r]eligious associations shall be separated from the State and shall be equal before the law". The constitution provides citizens the freedom of belief and of religious worship. Although the Constitution and laws state that the Russian Federation is neutral to all religions, in practice the Russian Orthodox Church is under the protection of the state and is "first among equals".

Today, the Russian Orthodox Church, along with Istanbul, Alexandria, Antioch, is ranked as one of the most important Orthodox churches in the world. The Russian Orthodox Church claims authority over the Orthodox Churches in the former Soviet countries. However, some of the Orthodox churches do not accept the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, the Estonian and Moldavian Churches do not adhere to the Russian Orthodox Church and maintain an autonomous status. A similar development has been observed in the Ukrainian and Belarusian

churches. The Russian Orthodox Church's influence, however, goes well beyond the geography of the former Soviet Union. For example, Orthodox churches in China and Japan are generally subject to the Russian Orthodox Church. Orthodox Churches in the USA are divided into two groups. Some of them accept the Russian Orthodox Church as the highest authority, and the other accepts the Fener Greek Patriarchate. The activities of the Russian Orthodox Church in the USA go back to 1867, when Alaska was sold by the Tsarist administration (Duali, 2014: 63-94).

Presently, Orthodoxy is the most common religious belief in Russia. Despite not paying attention to performing religious rituals, about two-thirds of Russians define themselves as Orthodox and religious. In the Russian Federation, which currently has a population of 143 million, the rate of Orthodox is 74% while the rate of Muslims is 6.5%. Religious groups with a ratio of less than 5% of the population in the country are Buddhist, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Mormon, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Hindu.

The largest Orthodox population in the world lives in Russia. According to the Russian Orthodox Church, the Pope in Rome is considered the highest authority of the Catholic world and the Orthodox Church in Moscow is the supreme authority of the Orthodox world. In this context, the Russian Orthodox Church does not accept the claims of the universality (ecumenic) of the Fener Greek Patriarchate and considers it a distortion of reality. Since the mid-1980s, when Perestroika and Glasnost policies came to the forefront, Russian society has undergone significant changes in religious matters.

Since the mid-1990s, the Russian Orthodox Church became the undeclared official religion of the state. The Russia Orthodox Church now has become an integral part of the Russian identity. It is not uncommon to see hanging icons in official public institutions, broadcasting Orthodox prayers on state television, recruiting a large number of clergymen from members of the military and police organizations, and building churches for soldiers on duty at the border, demonstrating that Orthodoxy is the official state religion.

In the post-Soviet era, the Church has increasingly become an important political actor in domestic and foreign politics. Despite the constitutional principle of secularism and the

provision that the state should maintain an equal distance to all members of religion and belief, the Orthodox faith in Russia is supported and encouraged by the state. The Church is supported not only by the Putin Administration, but also by the opposition Liberal Democratic Party and even by the Communist Party with its increased engagement in political activities. Gennady Zyuganov, Secretary General of the Russian Communist Party, has repeatedly stated that they support the strengthening of Orthodoxy in the Russian geography. The church, alongside of the Government, has sought to establish a Russian influence both within and outside of the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The Russian Orthodox Church considers the protection of the rights of Russian descents in the former Soviet Republics one of its primary duties. The church and the state act collectively in matters such as protecting the rights and interests of the Russians outside Russia and ensuring that the Orthodox peoples are attached to the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow (Somuncuoğlu, 2004: 93-107). The church considers the influence of other foreign denominations on Russians living abroad as a direct threat to its influence. In this context, the Russian Orthodox Church claims to represent the Orthodox religion in Belarus and Ukraine and opposes the activities of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the National Orthodox Church of Ukraine operating in the country. Additionally, the Church tries to influence the Russian minority in the Moldavian and Baltic countries through sectarian connections. The Moldovan Orthodox is affiliated to Moscow. However, the influence of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Moldova is expanding. In Estonia, the majority of the population is Lutheran. There are 50,000 Estonian Orthodox and 100,000 Russian Orthodox in the country.

Civil Society and Media

Russian society has undergone significant changes since 1991. The first remarkable trend after the Soviet Union was the quick adaptation of former communist rulers and bureaucratic elite to the political changes, many of which became businessmen. The Soviet society model and Soviet people have also rapidly changed.

Previously, Soviet society was heterogeneous in history,

religion, and culture. Economic disparities were not readily apparent, as the state had a means of production and redistributed income. The lack of astronomical differences between wages, the provision of free education and health care by the state, and finally the restriction of private property prevented major problems in society. The exception however was privileged groups such as members of the Communist Party and prominent bureaucrats.

In the mid-1980s, all of this changed when Gorbachev introduced *perestroika* to change the Soviet Union, although it would eventually hasten its collapse. During this time however, senior bureaucrats and party members became interested in trade and business. This interest was further spurred under the first president of the Russian Federation Yeltsin, whose first generation of enterprising elites demonstrated their support for him and the reforms, by minimizing their ties with the Communist Party in the early 1990's. During privatization and restructuring activities under the new system, elites in Moscow and the regions economically benefited.

The emerging entrepreneur class is composed of oligarchs at the local level and the Communist Party's bureaucracy. In particular, the direct contact of local managers with foreign capital has led to the emergence of new power groups prior to the strengthening of the authority of the central administration. Initially in the 1990s, Yeltsin attempted to control the new class that emerged, but he largely failed. Table 2 shows the economic strength of the oligarchs in Russia in the early 1990s.

Speculations about the new entrepreneurial class and the wealth of local elites influenced Russian society in two ways. First, the entrepreneurial class effected the foreign capital inflows and the expansion of Russia. Secondly, people opposed the empowerment of oligarchs on the grounds that it was unfair. Those who were adversely affected by political economic developments strongly supported the Putin administration in the 2000s.

Since 2000, some of the oligarchs in Russia have escaped from the country. Legal arrangements have been made to control the activities of the remaining oligarchs inside the country. In particular, the oligarchs' support for political parties and their dominance over the media were limited during the Putin period. Putin's fight with the oligarchs led to an increase in popular support for him.

Apart from the changes in civil society, there has been no significant progress on media freedom since the 1990s. Although the media is categorized as semi-independent, the Russian government largely controls it, directing society through newspapers, television, news agencies, and internet media. The media plays an important role in shaping Russian foreign policy as it did during the Soviet period. The Russian administration uses the media to make propaganda inside and outside of the country to expand its influence on society.

Television is the most popular information tool for Russian citizens, followed by internet, radio, and newspapers. The Russian government directs society through state controlled media and private media organizations, some of which belong to oligarch businessmen. Putin tries to create domination over oligarchs by using media tools.

The media serves as an important instrument of foreign policy. President Putin pursues a strategy that shapes foreign policy through state controlled and non-state instruments. After Putin's re-election as president in 2012, the pressure on the media increased. The President often manipulates domestic and foreign policy decisions through the media. The use of media in foreign policy is done in three ways: to provide public support for the implemented foreign and security policy, to put forward official foreign policy preferences, and to influence foreigners through propaganda. As a result, the media is the key to the formation and direction of Russian foreign policy. Putin conveys the message of the Kremlin to the public by means of state controlled media and private sector media channels.

The President's media strategy is primarily designed by his advisors. Putin's messages related to culture, society, business, political parties and target countries are communicated through the media. The strategy is based on an approach that puts Putin in the center. The Putin administration uses the media to gain influence over the public and businesses to reinforce his existing power, and to deliver messages to target countries.

The most popular television channels in the Russian Federation are Rossiya 1, Channel 1, NTV, Russia Today, Ren TV, and TV Centre. The leading internet media is Mail.Ru (ru + com), Rambler and Yandex. The radios in the same category are Yevropa Plyus, Avtoradio, Rosskoye Radio, Retro FM and

Radio Shanson, Ekho Moskvyy, Rario Marak and Vesti FM are the media organs that include news and analysis in their programs. Komsomolskaya Pravda, Metro Daily, and Metro Weekly are also among the strongest in the media in the printed media category. The total circulation of these three newspapers is around 6 million. State controlled Rossiskaya Newspaper, published as a tabloid, is the most popular publication (Snegovaya, 2015).

The Freedom House report argues that media freedom in Russia has become worse since 2000. The main reason is the increased propaganda in the statecontrolled media. In Russia, state television stations serve as the main source of information for 90% of the population. In particular, radical changes were made after the increase in anti-government demonstrations in 2011 and after Putin was re-elected in 2012. The most important change that prevents freedom of the media is the law, also known as the foreign agent law. This law increases the state pressure on independent reporters. Another turning point took place in 2014 when the Russian forces invaded the eastern regions of Ukraine, and the attack was largely camouflaged by the Russian media (Freedom House, 2018).

After 2014, publicly owned media and others faced intense pressure. The media strategy of the Putin administration in the new era is based on three pillars. The first of these is the application of censorship to the news. As a result of the continuity of this practice, the media began to apply censorship on their own and did not include any news and comments that the government would not consider appropriate. The second method is to control the media with official propaganda. Mass media has become bulletins that reflect the official view of the government. The third method is the use of legal and economic instruments such as accusations of media organs as foreign agents, the dismissal of editors and even the acquisition of the media. The media organs purchased in this way and who subsequently changed their publication policy include Ria Novosti, Gazete.ru, Kommersant, Londra.ru, EkhoMoskvyy, Nevasimiya, and Yandex. Independent media outlets that ignored warnings, legal and economic pressures have been closed down by federal or local authorities such as: Kasparov.ru, Ej.ru, Navalyn's Live Journal, Grani.ru.

The pressures of the administration on the media have been similar for non-governmental organizations. Following the foreign

agent law enacted in 2012, the Ministry of Justice accused some non-governmental organizations of espionage. Consequently, some NGOs have been oppressed and forced to limit their activities, others have terminated themselves, or some were closed by the administration. As this section has demonstrated, freedom of the press and the activities of non-governmental organizations are severely restricted in comparison with Western democracies.

Conclusions

The Russian Federation comprises of federal subjects made up – republics, krais, oblasts, cities of federal importance, an autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs. In Chapter three, Articles 65-79, the Russian Constitution officially names and explains the legal status of the all the subjects, states and territories of Russian Federation. Until recently, there was 83 administrative units consisting of 22 republics, 46 oblasts, 9 krais, 1 autonomous oblast, and 4 autonomous okrugs, and 2 cities of federal importance. More recently however, this number increased to 85 with Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and Sevastopol in 2014, although most states still refer to them as part of Ukraine.

The 1993 Russian Constitution defines the Russian government as “a Democratic federal law-bound State with a Republican form of government” (Article 1). It recognizes three branches of power – the executive, legislative, and judicial. All three branches of power are defined as independent and separate from each other. In terms of state power, the Constitution states “the Russian Federation shall be exercised by the President of the RF, the Federal Assembly (the Council of Federation and the State Duma), the government of the RF, and the Court of the Russian Federation” according to the authority granted to each (Article 11).

The main actors of the Russian federation foreign policy are the President, Federal Assembly, Security Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The President of the Russian Federation, in conformity with his constitutional powers, shall provide guidance of the country’s foreign policy and as the Head of State shall represent the Russian Federation in international relations. The Federation Council and the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, within the framework of their

constitutional powers, shall pursue legislative work to support the foreign policy course of the Russian Federation and fulfilment of its international obligations. The Security Council of the Russian Federation shall execute the decisions of the President of the Russian Federation in the area of international security and control over their implementation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation shall provide direct implementation of the foreign policy course approved by the President of the Russian Federation.

The United Russia Party is the most powerful political party in Russia. The other political parties represented in the State Duma are the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Liberal Democrat Party, Only Russia Party, Motherland Party and Civic Platform Movement. The role of the political parties in the formation of foreign policy decisions is extremely limited. As a mass party, the United Russia Party dominates the State Duma. In most cases, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, can abandon the ideological perspective and support the practices of the Putin administration on the basis of patriotism. On the other hand, it is not an exaggeration to say that the Liberal Democrat Party is also an ally of the government. An important problem with political representation has been the election threshold. Since the 7% election threshold is applied at the country level, many political parties remain outside the State Duma.

The Russian Orthodox Church is a widely recognized religious institution in the Russian Federation. The relationship between the Russian State and the Russian Orthodox Church is a complicated one, which demonstrates a breadth of activity, collaboration, and cooperation. The Church sees itself as the religious leader of the Russian Federation and claims authority over the Orthodox Churches in the former Soviet countries. However, some of the Orthodox churches do not accept the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, the Russian government supports the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church inside and outside the country and encourages cooperation in forming its foreign policy decisions.

The role of media and civil society in shaping foreign policy decisions has been limited in recent years. Following the events of Ukraine in 2014, criticizing the official policy of the government in mass media and civil society activities has been

limited by the foreign agent law enacted in 2012. Mass media state or privately owned has faced censorship, causing them to avoid any news or comments that the government would not consider appropriate. Media has also been controlled through official propaganda, now including bulletins that reflect the official view of the government. The government has also used legal and economic instruments such as accusations of media organs as foreign agents, the dismissal of editors and even the acquisition of the media as a means of silencing any criticism of the government. Non-governmental organizations have faced similar pressure accused of espionage, forced to either limit their activities or be shutdown.

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THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S RELATIONS WITH GREAT POWERS

Prof. Dr. Tarık Oğuzlu

Introduction

From Russia's inception, it has sought the status and recognition as a great power. Therefore, Russia's relations with other great powers are of significant value (Krickovic and Weber, 2018). The aim of this chapter is to discuss Russia's relations with the other great powers of international politics – the United States, China, European Union. The first section analyzes the conceptualization of great power. Then in section two, it begins with a discussion about Russia's status in international politics. From a conceptual perspective, it deliberates on whether and why Russia should be considered a great power considering the Country's decline in material and non-material power capabilities since the end of the Cold War era. Then in section three, it analyzes Russia's relations with the United States. Considering the geopolitical confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, one wonders how and in which ways the changing dynamics of Russian-American relations during the post-Cold War era have affected Russia's great power position. How have the dynamics of bilateral relations radically changed following Putin's coming to power in late 1990s? The fourth section highlights the key dynamics of Russia's relations with China and tries to answer why these two countries have in recent years come closer. It considers whether the evolving cooperation between Russia and China as an alliance relationship is designed mainly to prevent the United States from playing a hegemonic role in the Eurasian region. Finally, in the fifth section, it examines Russia's relations with the European Union, with a focus on the alternative schools of thought shaping Russia's approach to relations with European countries. What are the key features of Russia's approach towards the European Union? And how have they evolved under the leadership of President Putin?

The Concept of Great Power

Of all the theoretical approaches in international relations, it is the structural realist approach that sees the distribution of

power capabilities among states as vital to the ordering of the international system at a given time (Mearsheimer, 2001). The structural realist approach holds that states are the key actors of international politics. However, it maintains that states of great powers matter the most. The ordering principle of international relations assumes anarchy. States internal behaviors are presumed to function in a similar manner and to not play a decisive role in their international behaviors. States are only classified by their material power capabilities (Waltz, 1979). Dynamics of relations among great powers have shaped the course of international developments and the material and ideational foundations of the international order over the course of history (Brands, 2018).

Although many scholars place the United States in its own category due to its well-invested geopolitical interests in every part of the planet, and ability to protect them against all other actors through the use of coercive and non-coercive instruments, this chapter holds that Russia, China and the European Union should also be considered in the same category. Like the United States, they all differ from other actors in international politics in terms of the scope of their geopolitical interests, as well as capabilities to lead, either in all, or some dimensions of power. This chapter maintains they are the only great powers in today's international system.

Despite the United States lead on Russia, China and the European Union in terms of its material and non-material power capabilities, each of them, are the only powers on earth that have the ability to play hegemonic roles in their neighborhood as well as the capacity to protect themselves against a range of external attacks. Although many other countries outperform Russia in terms of economic and ideological power capabilities, it remains the only country on earth with the military power capacity to compete with the United States on nearly equal terms. If military power capability were to be the only criterion to differentiate countries, the United States and Russia would form a league of their own. Russia's non-conventional nuclear power capability can only be compared to the United States. Even with its deteriorating economic capacity over the last decade, Russia still possesses the ability to deploy troops to distant places in a short amount of time. Russia's military involvement in Georgia, eastern Ukraine, Syria and Venezuela attest to Russia's non-dwindling military power capacity (Sutyagin and Bronk, 2017).

The question of how many great powers exist in international politics depends on the type of polarity within the system at any

given point in time. In unipolar systems, there is only one great power whose material capability is unmatched by others. The time period between 1991 and 2008 is defined by many observers of international politics as a unipolar era in which the United States acted as the only global and hegemonic power within the system (Monteiro, 2014). Whereas the Cold War era represented a bipolar system consisting of two hegemonic powers – the Soviet and the United States. All other state powers arranged themselves within the system according to their relations with either of the two great powers. The international systems during the interwar years and the time period between the end of Napoleonic wars in 1815 till the end of the World War I in 1918 is considered an example of a multipolar system, where power was distributed among four great powers – Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, with wealth and military capabilities distributed relatively evenly and had the capacity to block political arrangements that threatened their major interests.

The Russian Federation's Great Power Status

Unlike the United States, which pursues geopolitical interests across the entire globe, Russia's geopolitical interests are mainly confined to the larger Eurasian region (Suslov, 2018). Even though Russia is the only country with the capability to annihilate the United States in a nuclear exchange, its overall military capability is no match of the United States. The United States for example, spends around 800 billion US dollars on its military, while Russia spends approximately one tenth of this amount. To illustrate one more example, the United States has twelve aircraft carriers, while Russia has only one. Nevertheless, Russia has the ability to defend itself against any potential American military attack and strike the American homeland with intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads.

In terms of its economic power capability, Russia is far below many other powers with a GDP of approximately 2 billion US dollars. For example, the United States and European Union command a GDP of around 19 trillion US dollars each, whereas the Chinese GDP is around 13 trillion US dollars. Yet, Russia is among the top three producers of oil and gas on earth and Russian authorities do not shy away from using others' dependency on Russian oil and gas resources as leverage in its foreign relations (Rumer, 2007).

Additionally, Russia's ideological/normative/soft power

capability is no match of the United States, China or the European Union. Neither Russia's political ideology nor its global brands have succeeded in gaining worldwide attraction (Kanet, 2018).

Despite Russia's inadequacies, Russia still considers itself a great power and seeks to be recognized as one. To understand why and how, it is important to understand different aspects of Russia's conceptualization of great power. First, Russia understands great power in terms of tangible power capabilities, in particular, military capacity, natural resources and geographical location of which it is endowed with.

Second, Russia assumes a great power should be one of the permanent members on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since it represents the most important decision-making body in international politics to deal with issues concerning international peace and security. Russia, as a permanent veto holder on the Security Council, also maintains that no international military operation should be undertaken without the approval of the UNSC.

Third, Russia views a great power as having the capacity to influence and determine the decisions of other states in international relations. This has particularly been the case since President Putin came to power in the late 1990s, where Russia has strongly opposed the legitimacy of the liberal international order and the global hegemony of the United States. However, it has not been the intention of Russia to influence other states by pursuing a revolutionary strategy to overthrow the liberal order and propose an alternative world order. Rather Russia's success to influence other states has emanated from its ability to use its disruptive power capacity to restrict attempts of western powers to shape international politics in their own image. Through this strategy, Russia seeks to prevent other actors from damaging its national interests in different parts of the world. This in part explains why Russia does not offer proactive solutions to global problems. Instead, as many Russian foreign policy analysts observe, Russia seems to benefit from frozen conflicts.

Fourth, Russian leaders are aware that the most powerful actors in international politics in the years to come will be the United States and China. The possibility of peace and war across the globe will be strongly determined by the interplay of relations between Washington and Beijing. However, Russia is determined to not let either of them shape the course of developments in the larger Eurasian region. For this reason, Russia follows a foreign policy strategy which simultaneously aims at contributing to

the erosion of the transatlantic trust between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean and improving relations with China to counterbalance the United States.

Russia and the United States

Following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new geopolitical environment emerged in which the triumphant western powers found it difficult to accept the new Russian Federation as a great power. Common amongst all successive American administrations from the early 1990s until now, is the perception that Russia is a regional power lacking the power capacity to be deemed as a great power on par with the United States (Roberts, 2013). As this section explores, the bilateral American-Russian relationship over the last thirty years can be characterized as an ongoing Russian desire to be treated as a global power on the one hand and incessant American reluctance to do so on the other.

Although Russia pursued a pro-western foreign policy orientation during the 1990s, setting in motion a liberal democratic transformation process at home, and cultivating functional cooperative relations with NATO and the European Union abroad, western powers refrained from treating Russia as a great power and providing it a legitimate place in the existing institutions of the liberal international order (Rumer and Stent 2009). This drastically contrasted with the western powers' treatment of the former communist countries in central and Eastern Europe. As the former communist states in central and Eastern Europe liberated themselves from the Soviet Union, they showed a strong determination to join the western international community. The western powers responded positively and many of these countries in the 1990s joined as members of NATO and the European Union. Likewise, as newly independent states emerged in Caucasia and Central Asia, western powers lent their support by offering to incorporate them into the western institutions at the risk of antagonizing Russia.

From the onset, it was not easy for the Russian Federation to recognize the newly independent states in the larger Eurasia region as its peers. Even though Russia was not in a strong position to resist western penetration into the post-Soviet geography during the 1990s, Russian opposition to western primacy in its former territories saw a radical increase following the coming to power of President Putin in late 1990s (Wishnick, 2009).

To understand why Russia did not immediately react to NATO's expansion in the 1990s, it is important to understand Russian leaders' initial assumptions following the end of the Cold War. Russian leaders mistakenly assumed with the end of the Soviet Union, there would be no need for NATO to exist as a collective defense alliance. Russian leaders hoped for the formation of a pan-European security organization that would replace NATO as the prime venue to discuss European security. Under this new arrangement, Russia expected western powers would recognize Russia as a great power and redefine the security structure in Europe in close cooperation with Russia (Layton, 2014).

When it became apparent that NATO was there to stay, Russia was then given the impression by western powers that NATO would not enlarge towards Russian territories in return for Russian acquiescence to German unification and ascension to NATO (German, 2017). Despite Russian expectations, NATO did expand closer to the Russian border. Initially, to ease tensions between Russia and NATO members, Russia signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997 whereby Russia was allowed to join NATO meetings in Brussels, without having the right to vote on final decisions. Additionally, Russia was admitted to the G-7 group in 1998 as a consolation prize for not opposing NATO's decision to admit Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic to membership in 1999.

After the Kosovo crisis in 1999 however, relations between Russia and NATO entered a crisis period. Russia vociferously opposed the US-led NATO operations in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. When NATO undertook military attacks against Serbia in 1999 to coerce the Serbian leadership to withdraw its troops from Kosovo, Russia strongly reacted. From Russia's perspective, any NATO-led involvement in the internal affairs of other countries without the approval of the United Nations Security Council is illegitimate and illegal (Karabeshkin and Spechler 2007).

In terms of Russian-American relations, they dramatically declined during George W. Bush's two term presidency between 2000-2008, when Russia became increasingly discontent and alarmed with American foreign policy. During this period the so-called neoconservative school of thought shaped American foreign policy thinking decisively, whereby the United States adopted a global primacy strategy that promoted American values across the globe through unilateral instruments. No longer

believing in the legitimacy of multilateral platforms, the Bush administration forced its allies to toe the line and place maximum pressure on potential rivals to digest American hegemony as fait accompli (Pan and Turner, 2016). To demonstrate its discomfort with American foreign policy, Russia strongly opposed the US-led war in Iraq in 2003. Together with France, Germany and China within UN Security council, Russia voted against any US-led multilateral military operation in Iraq.

The Bush administration also supported the peaceful revolutions that swept across the post-Soviet geography in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan collectively known as the “color revolutions”, hoping that successful implementation of liberal democratic practices in those countries would bring to power pro-American regimes. The US also supported Georgia and Ukraine’s nomination to join NATO. However, it was decided at the NATO summit in 2008 that Georgia could only join if it succeeded in transforming into a democratic and capitalist state.

From the Russian perspective, western policies, particularly American policies, aimed to contain the penetration of Russian influence in its near abroad. At the Munich Security Conference in 2007, President Putin delivered a historic speech in which he harshly criticized the American efforts to promote American values across the globe and strengthen its primacy through the adoption of unilateral policies. Putin made it clear that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a historical mistake and his mission was to rejuvenate Russia as a formidable great power. To Russian elites, it is assumed that all great powers are entitled to have their own sphere of influence, and Ukraine and Georgia were in Russia’s (Radin and Reach, 2017). In response to the perceived threat of western policies, Russia undertook a limited military operation against Georgia in the summer of 2008 in the immediate aftermath of the NATO summit in Bucharest. Not long after, Russia annexed Crimea after the pro-Russian regime Ukraine was ousted from power by people demonstrations in early 2014. Russia refused to accept the idea of Ukraine and Georgia joining the EU and NATO, before having the chance to develop a cooperative relationship with western powers supported by international agreements.

In 2014 Russia was disposed from G-8 following its annexation of Crime. The Russian use of force against sovereign states of Georgia and Ukraine demonstrated the primacy Russian leaders’ give to military power in foreign policy (Sherr, 2017). The recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as sovereign states and the annexation of Crimea into Russian territories were

in clear violation of the founding principles of the Westphalian international order. Former American Secretary of States John Kerry went so far as to accuse Russia of employing the tools of nineteenth century geopolitics in the emerging twenty first century (Epstein, 2014).

Once the Bush presidency was replaced by Barak Obama's presidency in early 2009, the new American administration decided to set in motion a reset in its relations with Russia. Despite the many disagreements between the two powers, the driving logic behind the reset initiative was that the United States and Russia also shared many common strategic interests, such as preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, defeating Al-Qaeda and its affiliates across the globe, bringing stability to Afghanistan and Iraq, dealing with transnational terrorism and organized crime and finding a lasting solution to the crises stemming from the attempts of regimes in North Korea and Iran to acquire nuclear weapons (Mattox, 2011). For about four years, the reset initiative appears to have eased the tension in bilateral relations coinciding with Medvedev's presidency in Moscow between 2008-2012.

Relations however would once again take a negative turn after Vladimir Putin returned to presidency in 2012. Following the eruption of protests in Russia in 2011 upon Putin's announcement to run again for presidency, a degree of skepticism rose in Putin's administration with respect to the intentions of American governments vis-à-vis Russia. From Putin's perspective the anti-Putin street demonstrations revealed nothing more than the US intentions to get involved in Russian domestic politics by supporting non-state actors. The illiberal authoritarian turn in Russian domestic politics following the reinstatement of Putin's presidency also demonstrated the widening value gap between the United States and Russia creating a thorn in bilateral relations (Oliker, 2017).

Russia's relations with the United States continued to deteriorate following the Crimean crisis. In cooperation with European allies, the United States orchestrated an economic and political embargo against Russia. Relations however dropped to a new low following Russia's military involvement in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the incumbent Assad regime in late 2015. Putin has demonstrated his willingness prop up the Assad regime through the employment of all policy instruments at his disposal to regain influence in the region with Russia's expanded military capabilities, reclaim its status as a great power, and to

play a greater role in the Middle East (Allison, 2013). Aside from Russia's military efforts, Russia received China's backing at the Security Council to block any multilateral or US-led military operations against Assad. Russia has also sought to create alternative platforms to find diplomatic solutions to the Syrian civil war and it is within this context that Russia, Türkiye and Iran have met numerous times and developed the Astana and Sochi processes to find a compromised solution to the Syrian civil war.

After Donald Trump won the presidential elections in late 2016, bilateral relations went from bad to worse. Despite Trump's intentions to improve relations with Russia on a transactional and pragmatic logic, who has also been sympathetic with Putin's strongman rule in Russia, there is now a bipartisan consensus in the US Congress that Russia deserves to be punished for its illiberal authoritarian turn and overt political interference with the American presidential elections (Rumer, Sokolsky and Weiss, 2017). The Trump administration went further by categorizing and identifying in the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy documents Russia and China as the most important global rivals to be reckoned with (The White House, 2017). And despite Trump's extremely critical stance on NATO and European allies, the US contribution to NATO's deterrence and reassurance capabilities have meaningfully increased over the last few years (Sperling and Webber, 2019). Furthermore, a sizable number of American troops have now been deployed to Poland and American efforts to fortify NATO's military presence in central and Eastern Europe has shot up.

Russia and China

Relations between the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War era ebbed and flowed depending on different time periods (Lo, 2008). For example, bilateral relations during the late 1940s and throughout much of the 1950s were cordial. This is in part because of the US, who as the leader of the liberal-democratic camp, defined Russia and China as enemies and did its best to contain both. Despite a certain degree of rivalry between Moscow and Beijing for the leadership of the communist world globally, Russian and Chinese leadership saw a great benefit in cooperating across the board.

Following the American strategic overtures towards China in the early 1970s, the bonds between the Soviet Union and China weakened. In line with realpolitik strategic thinking, the

American decision makers during the Nixon presidency wanted to drive a wedge between these two communist behemoths. While the famous ping-pong diplomacy of the Nixon presidency under the stewardship of the National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger paved the way for a strategic rapprochement between the United States and China, relations between the Soviet Union and China deteriorated. The prime goal of the United States in helping facilitate China's opening to international world was to weaken the so-called Soviet-Chinese axis.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new understanding in bilateral Russian-Chinese relations. Since the early 1990s till now, the degree and scope of cooperation between Russia and China has significantly grown (Charap, Drennan and Noël, 2017). Unlike the Cold War era, these two great powers have begun defining their relationship increasingly from a strategic point of view. Their common strategic goal has been to limit the influence of the United States in the greater Eurasian region.

Despite increasing cooperation, relations with China did not occupy the center stage in Russian foreign policy during the 1990s. There are two main reasons. First, post-communist Russia under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin adopted a pro-western foreign policy orientation during the 1990s. Russia undertook many liberal reforms at home, while yearning for the recognition of its western identity by western powers. Simultaneously, western powers supported Russia's incorporation into the western international community. The 1990s also saw that Russia was a great power in relative decline being in no position to challenge the enlargement of the western international community towards the post-Soviet geography in central and Eastern Europe. Despite Russia's opposition to the enlargement of NATO and the European Union's efforts to expand towards its borders, Russia's declining material power capacity and the willingness of Russian leadership to become a legitimate member of the western world restricted Russia's response.

Second, China was at the early stages of its economic development process during the 1990s and was in no position to appear as a reliable trade partner and a source of financial investment for the Russian economy. One should also underline the liberal engagement policy the United States pursued towards China the first fifteen years of the post-Cold War era, made it possible for China to adopt a reactive and low-key foreign policy orientation, one it did not want to jeopardize with western actors in general and the United States in particular. In other words, both

Russia and China valued their relations with western actors more than their relations with one another and none of them were in a possible to appear as a reliable strategic partner for the other (Lo, 2010).

However, the more western actors, particularly the United States, tried to contain the rise of China in East and South East Asia, and Russia in the wider Black Sea and the Middle Eastern regions, the closer Moscow and Beijing have become. Russia's efforts to improve its relations with China have skyrocketed over the last decade as western actors have put Russia under economic sanctions with the view of punishing Russia for its assertive and aggressive foreign policy stance.

Putin's coming to power in late 1990s boosted the determination of the Russian elites to help rejuvenate Russia as a great power with growing economic and military capabilities, as well as widening its sphere of influence. Increasing oil and gas revenues and Putin's success in strengthening the state capacity have proved instrumental in the revival of Russian power over the last two decades. In parallel to the increases in its material power capability, Russia has simultaneously adopted an assertive foreign and security policy line aiming at delegitimizing the core tenets of the liberal international order. Russia's war with Georgia in the summer of 2008, its annexation of Crimea in 2014, its support to pro-Russian separatists of Eastern Ukraine, its military involvement in Syria in late 2015 on the side of the incumbent of Assad regime, and its ongoing efforts to meddle in the internal affairs of some liberal western countries through hybrid tactics of political warfare, have put Russia on a collision course with the western world.

Therefore, Russia's recent strategic rapprochement with China can only be understood by considering the dramatic negative turn in Russia's relations with the western world in general and the United States in particular. Russia's relations with the United States reached their nadir following the alleged claims that Russia interfered in the latest 2016 presidential elections in the United States by overtly working for the success of one candidate, Donald Trump, at the expense of the other, Hillary Clinton. Despite all the intentions of President Donald Trump to help improve relations with Putin's Russia, both the Congress, and most of the American public alike, have now adopted a negative perspective towards Russia.

Irrespective of Trump's transactional approach towards European allies and extremely critical stance on the value of NATO,

American contribution to NATO's deterrence and reassurance capabilities has dramatically increased over the last five years. Some even argue that the dramatic deterioration of NATO-Russia relations has indirectly contributed to the perpetuation of NATO as a collective defense organization in the emerging twenty-first century.

Another point worth underlining is Russia's strategic rapprochement with China has also been driven by the worsening of relations between China and the United States over the last decade (Gabuev, 2015). To understand why relations between China and the United States has deteriorated in recent years, structuralist realist offers some answers. Structural realist scholars suggest war will likely occur between the established global power – the US, and the rising power – China, because the established power does not want to lose its hegemony and privileges within the system emanating from its unrivalled power status (Allison, 2017). Through this logic, if the United States does not want to lose its global hegemony in the years to come, it is in its strategic interest to contain China and prevent its rise now. Structural realists also predict that as the power capability of a state increases, it begins redefining its national interests from a much broader perspective than before and all states pursue power maximization strategies to secure their survival within the anarchic international order. The reason why American-Chinese relations have recently entered a downward spiral can be attributed to the rapid rise in China's material power capabilities relative to those of the United States which has instilled a fear in American decision makers.

This systemic cause is also compounded by the political aspirations of the Chinese communist party that has been in power since 1949. The current Chinese president Xi Jinping defines the Chinese dream as the rejuvenation China as the most powerful country in East Asia to end the country's century of humiliation at the hands of western powers (Callahan, 2017). China's leaders also wish to overtake the current global hegemon, the United States, in all critical power categories by 2035. China has now adopted a more nationalistic and assertive foreign policy line, leaving behind the decades old 'hide your capabilities and bide your time' dictum which the United States has begun interpreting as the most important challenge levelled against its national security and global primacy.

Today, the Trump administration has been pursuing a protectionist trade war against China while increasingly trying

to contain its rise through the adoption of Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and boosting military capabilities of its traditional allies in the region. The decades-old liberal engagement strategy has already given way to realist containment strategy. President Obama's strategy of containing the rise of China through pivoting to East Asia has been given a new boost by President Trump's efforts to fortify American military presence in the region as well as contemplate alternative development strategies to rival China's Belt and Road Initiative (Johnston, 2019).

Russia and China are both realpolitik security actors that believe in the primacy of hard power capabilities and tend to define security from the perspectives of territorial integrity, national sovereignty and societal cohesion (Wilson, 2018). Both countries believe that the unipolar era between the early 1990s and the second half of the 2000s was a historical aberration and a multipolar environment is required to maintain global peace and stability. Similarly, Russian and Chinese leaders share the view that both Russia and China are entitled to have geopolitical influence in their neighborhoods as well as curbing the American penetration into their regions. A common view shared by both countries is that western claims of universal human rights and morality are wrong, and simply serve to disguise imperialistic ambitions to impose one's values onto another. Both countries content that nations have different conceptualizations of morality, human rights and political legitimacy due to their peculiar historical experiences, geographical locations, state-society traditions and human capital. Looking from this standpoint Russia and China are the most ardent supporters of the idea that non-involvement in states' internal affairs and the recognition of their national sovereignty should remain as the most sacrosanct value of international relations. Therefore, western attempts to promote democracy abroad are not legitimate and the principle of responsibility to protect masks ulterior imperialistic ambitions. Likewise, there is not a universally recognized standard to define humanitarian interventions and nation-building initiatives in war-torn countries (Grant, 2012).

Russian and Chinese societies are inclined to legitimize strong state authority over society. Post-modern values of consumerism, hedonism and extreme individualism in liberal democratic western societies are considered vices to be avoided. Both countries are ruled by strong charismatic leaders and the scope of civil society participation in national politics is strictly limited. Martial values are strong within Russian and Chinese societies and the value of individuals emanate from their

contribution to the well-being of their societies and security of their states.

Even though the scope of the cooperation between Russia and China has recently widened to incorporate as many different realms as possible, it would be wrong to characterize the current relationship as one of an alliance (Gabuev, 2015). Rather it serves as a growing strategic partnership of convenience, not a NATO-like collective defense alliance. The burgeoning friendship between Presidents Putin and Jinping has been demonstrated by their frequent visits to each other, more than thirty times since Xi Jinping became president in 2013. China is Russia's number one trading partner and the volume of bilateral trade is a little more than 100 billion US dollars. Yet, Russia is not among China's top trade partners. Russia mainly sells to China oil and gas whereas China exports to Russia predominantly manufactured merchandise goods. The Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and Chinese-led BRI have merged with each other as parts of the Greater Eurasian Economic Partnership. Both countries are the two most powerful members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the so-called BRICS community. Their military cooperation is also noteworthy. Russia is the number one arms exporter to China and Chinese military modernization has been made possible, among others, by Russian technology transfers. Both countries organize joint military exercises in different locations across the globe. Their diplomatic cooperation within the United Nations and other international settings is also remarkable.

However, it is still the case that both countries define their relations with the United States more vital to their security and economic interests than their own bilateral relations. Many analysts share the view that neither Russia nor China would accord the other the big brother role in an emerging alliance relationship (Kaczmarek, Katz, and Tiilikainen, 2018). Indeed, both countries take great pains to avoid giving signaling that their goal is to establish a NATO-like military alliance.

Russia and the European Union

Russia's relationship with Europe consists of a strong historical legacy dating back to the modernization efforts of the Tsar Peter the Great and institutional interactions since the end of the Cold War era. Historically speaking three alternative narratives have shaped Russia's relations with Europe, namely a pro-Europeanism, pan-Slavism and Eurasianism (Sakwa, 2011).

The pro-Europeanist school of thought holds that Russia is first and foremost a European country and the Russian civilization can be rightly placed within the larger European civilization (Kaempf, 2010). Once the Byzantine Empire ended at the hands of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century, Russia became the most important representative of the Orthodox Christian world. It has also been Russia's conviction that the Orthodox Patriarch in Moscow holds the highest religious authority within the Orthodox community. The Russian Church strongly opposes attempts of other patriarchates, most notably the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul, on claims for the ecumenical title. During the reign of the Ottoman Empire, the Russian tsars claimed to act as the legitimate protectors of the Orthodox community living within the borders of the Ottoman Empire.

Furthermore, the pro-Europeanist narrative holds that Russia's modernization and transformation into a developed country was contingent on Russia adopting European norms and practices. Many go back to the centuries-old modernization process in Russia to the reign of Peter the Great mainly because he had sent a bunch of Russians to European countries to study European practices and set in motion a detailed transformation process within the Empire to mirror European norms and practices. Pro-Europeans also cite Russia's contribution to European cultural and artistic civilization among the proofs of Russia's European identity.

From the perspective of pro-Europeans, Russia should develop good relations with European countries and try to join all leading European regional organizations as a full member. The Russian economy is strongly tied to European economies and the volume of bilateral trade between the two is unrivalled in Russia's overall trade relations. Europe is also the number one source of all foreign direct investment in the Russian economy.

In terms of security interests, pro-European perspectives argue that Russia's geography would be better served and protected from European nations by being considered as a European country (Hill, 2019). Russian territory to the west of Urals is plain and difficult to defend against powerful armies of European nations. Napoleon, for example, almost succeeded in conquering Russia in the 19th century and a similar situation occurred almost one hundred years later when Hitler invaded Russia from the west during the WWII.

This security logic manifests itself strongly in Russian attempts to establish buffer zones between the Russian mainland

and powerful nations of western Europe, most notably France and Germany (Roberts, 2017). For example, Poland served as a buffer zone between Germany and Russia in the past. Even Russian and German authorities signed some agreements to divide Poland into Russian and German spheres of influence. When the Second World War ended, Russian troops invaded many Central and Eastern European countries and helped install pro-Soviet communist regimes. Similarly, the Warsaw Pact was established in the year of 1955 when the Federal Republic of Germany was invited to join NATO in the same year. All such security practices fit in well with geopolitical desires to protect the Russian mainland against potential territorial attacks coming from the west (Graham, 2010).

The wartime alliance among Russia, the United States and Great Britain against Hitler's Germany also attests to Russian efforts join forces with maritime powers whenever a continental European nation put claims to hegemony across the continent. This demonstrates that the balance of power logic shapes Russian security culture profoundly (Kotkin, 2016). Despite ideological and cultural differences between Russia and western European nations, as well as the United States, they all succeeded in forming a powerful anti-German alliance during WWII.

The second historical narrative that has shaped Russia's approach to Europe is pan-Slavism. Russia is presumed to be the natural leader of the Slavic origin-nations. The insurmountable differences between Russia's orthodox and Slavic culture and Catholic and protestant Europeans suggests that Russia should not pursue a pro-European orientation at home and abroad. There is a distinctive The Russian identity is set apart from western European nations and the best Russia can do is pursue power politics with European nations. Russia is a civilization-state of its own. Pan-Slavism also suggests that Russia is first and foremost a Slavic country rather than a multicultural entity in which all ethnic and linguistic communities living in Russia possess equal claims to.

The third historical narrative that has decisively shaped Russia's approach towards Europe is Eurasianism (Morozova, 2009). According to this school of thought Russia is both a European and Asian nation. The Russian identity is defined alongside Eurasianism as a multicultural identity. All non-Slavic subjects of the Russian state can shape the destiny of Russia should they prove their allegiance to Russian national interests. Looking from this perspective, Russia is defined as a quasi-imperial state. Russia is the traditional and natural leader of the greater Eurasian region As the center of gravity in international politics has shifted

away from the transatlantic area to the Indo-Pacific region, Russia would do well to define itself as Eurasian rather than a European or an Asian state, instead focusing its geopolitical attention on the developments taking place in the greater Eurasian region. As geopolitical rivalries over connectivity issues increase, Russia's Eurasian identity would accrue greater advantages.

For Russia to feel secure and safe, Russian leadership seeks to create fissures within the transatlantic community by wooing European nations away from the United States as well as dealing with EU members on a bilateral basis rather than treating the EU itself as a single international actor (Wohlforth and Zubok, 2017). This strategy is the outcome of the Cold War era legacy that still lives in today's Russia. The United States previously defined the Soviet Union as the existential enemy in geopolitical and ideological terms and adopted the so-called containment strategy during the Cold War years. NATO was established to help bring into existence a powerful defensive alliance in Europe under American leadership and all successive American administrations supported western European allies in their efforts to strengthen their integration in economic and other realms. For the United States to deal with the Soviet menace, strong security bonds between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean would prove to be decisive. Preservation of the transatlantic alliance under American leadership and the adoption of the containment strategy constituted the cornerstones of American security policy towards the Soviet Union.

Given this historical experience, Russian leadership has prioritized driving wedges between Americans and their western European allies. During the Cold War era, Russian rulers tried to convince and persuade their European counterparts that Russia and European nations were neighbors sharing the same geopolitical landscape, and that it was in their strategic and security interest to work together. Furthermore, they pointed out that in the case of a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, Europe would be the first theatre to be wiped off the map.

Put another way, the Soviet leadership warned NATO's European allies against the dangers of entrapment in a potential American-Russian face-off and that they had toed the American line blindly. Looking from this perspective, the Soviet leadership supported Germany's efforts to reach out to the Soviet Union through economic engagement in the early 1970s. Russia capitalized on anti-American feelings in leading European allies such as France and Germany in its efforts to help create cracks

within the transatlantic alliance. The signing of the Helsinki accords and the founding of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975 testify to the success of Russian efforts in this regard. The Soviet leadership also tapped into the strong German opposition to the instalment of American intermediate range nuclear ballistic missiles in the territories of European allies.

This thinking manifested itself in the immediate aftermath of the post-Cold War era as Russia proposed to help bring into existence new security structures in Europe that would leave no European nation outside. Even before the Cold War era ended in 1991, the last Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev proposed the common European House initiative (Layton, 2014). Likewise, from the Russian perspective, the end of the Cold War era between the two rival power blocks justified the dissolution of the NATO alliance. Russian leadership has incessantly argued that a new pan-European security organization should replace NATO if Russia and European countries want to live in a stable and secure Europe. If this was not possible, Russia should be admitted to NATO as a member.

As part of its efforts to woo European allies away from the United States, post-Cold war era Russian leadership has consistently sided with key European allies such as France and Germany whenever these countries had strong geopolitical and foreign policy disagreements with the United States. Two examples stand out in this regard. First, Russia cooperated with France and Germany inside the United Nations Security Council to help scupper the American plans to organize a military operation against Iraq in 2003 on the pretext that Saddam's regime developed nuclear weapons capability and actively supported transnational terrorist group Al-Qaeda. Russian cooperation with France and Germany was undoubtedly made possible by the neoconservative foreign policy mentality of the Bush presidency which not only prioritized unilateralism over multilateralism but also saw NATO as a platform that would confer legitimacy on American military engagements across the globe.

The second example concerns Russian support to European initiatives to help find a solution to the Iranian nuclear dispute through diplomatic mechanisms. Neither Russia nor key European allies sees Iran as an existential enemy. Nor do they believe Iran has the capability of developing nuclear weapons. They also all agree that lasting peace and stability in the greater Middle Eastern region requires Iran's incorporation into the international

community as a responsible stakeholder. It is within this context that Russia, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and China joined Obama to sign off on the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan with Iran in the summer of 2015. For this reason, Russia and other signatories, have shown a strong opposition to the withdrawal of the United States from the Iran nuclear agreement in May 2018 under the watch of Donald Trump's administration.

Russia also feels sympathetic with any European calls for a multipolar world order in which Europe and the United States might part ways (Lukin, 2016). Even though Russia would not feel comfortable with the idea that European nations would unite under a pan-European entity, such as EU, and constitute one of the poles in a multipolar world order, Russian leadership had in the past felt content with any European initiative that would hollow out NATO from within. French desires to help transform Europe into a third block during the Cold War and endow the European Union with strategic autonomy during the post-Cold War have all struck sympathetic chords with Russians.

Another aspect of Russian approach towards Europe, particularly in the realms of geopolitics and security, is that Russia has long preferred to engage with European nations on a bilateral basis rather than treating the EU as a credible international actor that could speak with one voice. Russian leadership pays a great deal of importance to improve bilateral relations with European nations for the main reason that Russia's bargaining power vis-à-vis each European nation would be much higher than Russia facing the European Union as a block. There is no way for Russia to dictate its terms on the European Union because the power disparity between the two is immense. As is well known, Russia mainly exports gas and oil to European nations. Many countries bordering Russia in central and Eastern Europe are highly dependent on gas and oil imports from Russia. Russia wants to make sure that European dependence on Russian energy resources continue (Monaghan, 2007). Rather than negotiating with the European Union the economic terms of any energy trade, Russia prefers to engage with European nations bilaterally because this way it would be in a more advantageous position to dictate its terms. Russian oil and gas companies offer different deals to different EU members. The well-known example in this regard is the Nord Stream II gas pipeline project between Russia and Germany. Noteworthy in this context is that Germany wants to finalize this project despite all opposition coming from other members of the European Union, in particular those bordering

Russia in Eastern Europe, as well as the United States (Dyson, 2016).

Another example of Russian attempts to court EU nations bilaterally, is Putin's latest intensified efforts to help bring into power pro-Russian political parties across Europe. Reminiscent of its support to communist and socialist parties in Europe during the Cold War era, today's Russia is trying to increase its influence in Europe by cultivating cooperative relations with populist parties of the right and left that are anti-globalist, anti-American, anti-immigrant and anti-integration and help them come to power across the continent (Robinson et al., 2018). A common theme that Russian leadership and many of these populist parties share is the claim that nation-states should continue to be the ultimate political communities in international relations and universalistic political designs should be discarded.

Looking from this perspective, Putin's Russia would like to see that the European Union evolve into a Europe of United States, rather than the United States of Europe. Russian efforts to get involved in internal politics of many European nations and employ hybrid tactics have recently increased. Inviting former German Prime Minister Gerhard Schroder to serve in the board of Gazprom, the leading Russian gas company, lending financial support to the political campaigns of pro-Russian populist parties, hosting prominent leaders of European populist movements in Russia are among the tactics that Russian leadership has employed so far.

Conclusions

The structural realist theoretical approach in international relations discipline holds that states are the key actors of international politics and of such states great powers are the ones that matter in the course of global politics. Dynamics of relations among great powers will shape the course of international developments as well as the material and ideational foundations of world order. The Russian Federation, together with the United States and China are the only great powers of today's international political environment. Even though the United States is far ahead of Russia and China in terms of its material and non-material power capabilities, these are the only powers on earth that have the ability to impose their priorities on the countries in their neighborhood as well as the capacity to protect themselves against all kind of external attacks.

Although there are many other countries outperforming Russia in terms of economic and ideological power capabilities, Russia seems to be the only country on earth having the military power capacity to compete with the United States. If military power capability were to be the only criterion to differentiate countries, the United States and Russia would form the league of their own. Russia likewise defines itself as a great power and wants to be recognized as one. Russia defends its title as a great power based on several criteria. First, Russia understands great power in terms of tangible power capabilities, particularly military capacity, natural resources and geographical location of which it is endowed with. Second, Russia assumes a great power should be one of the permanent members on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since it represents the most important decision-making body in international politics to deal with issues concerning international peace and security. Third, Russia views a great power as having the capacity to influence and determine the decisions of other states in international relations. Fourth, Russian leaders are aware that the most powerful actors in international politics in the years to come will be the United States and China. Russia however is determined to not let either of them shape the course of developments in the larger Eurasian region. For this reason, Russia follows a foreign policy strategy which simultaneously aims at contributing to the erosion of the transatlantic trust between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean and improving relations with China to counterbalance the United States.

Even though Russia itself pursued a pre-western foreign policy orientation during the 1990s by setting into motion a liberal democratic transformation process at home and cultivating functional cooperative relations with NATO and the European Union abroad, it vociferously opposed the US-led NATO operations in the territories of the former Yugoslavia. Russian discomfort with unilateral American policies increased tremendously during George W. Bush's two term presidency between 2000 and 2008. During this period the so-called neoconservative school of thought shaped American foreign policy thinking decisively according to which the United States adopted a global primacy strategy and promotion of American values across the globe through unilateral instruments. It is worth underlying that once the Bush presidency was replaced by Obama's presidency in early 2009, the new American administration decided to set in motion a reset in its relations with Russia. For about four years, the reset in American-Russian relations appears to have eased the tension

in bilateral relations. This time period between 2008 and 2012 coincided with Medvedev's presidency in Moscow. Yet, relations have begun deteriorating once again when Vladimir Putin returned to presidency in 2012. Russia's relations with the United States have deteriorated dramatically following the Crimean crisis. In cooperation with European allies, the United States orchestrated an economic and political embargo against Russia. Relations have taken a more negative turn following Russia's military involvement in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the incumbent Assad regime in late 2015. With Donald Trump winning the presidential elections in late 2016, bilateral relations have turned extremely negative. Despite Trump's intentions to improve relations with Russia on a transactional and pragmatic logic as well as his sympathy with Putin's strongman rule in Russia, there is now a bipartisan consensus in US Congress that Russia deserves to be punished for its illiberal authoritarian turn and overt political interference with the presidential elections.

Although the scope of cooperation between Russia and China has recently widened to incorporate as many different realms, it would be wrong to characterize the current relationship as one of an alliance. Their relationship is a growing strategic partnership of convenience rather than a NATO-like collective defense alliance. Presidents Putin and Jinping's burgeoning relationship has been demonstrated from their thirty visits to each other since Xi Jinping became president in 2013. China is Russia's number one trading partner and the volume of bilateral trade is a little more than one 100 billion US dollars. Yet, Russia is not among China's top trade partners. Russia mainly sells oil and gas to China whereas China exports to manufactured merchandise goods to Russia. Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and Chinese-led BRI have merged with each other as part of a Greater Eurasian Economic Partnership. Both countries are the two most powerful members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the so-called BRICS community. Their military cooperation is also noteworthy. Russia is the number one arms exporter to China and Chinese military modernization has been made possible, among others, by Russian technology transfers. Both countries organize joint military exercises in different locations across the globe. Their diplomatic cooperation within the United Nations and other international settings is also remarkable. However, it is still the case that both countries define their relations with the United States more vital to their security and economic interests than their own bilateral relations.

Russia's relationship with Europe contains both a strong degree of historical legacy dating back to the modernization efforts of Peter the Great and the institutional interactions between Russia and the European Union. Historically speaking there are three alternative narratives on Russia's relations with Europe, namely pro-Europeanism, pan-Slavism and Eurasianism. However, the current war in Ukraine of Russia seems to have destroyed the choice of pro-Europeanism and empowered nationalist, pan-Slavist and Eurasianist circles and preferences while a new Cold War emerged between the West and the Russian Federation under the tacit support of China for Putin.

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RUSSIA IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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Introduction

Modern Russia participates in almost all open intergovernmental global organisations, and some regional. The main focus of this chapter is Russian foreign policy and cooperation with international organisations. This chapter is separated into eight sections: the first section analyses the Russian approach to international organization, taking into consideration its Soviet legacy; the second focuses on the UN and its Security Council; the third examines Russia's cooperation with the Council of Europe, one of the oldest institutions of Europe; the fourth discusses relations between Russia and Eurasian Economic Union, where Russia is considered as a driving-force and critical in strengthening the integration processes in the post-Soviet space; the fifth examines the cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where Russia along with China are considered as the primary leaders; the sixth turns to the Asia-Pacific region, looking at the APEC Forum, and Russia's specific interest; the seventh evaluates the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation concerning the position of the Russian Federation; and the eighth addresses the topic of the Commonwealth of Independent States and their integrated associations in the post-Soviet space. Post-Soviet Space is the unofficial term for the area formerly occupied by the Soviet Union and covered by the 15 new independent states, which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Nikitin, 2008: 10).

The Russian Approach to International Organizations

The post-Soviet change of Russian foreign policy during the 1990's was marked by the acknowledgment of national weakness caused by the breakdown of socialism and the dissolution of one powerful state into fifteen new ones. Initially, Russia was

preoccupied with the task of internal stabilization and financial survival and was therefore hesitant to play a leading role in the region. However, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, Moscow began to position itself as a regional leader, resurrecting a new Russian globalism under Vladimir Putin in new historic conditions of the “end of the post-Soviet space” (Nikitin, 2008: 9).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, two major debates arose about Russian foreign policy. The first question was whether Russia’s national interests would be better off by establishing closer relations and integration into the Euro-Atlantic world led by the United States of America (USA), or looking for friends and partners to ensure and even limit the USA power throughout the world. The second was the extent to which Russia should contribute to the reintegration of the Eurasian space and whether it should also actively block the expansion of the political and economic influence of other major powers in this part of the world in order to secure Russian interests (Gvosdev and Marsh, 2013: 88).

The administration of Boris Yeltsin, the first president of the Russian Federation, decidedly chose to concentrate its foreign policy efforts on quick integration into the Euro-Atlantic structure, to join the ranks of the West, even if meant undermining Russia’s real interests. In a world that seemed increasingly unipolar, if not in terms of American centrism, then in terms of an increasingly centered West or Northern Hemisphere, Russia’s integration into the West and the Euro-Atlantic community of states seemed to be the only viable option at that time. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in 1992 went on to elaborate that “the developed countries of the West are natural allies of Russia” (Gvosdev and Marsh, 2013: 88) and that Russia’s foreign policy will be primarily aimed at these countries, especially the USA, France, the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany. The “second echelon” of Russian foreign policy interests included other areas of the world such as the Eurasian space, the Far East, South Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America (Gvosdev and Marsh, 2013: 88).

Although the “West-skepticism” was already expressed in Russia, Russia’s policy throughout most of the 1990’s was aimed at developing special relations, strategic partnerships with

the USA, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), as well as joining the G7, World Trade Organization (WTO) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The openness in the late 1980's and early 1990's of a significant part of the Russian political elite and society as a whole to the democratic values of a pluralistic society, and at the same time toward the development of a market economy, played as significant role in the choice to align Russia with the West (Zagorski, 2010: 27-28).

Shortly after Russian attempts to integrate with the West, opposition rose. When Yevgeny Primakov, the leading critic of this integration, was appointed new foreign minister, the vision of national interests changed. By choosing him, Yeltsin committed himself to a new perception of external threats and foreign policy objectives. Instead of proposing modernization and westernization as Russia's key national interests, Primakov pointed out the danger of the concentration of world power associated with the unipolar status of the USA. As a realist, he proposed the concept of 'great power balancing' with the goal of gradually turning the existing unipolar world into a multipolar one. This vision required integration of the former Soviet region under Russian leadership and seeking assistance from other powerful states, such as China and India, in order to balance the American hegemony (Tsygankov, 2016: 262-265). However, a lot of Primakov's initiatives and suggestions remained unfulfilled.

By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russian diplomacy focused on expanding (Gvosdev and Marsh, 2013). Vladimir Putin, who came to power as a new president, drew attention to the world's instabilities, such as terrorism, as well as some new economic opportunities. Putin saw the need to engage the West in ambitious joint projects. At the same time, he visualized Russia as a great power and sought the recognition of the West. Putin redefined national interest as that of 'pragmatic cooperation' of a great power. Instead of balancing the power of the USA, the key goal was now declared as an economic modernization for the sake of preserving the status of a great power (Tsygankov, 2016: 262-265).

Since then, the politics of Russia have changed from attempts to reengage with the West, to that of assertiveness. The Kremlin has been very active in developing relations with Europe

and the USA, especially after the 9/11. For example, in Europe, Russia has sought a stronger role in defining a security framework and a greater share in economic projects. In Eurasia, it has initiated ambitious ideas of regional integration under the umbrella of the Eurasian Union by inviting several former Soviet states to join. In Asia, it has sought to pool its resources with China in order to challenge the West-centered world. Russia also has contributed to the development of alternative international organizations such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, with the idea of using and taking advantage of new international opportunities outside the West (Tsygankov, 2016: 262-265). Russia's desire to build SCO structures or BRICS project can be seen as an expression of Russia's desire to build a strategic network between new actors of international relations which have the potential to grow and, thus, to balance the USA power in the international system. In addition, the Russian government is concerned about remaining a key player in the international system in the near future and therefore tries to establish links with countries whose power and influence is growing (Leichtova, 2016: 91).

The importance of Russia's integration into the world community is reflected in the words of the Preamble of the Russian Constitution: "We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation...are conscious of ourselves as part of the world community" (constitution.ru). It is the only constitution that explicitly states the people's will is to integrate into the world community. The Russian Federation's participation in the activities of more than 300 international organizations demonstrates this point, which can be divided into three groups:

- Bodies and specialized organizations (institutions) of the United Nations (UN) system;
- Economic, trade, financial and investment, scientific, technical, cultural and educational, law enforcement, environmental and other international organizations;
- International clubs, unions and communities, etc. (Jadan, 2016: 89).

This however was not always the case. The former Soviet Union's stance towards international organizations such as the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization

(ILO) was defensive. When tensions peaked with the League, the Soviet Union was excluded and temporarily withdrew from the ILO. The Soviet Union perceived international organizations as an instrument of imperialistic foreign policy. This was particularly apparent during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union blatantly disregarded existing regional associations and blocked decisions made by the UN Security Council and many of its specialized agencies causing them to remain ineffective. The Soviet Union did not attempt to create its own effective cooperation mechanism within the framework of multilateral institutions and categorically refused to borrow them from the West. Rather the nature of associations created and headed by Russia were quasi-integrated. Even those institutions the Soviet Union and Western states shared equal footing, such as the UN, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Russia took a defensive position. Its primary objective was to maintain equal opportunity with the USA and its allies (Sagalova, 2013: 59-60).

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union however, Russia's stance towards international organizations changed and it sought to rebuild relations. In the 1990's Russia had plenty of opportunities to join existing organizations in the Western world, to participate in the creation of regional organizations, to intensify cooperation with regional associations of Europe and Asia, Pacific integration, and to transform security institutions. From 1991 to 2001, it became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Council of Europe, the G8 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), became the founder of the Council of the Baltic Sea States and the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, started an active dialogue with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), MERCOSUR, NATO and the EU, initiated reform of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), led a number of integration projects in the post-Soviet space and shared with China the status of the SCO architect. The feverish catch-up of chances missed during the Cold War years was essentially a set of tactical measures designed to solve several problems simultaneously: integration into the community of democratic states and overcoming European determinism in foreign policy through the development of relations with Asian (especially Pacific) states (Sagalova, 2013: 59-60).

By the twenty-first century Russia felt more confident at a regional and global level to make choices that favor an internationalist approach. The trend over the last decade has been an integration breakthrough in the post-Soviet space; the stake in this case is not on the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but on the most compact Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), within which the Customs Union is already functioning and the Eurasian Economic Union has been formed. Russia demonstrates a positive dynamic in the Pacific direction as well. Since 2005, Russian-ASEAN summits have been held, and later, starting in 2011, Russia has participated in meetings of senior officials and foreign ministers of the East Asian Community (Sagalova, 2013: 59-60).

Russia views international organizations as instruments for the use by great powers. It often seeks to undermine organizations it feels it cannot control or at least influence (e.g. the EU) and instead create alternative bodies that it can or at least play a dominant role (e.g. the Eurasian Economic Union) to make post-Soviet Russia great again as one of the members of global Concert of Powers to settle world affairs, taking into account international law, but not necessarily being bound by it and influence the course of events in the international arena (Bond, 2015: 202).

The United Nations and Security Council Decisions

Multilateral diplomacy is understood by Moscow as an interests-based Concert of Powers, whereas the EU comprehends it as a means of greater value-based convergence of policies of the involved countries. The Russian conceptualization is characterized by three significant features. First it implies the concept of ‘collective leadership of leading states’, which objectively assumes a special responsibility for the state of world affairs, and not the leadership ambitions of a single superpower. Second, the very concept of multilateral diplomacy implies that a coordinated multilateral policy must be agreed on between the countries concerned, including Russia. Therefore, the results of negotiations, in any forum where it was not part of the decision-making process, and did not approve of the decision, will not be considered legitimate by Russia. In the same way, Russia does not view multilateral decisions taken by regional organizations that it does not belong to, such as NATO or the EU, as legitimate.

Third, multilateral diplomacy is thought to serve as the basis and reflect the distribution of power in the emerging multipolar world with the rising influence of China, India and Brazil. For this reason, Moscow considers the UN as the only major international organization institutionalizing and practicing the concept of multilateralism. The UN remains a universal forum, given unique legitimacy and remains the main element of modern multilateral diplomacy (Zagorski, 2008: 47). This section focuses on the Russia - UN relations and its participation in the UN Security Council.

The UN is the world's leading organization, coordinating issues of international cooperation between states and international organizations. Following the end of WWII, the winning allies – China, France, Soviet Union, UK, and USA established it in 1945 as a result of a series of negotiations and agreements held at successive conferences in Moscow (1943), in Dumbarton Oaks (1944) and in Yalta and San Francisco (1945). The negotiations held at these meetings were designed to harmonize the views of the “Big Three” – USA, UK, and the Soviet Union on the organization and procedures of the UN, which, unlike the ill-fated League of Nations, was supposed to ensure world peace by means of law (Panagiotou 2011: 196; Bourantonis and Panagiotou 2004: 80). They played a key role in the formation of constituent documents (e.g. UN Charter), the structure of this organization, developing its goals, objectives and functions (un.org).

Among all the organs and bodies of the UN established, the Security Council is the executive organ which has the real power and authority in relation to the most important activities of the organization. It consists of 15 members, five permanent and ten non- permanent, elected for two years by the General Assembly (Bourantonis and Panagiotou 2004: 80). Permanent members included the original victors of WWII – China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia became its predecessor on the UN Security Council.

The Security Council was established with the primary objective to maintain the peace and security in the international arena, and the status quo established after the defeat of Axis powers and Japan as indicated in the Charter. Permanent members enjoy an exceptional status not only because of their constancy,

but also because of their veto power. It is the only organ that may authorize UN peacekeeping missions or enforcement actions to maintain and restore international peace and security, as well as the only body that can make decisions binding on all UN member states. Chapter VII of the UN Charter for example, explicitly authorizes the Security Council to “undertake such actions by air, sea, or land forces that may be required to maintain or restore international peace and security” (Jensen 1994: 8; Krasno 2004: 4-5).

Russia has always stressed the importance of the UN. Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership fully realized the importance and implications of permanent membership in the UN Security Council. The presence of the Soviet Union in the Security Council ensured its national interests were protected with the right to veto on any major political decision. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Andrei Gromyko for example once stated that no international issue of any consequence can be solved in the UN without or against the Soviet Union (Panagiotou, 2011: 200). His predecessor Eduard Shevardnadze, reinforced this point, later stating that “the most important thing is to preserve the order in which all decisions relating to the maintenance of international security are made by the UN Security Council, in which we have veto power” (Panagiotou, 2011: 203). Both statements illustrate the point that the stronger the UN and the Security Council was, in terms of power, scope and authority, the greater the international voice of the Soviet Union would be (Panagiotou, 2011: 203).

Now, under the leadership of Putin, the UN has gained an even greater role in his multi-vectoral and multidirectional foreign policy program. The UN is considered a central collective mechanism for the formation of a multipolar world order and regulation of world politics. It serves as the basis of an emerging international system based on international law, the UN Charter, and multilateral approaches to global and regional issues.

The Security Council is understood in Russian foreign policy as one of its principal weapons for defending its perceived interests and to play a significant role in world affairs (Bourantonis and Panagiotou, 2004: 81). In the post-Soviet period, Russia’s attitude to the UN Security Council is inextricably linked with its search for a new role after losing its empire and the status of a

world superpower. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had to put up with the huge loss of population and territories, weak economy and the massive withdrawal of military troops from the territory of its former allies. Russia's economic, military and political shortcomings directly restricted its international role and dramatically influenced the course of its new foreign policy. To compensate for the loss of superpower status and to counteract marginalization in the international system, Russia views the UN, particularly the UN Security Council, as the only arena in which it can regain power in the international arena (Bourantonis and Panagiotou, 2004: 84).

The balance of power since the end of the Cold War has shifted away from unipolarity to a more multipolar and interdependent world. Moreover, the past few years have witnessed the emergence of a more confident, assertive and confrontational Russian foreign policy such as demonstrated in Moscow's support for Iran's nuclear program, its decision to sell aircraft missiles to Tehran over Western and Israeli protests, its invitation to Palestine's new Hamas government to visit Moscow, the invasion of Georgia, in response to Georgia's attack on South Ossetia, its decision a few weeks later to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkazia. Although Russia's unilateral actions have received criticism and increased the country's isolation in recent years, Russian leadership has refused to back down. Recently, these situations have been exacerbated by conflicts over Syria, the rest of the Middle East, Ukraine, the Korean Peninsula, and the East and South China Seas. These situations have undermined the unity of the Security Council's permanent members and thereby reduced its dominance. Russia is not willing to obey the norms and practices established, controlled and resolved by the West. The heightened divisions among permanent members of the Security Council have however increased the opportunity for other elected members to play a more productive global role (Langmore and Thakur, 2016: 106-107).

At present, it is difficult to predict how the recent developments in the global arena will affect Russia's relations with the UN, in particular the Security Council. As for Russia's relations with the UN, the consequences of these important changes are twofold: first, Russia no longer turns to the UN to confirm its superpower status and no longer considers the Security Council to be its only voice in the international stage;

second, the erosion of USA unipolarity and the prospect of more constructive relations between the two countries mean that Russia no longer needs to adhere to its strategy of “advancing the Security Council” to balance the power of the one-sidedness of the USA. The combination of these two decisive factors will undoubtedly affect the role and importance of the UN in Russia’s foreign policy and can stimulate a new turn in Russia’s relations with the UN, in which the organization plays a less strategic and significant role (Panagiotou, 2011: 212-213).

The Council of Europe

The Council of Europe (CoE) is the oldest and leading international political organization on the continent in the field of human rights. The official date of the creation of the Council is May 5, 1949 (coe.int). Historically, the main function of the CoE was to contribute to the consolidation of peace in Europe through democracy. Over time, various organs of the CoE have become forums for tackling a wide range of international or regional issues, apart from national defense. Its official mandate, the Statute adopted in 1949, emphasizes the role of the CoE in creating a greater unity between its members in order to protect and realize the ideals and principles of their common heritage. Originally the COE envisioned cooperation in economic and social matters, which later led to the development of the European Coal and Steel Community, and then to its successor, the European Economic Community. The CoE, which is separate from the EU, developed a specialization in promoting discourse on democracy and human rights in Western Europe. In addition, it showed a special interest in states that are in the process of political transition (Stivachtis and Habegger, 2011: 162-163).

During the Cold War, the Soviets did not make any attempt to be a member of the CoE. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin’s government applied to join the CoE in May 1992 with the hope of obtaining a new international identity with the “club of democratic countries”. After several months of preliminary discussions, council officials stated that no decision would be made on Russia’s application before the adoption of a new constitution and subsequent elections to new parliamentary bodies in Russia. Although these conditions were met in December 1993, negotiations on the admission of Russia moved slowly.

The application was approaching the final review when Russian troops invaded Chechnya in December 1994. In February 1995, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (PACE) voted to suspend its consideration of Russia's request for membership due to the use of force by Russian military during the first Chechen war, in particular against the civilian population, which is a violation of the CoE's basic human rights principles.

After engaging in negotiations with PACE, Russia agreed to allow council officials to visit Chechnya and sign a cease-fire agreement in July 1995. PACE likewise agreed to resume the formal consideration of Russia's application in September "on the grounds that Russia is henceforth committed to finding a political solution to the Chechen crisis and that the alleged and documented human rights violations [would be] investigated" (Jackson, 2004: 25).

In October 1995, former Chairman of the PACE's committee on relations with non-members Jean Seitlinger, announced Russia was on the right path to joining and being accepted to the Council by mid-January 1996. This decision was based on Russia's demonstrated willingness to join the CoE, and to catch up to Western countries, in terms of its legal structures and adherence to democratic norms (Smith, 2014: 131). Even though the war in Chechnya continued, Russia became a member of the CoE on February 28, 1996 with the idea that Russia was better in than out.

Taking part in European structures was important for Russia, to institutionalize its foreign policy, and to belong to the "European Common House". Russia sought to build a Greater Europe without dividing lines and had high hopes for the CoE, both in terms of obtaining support for its political course of action and overall development of the country, especially its legal field. With the accession into the CoE, Russia was able to pursue its political and legal goals. The political goals included providing Russia with an international platform to participate in all European affairs, processes, defending its positions, and declaring its national interests on an equal footing with other European countries as well as integrate in the global community. As for legal objectives, these included the integration of Russia into the European legal space and the reform of Russian legislation based on the implementation of the CoE legal norms, the adoption of European legal standards, and respect for human rights.

Russia therefore committed itself to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols Nos. 1, 2, 4, 7, and 11. Furthermore, Russia accepted a series of specific reforms of its existing law and policy (Jackson, 2004: 25). Joining the CoE was viewed as an important political gain, testifying to the quality of the changes taking place in Russia. Despite the condemnation by PACE of Russia's actions in Chechnya in 2000, Russia has nevertheless remained a member and maintained a favorable attitude towards the CoE. As Andrei Zagorski notes: "The special value of the CoE for Russia is that it is the only Western European institution in which Russia wanted to become a full member" (Smith, 2014: 149). In subsequent years Russia has continued to reaffirm its commitment to the CoE and has used it as an advisor of its own legislation, especially in regard to regional cooperation (Smith, 2014: 151).

However, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 created much more troubles in relations with the CoE, too. As a result, the Council decided suspending Russian membership but Moscow reacted it and withdrew its membership without waiting any decision of the Council on March 15. However, next day, the Committee of CoE Ministers decided to expel Russia with a declaration that "the Russian Federation ceases to be a member of the Council of Europe as from today." (ABC News, 2022).

The Eurasian Economic Union

Russia's current foreign policy strategy is based on the idea of a multipolar world order. The concept implies the presence of several influential centers within the framework of a single global system. The multipolar model of the international order assumes the presence of several poles-centers that are comparable with each other according to their respective potentials (Vasilyeva and Lagutina, 2013: 82-83). With the process of globalization, new centers of economic and political influence have emerged, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. This is in part because of the West's inability to dominate the global economy and politics. For this reason, Russia seized the opportunity to form and fund the geopolitical project EAEU as will be discussed in this section (Vasilyeva and Lagutina, 2013: 82-83).

During the 1990's the Eurasian integration process was

slow, with numerous treaties signed by CIS member states to settle on a regional-type trading bloc (Sergi, 2018: 52). The first attempt at Eurasian integration came in 1994 with the creation of the Central Asian Economic Cooperation. Later in 2002 it was transformed into the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), which then merged with EurAsEC in 2005. In 2012 Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia transformed the customs union into a Single Economic Space. In 2014 they signed the Agreement on the EAEU formation, which came into force on January 1, 2015 (Khitakhunov *et al.*, 2017: 2).

The EAEU is an international organization for regional economic integration. It was formed to coordinate policies in the economic sectors defined by the treaty and other international treaties within the Union such as the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and labor. EAEU also seeks to counter the Western world's hegemonic status and to reduce China's economic dominance in the region (Khitakhunov *et al.*, 2017: 3-4). The Organization also aims to reduce the negative effects of global instability and strategically position all members in foreign markets (Ziyadullaev and Ziyadullaev, 2016: 6).

The main organs of EAEU include: The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council consisting of the presidents of member countries, the Eurasian Intergovernmental Economic Council including member countries' prime ministers, the Eurasian Economic Commission, and the Court of the EAEU. All EAEU members share a number of common features: A Soviet history as part of a single economic entity, language, and institutions, all of which have made economic integration easier. Eurasian integration has been particularly strong thanks to the political and strategic support the idea has received (Khitakhunov *et al.*, 2017: 2).

Amongst the EAEU members, Russia is undoubtedly the strongest and most advanced (Sergi, 2018: 56; Ziyadullaev and Ziyadullaev, 2016: 8). The territory and population of Russia is much larger than the other participants. Russia accounts for more than 85% of the total GDP. Russia therefore bears the brunt of the cost in constant concessions and financial assistance to its partners (Ziyadullaev and Ziyadullaev, 2016: 8-9). However, Russia's assistance is calculated and strategic, to convince members to implement the rules and norms of the EAEU, by providing,

for example, direct or indirect subsidies to Belarus and other small poor countries in the form of cheaper energy and loans, or politically motivated investments and security guarantees for Armenia.

In return, Russia receives a tariff structure that favors Russian industry in partner countries. Putin aims to secure a geopolitical Eurasian Partnership that will allow Russia to compete with the European Union for influence in Europe and possibly the world scene (Tarr, 2016: 18). Some observers view the EAEU as a purely Russian geopolitical project, a “political platform for economic integration” aimed at restoring the country’s position in a multipolar world “as a major power” (Kirkham, 2016: 113). Existing studies, for example, indicate a discrepancy between the publicly declared economic goals of the EAEU and unstated power-driven goals. Although the economic benefits of a single market are an incentive for all participants, the Russian leadership also seems to have unidentified political goals such as expansion, as illustrated with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Russia maintains a special interest in the ex-Soviet republics, not only because many ethnic Russians still live there, but also because they share a unique relationship and common culture. Formerly when Vladimir Putin was Prime Minister, he called the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its empire one of the greatest geopolitical tragedies of the 20th century, although he denies trying to reconstitute it. Later in 2011, after announcing plans to return to the Presidency, Putin called for a stronger “Eurasian Union” to include Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (Spechler and Spechler, 2013: 1).

EAEU is regarded by Russia as critical in strengthening’s its influence in the post-Soviet space. However, instead of recreating the old centralized state system, Putin’s administration seeks to create a new system that will affect the former Soviet republics without assuming responsibility for the official logistical functions of each state (Sergi, 2018: 57-58). The idea of the Eurasian Union is not so much the creation of a common strategic space, but as the formation of a supranational management system throughout the global Eurasian region, which is intended to become an important part of the emerging global system of global governance (Vasilyeva and Lagutina, 2012: 23). In this regard, the EAEU is viewed as a historic economic and political

achievement for the region and Putin's political agenda. In the context of geopolitics and geo-economics, this Union serves as a powerful illustration of what Putin foresaw for the post-Soviet space, since the Union is partially motivated by the goal of self-affirmation of Russia. However, given the many advantages, it is still unclear whether this institution will succeed or simply reduce in importance (Sergi, 2018: 59).

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization

The highest mixture of post-Soviet and non-Soviet countries and societies is currently represented by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This section examines the SCO and Russia's interests in participating in this organization. The SCO began as a series of negotiations between 1996-2000 on the delimitation of the border between China and some of its post-Soviet neighbors (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). In the framework of these negotiations, this group of countries was scalled the Shanghai Five. After the initial security task was completed, it was decided not to dismiss the Shanghai Five, but rather redirect its efforts to a broader political and economic dialogue. With the adoption of Uzbekistan in 2001, the Shanghai Five became six members, transforming into the political interstate organization known today as the SCO.

Since the mid-2000s, the SCO has further expanded, providing new members with an observer status: first Mongolia, and then Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. In 2017, both Pakistan and India became full members, and the list of observers and dialogue partners have expanded (Nikitin, 2008: 17-18). With the departure of a unipolar world order, the SCO has also expanded its areas of interest, particularly in the area of security. The security agenda of the organization includes the protection of borders from common threats such as terrorism, extremism and separatism, drug trafficking and shared security information. The current Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S. Lavrov, describes the SCO as "an authoritative association, a significant factor in the formation of a new polycentric system of the world order" (Shilina, 2014: 46).

Within the SCO, both China and Russia play a central and leading role. However, many Russian analysts describe the SCO

as a Chinese, not a Russian, organization. China is regarded as the dominant great power within the SCO and Russia a junior partner (Oliker *et al.*, 2009: 104; Crosston, 2013: 287-288). Aware of this reality, Russian experts explain the importance of China to Russia at both the micro and macro level. At the micro level, Russia considers friendship with China as strategically important in terms of national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty provided by diplomatic means without military conflict. Likewise at the macro level, Russia views China as a key ally to prevent the global hegemony of the USA over the region, while at the same time seeking to balance China's influence in Central Asia to preserve its participation in other structures without direct involvement (Saraç, 2008: 89-101).

Russia has always viewed Central Asia as its own backyard and special sphere of influence. Thus, the SCO is regarded as a soft entry point for Russia to preserve and create its military influence in the region. Although a competitive dynamic exists between Russia and China, the SCO acts as a peaceful arena for the two countries to identify ways to work together. Within the SCO, an implicit voluntary division of leadership exists between the two countries: China maintains economic control, while Russia occupies a position of primacy in security matters. Russia cannot withstand the emerging economic influence of China in the region, and therefore embraces the SCO as an effective channel to maintain friendly relations with other countries in Central Asia and to keep China in check from dominating and controlling them (Crosston, 2013: 287-288). At the same time, China understands the importance of preserving and promoting Russia's credentials as a co-leader in the organization, presenting it (whether correctly or not) as playing role on a par with China in defining the SCO's mission and goals (Trotskii, 2007: 31). Should Russia feel sidelined within the SCO, China recognizes the organization would lose much of its legitimacy and purpose in the eyes of the smaller Central Asian members.

Some analysts, however, suggest Russia's real motive behind co-founding the SCO was to counter competition with the USA and NATO (Bailes and Dunay, 2007: 11). As reflected in Russian foreign policy, it adopts an "anti-hegemonic front" through the formation of tactical allies and regional blocks to break the USA hegemony and form a multipolar system in the

international stage. In this context, the SCO is seen as a structure which has the potential to make a serious contribution to the establishment of a new international order based on collective leadership in the world.

Despite some members jointly expressing concerns about the USA involvement and influence in the region, it would be a mistake to consider the SCO as an anti-American bloc as it would contradict many of their interests. The SCO has served as a useful mechanism for members to discuss mutual security concerns to alleviate interstate conflict in Central Asia, to conduct joint military exercises and to issue joint statements together and with the USA. Even if the actual exercises have been limited, and the depth of strategic and intelligence cooperation between the SCO states is questionable, these actions have nevertheless been based on common interests and concerns (Oliker *et al.*, 2009: 103).

Russia's approach towards the SCO has also been influenced by internal factors caused from the risk of instability in Central Asia such as with the outbreak of conflicts in the region and rise of radical Islamists as a result of the collapse of existing secular regimes. The Volga, Ural and Western Siberian regions, are especially vulnerable to external influences (Özkan, 2013: 171). Central Asia serves as a buffer zone not only for China's western front, but also Russia's southern front, especially against Islamist extremist threats (Crosston, 2013: 287-288). Furthermore, Russia has sought to maintain its global role in the international energy markets by keeping the Central Asian energy sector under control and preventing it from losing its dependence on Moscow (Nogayeva, 2013: 7). Finally, with the end of the bipolar world order, Russia is also concerned that the Western-based liberal democratic model will come to dominate the region, and instead seeks to spread its own.

The SCO in summary signifies a new platform and model of cooperation, which seeks to contribute to the changing configuration of the geo-economic map of the Eurasian continent. For Russia specifically, the SCO is both economically and geo-strategically important (Özkan, 2013: 171). It serves Russian interests in four areas: its influence in Central Asia, maintenance of Chinese–Russian relations, relations with the USA and world politics (Bailes and Dunay, 2007: 10). Thus, the SCO represents a unique form of integration, and demonstrates growing economic and political potential in a global context.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

The role of the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) in the global system of international relations has increased in recent years and attracted attention as one of the leading zones of dynamic economic growth. Currently, the APR is one of the main centers of the world economy drawing increased interests from great powers such as the USA, China, Russia, and Japan. This section focuses on the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), which is one of the successful economic forums in the region and discusses Russia's attitude towards this organization. In the APR there is no single dominant international association as is the case of the EU in Europe. Instead, there are several regional entities of different formats and focus, of which Russia cooperates with many of them. However, Russia pays special attention to APEC, which is mainly engaged in economic cooperation.

APEC was established in November 1989 at the initiative of Australia with the participation of representatives from 12 countries in the region. The combined economic potential of the APEC countries has made it possible for this organization to exert a systemic impact not only on the region, but also on global processes in the world economy (Sarishvili, 2011; 28). It acts as a joint multilateral trade and economic forum serving as the only international intergovernmental group in the world committed to reducing barriers to trade and investment, without requiring its members to make legally binding commitments.

The goal of APEC is to cooperate on regional trade and the of capital investment, thereby increasing the economic development of the APR. APEC achieves its goals by facilitating dialogue and making decisions by consensus, giving equal weight to the opinions of all members. APEC member countries report progress towards achieving the goals of free and open trade and investment through individual action plans (IAPs) and collective action plans (CAPs). Members set their own timelines and goals and take action on a voluntary and non-binding basis (apec.org)

Today, APEC unites 22 countries, which includes about 40% of the world's population, 54% of gross national product and 44% of world trade (Jadan, 2016: 89). Among these 22 countries, the Russian Federation occupies an important place. In March 1995, Russia filed a formal application to join APEC.

Russia has consistently implemented actions aimed at joining the future ranks of APEC forum participants. To participate in APEC, first Russia had to fulfill certain conditions, including strong economic ties with the APR countries and the adoption of the goals and principles of APEC, as indicated in the APEC Seoul Declaration. With the support of China, the USA and Japan, the application of the Russian Federation was satisfied. For Russia, along with Vietnam and Peru, a transitional period of one year was defined, after which in 1998 they became full participants in APEC (Zamalieva, 2010; 2-3).

By joining APEC, Russia thereby reaffirmed its commitment to close economic cooperation with the APR and its intention to fully integrate into the system of international division of labor. APEC identified a number of priority areas for Russia's participation:

- the consistent increase in the volume of economic cooperation with all APEC sub regions, stimulating geographical diversification of foreign economic relations of the Russian Federation;
- the active use of imports and attracting foreign investment from the APEC countries for the socio-economic development of Siberia and the Far East;
- strengthening Russia's political and diplomatic presence in APEC;
- developing the technique of participation in APEC, the working bodies and projects of the forum at the governmental and non-governmental levels;
- increasing Russian participation in key areas of the forum's activities, including in the fields of energy, transport, communications, science and technology, and the use of Pacific resources;
- collection, synthesis and adaptation to the Russian conditions of the experience accumulated in the APEC countries in the management of market economies and the implementation of reforms (Sarishvili, 2011; 33).

APEC occupies an important place in Russian foreign policy. At the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, Putin emphasized the importance of APEC to Russia:

We greatly value the APEC forum for the ample opportunities it affords all participants to engage in

discussions and coordinate positions on a variety of economic, social, environmental, and cultural issues. Our countries strive to cooperate based on principles of consensus and voluntary participation, mutual respect and willingness to compromise, regardless of the political situation. This is what APEC's unique spirit of partnership is all about (The Globe and Mail, 2017).

Since 2017, APEC approved the Russian initiatives for the development of remote areas and cooperation in the field of innovation. In addition, representatives of Russia actively participated in discussions on key issues for APEC on the development of the digital economy and e-commerce, the formation of the Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area (APCTT) and the contents of the post-2020 forum agenda. Russia's work in APEC has been particularly influential in the areas of the development of human resources, the increase in women's economic activity, and the improvement of the competitive environment in public procurement. Russia has also received funding for four of its proposed projects (apec-center.ru). As this section has demonstrated, APEC is not only a major source of growth for the global economy, but also continues to serve as a key regional platform for the Russian economy.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization

The Black Sea is an important area in geostrategic and geo-economic aspects. This area serves as a meeting point of several regions, such as Europe, the post-Soviet space, and the Caucasus. For centuries the Black Sea region was a zone of special interests of both regional actors and extra-regional powers. When it fell under the influence of the Russian and Ottoman empires, the Black Sea region was largely closed off to the rest of the world.

During the Cold War, the region was placed in a critical juncture of multidirectional interests of geopolitical entities, and the existence of blocs precluded the possibility of full-fledged cooperation between the countries of the region (Eshba, 2013: 43). However, some institutions, such as the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) formed. In this regard, the main topic of this section is the cooperation within the organization and Russia's interests in it.

The BSEC came into existence with the initiation of Türkiye. In 1990, former Turkish President Turgut Özal sought to create a Black Sea zone of prosperity and cooperation with the participation of the Soviet Union, Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria. However, soon after, the Soviet Union collapsed, which radically changed the geopolitical map of the region and led to the growth of new independent states (Baburina, 2013: 37).

Nevertheless, BSEC, as stated on its webpage, “came into existence as a unique and promising model of multilateral political and economic initiative with the signing of the Istanbul Summit Declaration and the Bosphorus Statement by the Heads of State and Government of countries in the region on, 25 June 1992” (bsec-organization.org). It was intended as an informal and flexible forum of cooperation with the ambitious aims to achieve further development and diversification of their bilateral and multilateral cooperation, to foster their economic, technological and social progress, and to encourage a market economy and free enterprise.

To reach its goals however, participating states acknowledged that BSEC should be endowed with permanent institutions and therefore decided to transform the initiative to a fully-fledged international organization with an international legal identity (Stribis, 2003: 130). BSEC came into force after its Charter was signed on May 1, 1999, at which time it acquired an international legal identity and was transformed into a regional economic organization (bsec-organization.org). The BSCE’s mission is:

- to act in a spirit of friendship and good neighborhood and enhance mutual respect and confidence, dialogue and cooperation among the member states;
- to further develop and diversify bilateral and multilateral cooperation on the basis of the principles and rules of international law;
- to act for improving the business environment and promoting individual and collective initiative of the enterprises and companies directly involved in the process of economic cooperation;
- to develop economic collaboration in a manner not contravening the international obligations of the member states including those deriving from their membership to international organizations or institutions of an integrative

or other nature and not preventing the promotion of their relations with third parties;

- to take into account the specific economic conditions and interests of the member states involved;

to further encourage the participation in the BSEC process of economic cooperation of other interested states, international economic and financial institutions as well as enterprises and companies (bsec-organization.org).

Today 12 countries – Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Türkiye, Ukraine and Serbia, belong to the organization and demonstrate the heterogeneity that characterizes the region. In addition, 17 international organizations and observer countries, outside of the region, participate in the activities of the organization. Two groups of observers were formed, one consisting of states: Austria, Belarus, Germany, Egypt, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, USA, Tunisia, France, Croatia, and Czech Republic. The other group includes four international organizations: Conference on the European Energy Charter, The International Black Sea Club, the Union of Associations of Road Carriers in the Region of the BSEC, the Commission of the European Communities. Their appearance is explained by the interests of many third parties to cooperate with BSEC countries as a promising developing region (Baburina, 2013: 35-36).

Within the framework of the BSEC activities, emphasis is placed specifically on economic cooperation, and excludes working out a common political strategy (Eshba, 2013: 43-44). The BSEC's founders considered economic cooperation as the prime aim of this regional initiative. Consequently, some analysts argue, "The region has lacked a sense of ownership, effective regional leadership, common threats, and resources" (Friere 2014: 375). Yet others view BSCE as playing a critical role as a confidence-building mechanism that indirectly enhances the security situation in the area, marked with unrest and insecurity (Stribis, 2003: 131-132).

In Russian foreign policy documents, the Black Sea, along with the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea basin and the Middle East, is mentioned as a regional priority and of strategic importance as one of the choice routes for the important of energy flows. The BSEC is also mentioned as the preferred institutional format for

cooperation between the states in the area due to its growing role in the region, strategic geopolitical position, extensive resource base and long-term human potential (Freire, 2014: 375). In July 2016 for example, Russia announced its initiative to allocate 1 million US dollars to create a mechanism for the development of project cooperation in the Black Sea region. Following the 39th meeting of the BSEC Council of Foreign Ministers held in Baku December 14, 2018, Russia discussed projects it sought to support –the construction of a motorway around the Black Sea and new sea routes, to develop more effective and free trade, tourism etc. in the region, and to create conditions for the member countries’ economic growth (mid.ru).

The Black Sea region has a huge potential for economic cooperation. Its natural transport artery associated with the Mediterranean region, allows goods to be transported cheaply and in large volumes, which is important for the development of new markets. In the field of transport logistics development, it is necessary to develop the integration of water and land trade routes, which in the future will lead to cheaper transportation, reducing its time and involving new participants in the economic orbit of the region (Ízvestiya, 2017). Taking into account the growing trade and the development of tourism between the BSEC member countries, work continues on the restoration of regular cargo and passenger ferry communication between the Black Sea ports. Also, cooperation continues in the energy sector. The synthesis of the energy strategies of the BSEC member countries is completed. This is an important practical step for the development of joint projects, one of which is the creation of the Black Sea Electric Power Ring. Its implementation could contribute to the formation of a regional electricity market. The BSEC therefore, may be the most convenient tool that would enable the region’s countries to carry out a brand new paradigm of energy transportation.

Although disagreements and conflicts exist between the BSEC countries, the Black Sea’s importance is irrefutable and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Aware of the BSEC’s importance and potential, Russia will continue to find ways to strategically position itself in the region.

The Commonwealth of Independent States

On December 8, 1991, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine concluded the Treaty on the Establishment of the Soviet Union. This Agreement officially confirmed the cessation of the existence of the Soviet Union and established in its replacement the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Within the framework of the Alma-Ata Conference on December 21, 1991, the Protocol to the Agreement on the Creation of the CIS was established, at which point other states of the former Soviet Union joined the Commonwealth (Ivanova, 2015: 114). This section examines the CIS and Russia's attitude towards it.

In the beginning of the 1990's the CIS served mainly to fill the political vacuum caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union (Sergi, 2018: 52). Originally CIS represented an institutional means for the stable breakup of the Soviet Union; it also constituted the organizational vessel for managing member states' shared infrastructural, security, economic, and other policy interests (Willerton *et al.*, 2012: 61). The objective was "the development and strengthening of relations of friendship, good neighborhoods, interethnic harmony, trust, mutual understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation between member states" (cis.minsk.by). According to the 1991 Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS, the sphere of joint activities of the member states included "coordination of foreign policy activities; cooperation in the formation and development of a common economic space, European and Eurasian markets, in the field of customs policy" (cis.minsk.by).

CIS was established to form a free trade zone, in order to boost modernization, close cooperation in innovation, food and energy security, joint ventures and development of intra-regional cooperation. Cooperation in the humanitarian area remains a top priority through the development of networks including institutions of culture, education, science, mass media, and so on. Members share a common agenda in security that includes the following threats: terrorism, transnational organized crime, illegal migration, human trafficking, drugs, and natural disasters. All internal disputes are to be settled peacefully and political consultation is to be used concerning worldly issues that might affect CIS member states (Lomagin, 2016: 131-132). In addition, special attention is paid to the observance of the territorial integrity

and inviolability of the borders of the CIS, and the protection of human rights.

For 12 states (out of the 15 post-Soviet newly independent states) that formed the CIS some new factors were added over the years as unifying vectors. First, a network of inter-state integrative CIS organs was created: Council of Heads of States, which is the governing body, Councils of Heads of Governments, Defense Ministers, Foreign Affairs Ministers, Secretaries of Security Councils, Procurators General, and the Economic Court to name the most critical ones. In addition to this system of legislative and decision-making organs, more than 15 agencies for economic and political cooperation and another 10 inter-state specialized functional organizations affiliated with the CIS were added over the years. Second, the attempt to establish a common legal space was undertaken through the work of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, later joined by the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), which elaborated and adopted hundreds of CIS and EEC model laws and undertook endless campaigns for the harmonization of legislation in the newly independent states. Third, Councils of Foreign and Defense Ministers undertook certain attempts to set up a coordinated common foreign and security policy towards the external world. Fourth, the relatively regular CIS summits on the level of presidents served as a common mechanism for a degree of political coordination (Nikitin, 2008: 11-12).

For Russia, international cooperation in the CIS space is of major economic and political importance. Not only does Russia seek to maintain its influence on the territory of the former Soviet republics, but also to play a leading role, since politically and economically it is the most powerful state among the members of this organization.

After being rejected by Europe in 1990's, Russia changed its regional priorities in favor of creating a post-Soviet space (Lomagin, 2016: 136). In 1993, Russia clearly outlines in its Foreign Policy Concept its priority of creating stable and strong ties with the countries of the post-Soviet Union. The document warns against efforts of individual states to exploit the collapse of the Soviet Union for their own benefit, endangering not only relations with Russia, but also the rights of Russians living in these countries. Repeatedly the document labels the situation

as crucial to Russia's development and transformation and calls on post-Soviet countries to coordinate their activities through international integration. It discusses the importance of CIS as a multi-thematic integrating structure, where each member can regulate the degree of its integration (Leichtova, 2016: 50).

In Russia's second and third Foreign Policy Concepts adopted in 2000 and 2008, it reiterates the importance of CIS as one of its regional priorities. Both documents acknowledge however the weaknesses of CIS, having not proven to be a full-fledged, multi-thematic integration project as was planned, and thus emphasized the importance of creating additional platforms for cooperation inside or outside the CIS area (Leichtova, 2014: 51).

By the end of twentieth century, however, almost all CIS members were either in an economic or political crisis, so cooperation developed extremely slow and unevenly. There are different reasons why this situation occurred. One of them is that not all the integrative efforts among newly independent states were focused at CIS mechanisms. The Commonwealth remained structurally weak for most of its existence, and many political encounters among new states took place either on a bilateral basis, or within other competing or complementing formats, like EurAsEC, the bloc of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUAM), and many others.

Another reason is the configuration of the CIS itself, although the former-Soviet space was territorially preserved, preferences of integration were diverse amongst members. Ukraine for example, in the mid-1990s, insisted on changing the notion of "CIS member state" to a less demanding title of "CIS participating state," meaning that not all states of the former Soviet space were interested or obliged to participate in all sessions and decisions. As a result, very few CIS decisions have been co-signed by all 12 heads of CIS states. There are numerous resolutions for example, that only a hand full of CIS members signed (Nikitin, 2008: 11-12).

Nevertheless, Russia still prioritizes CIS as was reiterated in the 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept. In Article 49 for example, it states the priority directions of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation are the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CIS member states and the

further strengthening of the integration structures operating in the CIS space with Russian participation (www.kremlin.ru). Article 55 further elaborates on the importance of CIS stating:

Russia builds friendly relations with each of CIS member states on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, respect and consideration of each other's interests. To this end, the Russian Federation:

- a) actively promotes the development of interaction of the CIS member states on the preservation of common cultural and historical heritage, expanding cooperation in the humanitarian, scientific, educational and cultural fields, pays special attention to supporting compatriots living in CIS member states, improving international legal instruments of protection their rights and legitimate interests in educational, linguistic, social, labor, humanitarian and other spheres;
- b) contributes to the expansion of economic cooperation with the CIS member states, including by improving the regulatory framework in accordance with the Treaty on the free trade zone of October 18, 2011;

enhances cooperation with the CIS member states in the field of security, including joint resistance to common challenges and threats, primarily international terrorism, extremism, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors, transnational crime, illegal migration (kremlin.ru).

Despite the difficulties of consolidating the post-Soviet space, the process continues to evolve. Earlier criticism of CIS has decreased. The collapse of the CIS, as formerly predicted by individual experts, did not take place after Georgia left. The Commonwealth continues to be a political club of the post-Soviet states, which suits national elites. Although the CIS has not become a decisive structure for the integration of the post-Soviet space, it has filled the political vacuum left in the absence of the rigid supranational structures that formerly existed, and provides a platform for the convergence of positions and the adoption of joint decisions on many sensitive issues of interstate relations (Chernyavskii, 2011: 31).

The most important outcome within the framework of the Commonwealth is the acquisition of a joint experience of

multilateral cooperation, which over time has moved towards more productive forms of multi-format and diverse regional integration. The community has become a platform for cooperation and collaboration (Chernyavskii, 2011: 32). The CIS experience has enabled states to launch a many-tiered, multi-speed integration process in the post-Soviet space and to set up much needed institutions, such as the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Customs Union and finally the Common Economic Space (Lomagin, 2016: 131-132).

The extensive experience of post-Soviet development has led to many changes in the activities of the CIS compared with the initial period of its existence. The important point is CIS does not act as a comprehensive merger project, but as a mechanism for maintaining preferential intra-regional relations and achieving coordination of the positions of the participating countries (Chernyavskii, 2011: 32).

Conclusions

After the collapse of the Soviet Union a very active participation of Russia in international organizations can be noted. By years passing and Russia' gaining more experience in this sphere today can be said, that Russia views international organizations not as independent subjects, but as instruments for use by great powers. Russia is not much interested in institution where it has not controlled position. It creates alternative bodies or institutions in which it plays a dominant role, such as the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia likes organizations with the top table, at which it sits "concerts of powers", in which Russia with other great powers can settle world affairs and influence the course of events in international arena.

The UN and its Security Council, especially the group of five permanent members with the veto right is a comfortable area for Russia. Recent developments in the global arena may influence Russia's attitude towards the UN and, in particular, towards the Security Council, but today it is still clear that Russia turns to the UN to confirm its superpower status and considers the Security Council one of the platforms to be heard on the international stage. The CoE, which along with the UN occurred

after the World War II, is also one of the important directions in Russian foreign policy. Russia has a strong feeling and need for belonging to something, and the Council has given it a platform where it feels that itself working in a European context. The era of Putin has confirmed that Russia is quite firmly committed to its membership in the CoE. It should be noted that now and then the Russian administration has used the CoE as an advisor on its own legislation, and especially regional cooperation with the CoE was viewed by all parties as very positive cooperation.

Within the framework of the CIS a joint experience of multilateral cooperation has been acquired, which allowed, over time, to move towards more productive forms of multi-format and diverse regional integration, such as the EAEU. In the context of geopolitics and geo-economics, the EAEU serves as a powerful illustration of what Russian government led by Putin foresaw for the post-Soviet space, since the Union is partially motivated by the goal of self-affirmation of Russia. However, given the many advantages and an equal amount of costs, it is still unclear whether this institution has succeeded or is simply reduced in importance.

Another important integration process with the big participation of Central Asian states and other rising powers as China and India is the SCO. The clearest specific value of the SCO for Russia lies in regulating the uneasy mix of cooperation, competition and a gradually shifting power balance that characterizes its current dealings with China. Russia's interests in the SCO form a complex which emphasizes at least four directions: Central Asia, Chinese–Russian relations, relations with the USA and the general world politics.

Moving in the direction of regional organizations, of great importance for Russia and especially for the development and growing its Siberia and Far East regions is APEC Forum. The APR region has a high potential for economic growth and is a source of growth for the global economy, so Russia's associated opportunities should not be missed. Understanding that the “turn to the East” is one of the main vectors of the Russian economy and Russia should pay close attention to the processes taking place in the APEC, as one of the key regional platforms.

Another organization which is focused on the economic cooperation in particular area is the BSEC. The main interests for the Russian side are cooperation with the BSEC in the field

of transport and communications, energy, economic cooperation among the member states, tourism etc. In addition, Russia initiated creation of a mechanism for the development of project cooperation in the Black Sea region and finances it. In this regard, despite the fact that there are some disagreements and even conflicts between the BSEC countries, the Black Sea importance is irrefutable, and Russia is trying to take its place in the region.

The extensive experience of post-Soviet development has led to many changes in the activities of the CIS compared with the initial period of its existence. At present the CIS acts not as a comprehensive merger project, but as a mechanism for maintaining preferential intra-regional relations and achieving coordination of the positions of the participating countries.

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RUSSIA AND GLOBAL PROBLEMS

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Introduction

Globalization is a process that makes people, businesses, and countries increasingly interdependent and interrelated. This interdependence includes economic, environmental, socio-cultural, military, and other major issues. Globalization generates new opportunities, as well as new problems. To cope with emerging global problems, states have increasingly become interdependent.

Globalization affects Russian foreign policy in different ways. Firstly, the pressures and opportunities arising from globalization shape the goals of Russian leaders in foreign policy. Russia determines its allies and rivals according to the new types of relationships that globalization brings. Secondly, with the increase in globalization, Russian society has transformed and the state-society relations have changed. In response, Russia tries to exploit the economic, scientific and technological opportunities of globalization, while seeking to produce policies to meet the increasing demands of Russian society. Thirdly, global threats such as armed conflicts, arms races e.g. weapons of mass destruction, outbreaks of social violence and ethnic confrontation caused by terrorism, drug trafficking, mass starvation and epidemics affect the interests and security of Russia (Melville and Shaklenia, 2005: 30).

In response to global issues, the Russian Federation had developed a number of policy responses, for the purpose of this chapter, it will focus on two of them: The National Security Concept (2000) and the Foreign Policy Concept (2000). Both documents state the national interests as: combating (international) terrorism; tackle natural and industrial disasters; expedite economic development and raise living standards; preserve and strengthen the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation; strengthen the foundations of the constitutional system and Russia's position in the global arena (Haas, 2005: 2).

In recent years, technological developments, political and socio-economic consequences resulting from globalization has led to the revision of Russia's foreign policy. This chapter examines Russian foreign policy towards the following major global issues: terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts, environment, global warming and climate change, arms control and nuclear weapons, energy supply and security, migration, global poverty, hunger and sustainable development, human rights, global ethics and global justice, artificial intelligence, robotics and cyber security.

Russia and Contemporary Conflicts

Terrorism: Globalization has created new threats to international security and stability. Terrorism is the most striking of these threats. The events of 9/11 were a turning point in global terrorism, and the fight against it has since then been at the top of the international agenda. In the face of terrorist threats coming from both near and far, Russia has taken a strong stance to fight terrorism and is engaged in international cooperation efforts to fight against it. This chapter evaluates Russia's struggle against terrorism in two contexts – national and international.

Long before the 9/11 attacks in the USA, Russia viewed terrorism one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Anti-Terrorism Act was the first law legislated in 1993, then adopted in 1998 in Russia. The Act defines terrorist organizations and terrorist movements, identifies the types of counter-terrorist institutional structures and lists the rights and responsibilities of citizens. The Act states that the *Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti* (FSB)/*Federal Security Service* (FSS) is the principal security agency in the Federation of Russia and the successor of the Soviet Union's Committee for State Security (KGB) to combat terrorism. In 1997, the RF established the National Anti-Terrorist Committee (NATC), a skilled body responsible for coordinating and organizing counterterrorism activities of government bodies at the federal level, level of subjects of RF and local governments. The Chairman of the Committee is also the Director of the FSS of the RF. NATC is responsible for developing counterterrorism measure, participate in international cooperation, prepare proposals to the President of Russia on the formation of national policy and the improvement of counterterrorism legislation, and

increase public awareness of emerging terrorist threats (en.nac.gov.ru).

President Putin elaborated on the counter-terrorism strategy by signing a new law – the Federal Law on Countering Terrorism in March 2006. The law states, “terrorism shall mean the ideology of violence and the practice of influencing the adoption of a decision by state power bodies, local self-government bodies or international organizations connected with intimidation of the population and (or) other forms of unlawful violent actions” (Federal Law No. 35-2006, Article 3). The Law discusses three main areas that are needed: to increase the power of the Russian *Spetsnaz* (Russia’s Special Forces) and security institutions, to build international cooperation with interested partners – state and non-state, and to develop civil society mechanisms to reduce terrorist activity (Rykhtik, 2006: 165).

The official definition of terrorism in Russia is broad, encompassing a wide range of activities such as the promotion of terrorist ideas and the dissemination of related information. To be declared as a terrorist by Russia, an organization must either try to change the constitutional system by using terrorist methods and/or be associated with the organizations identified as terrorists by the international community. If however, an organization defined by the international community as terrorist organization does not directly threaten Russia’s security, it will not be perceived by Moscow as a terrorist organization. Russia for example does not recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization, with which Türkiye has been fighting for more than 35 years (For a list: fsb.ru).

In Russia, several institutions are responsible for combating terrorism, including the Interior Ministry, General Prosecutor, FSB, The Defense Ministry (Rykhtik, 2006: 181-183). Among them, the FSB is particularly important as the main organization for combating terrorism. The FSB employs around 150,000-350,000 people that fall under the supervision of the President. Some of the FSB’s primary responsibilities include counter intelligence, anti-terrorist activity, fighting crime, information security and also border security (Kosals and Pavlenko, 2018: 334).

For Russia, terrorism is a critical area of cooperation with regional/global powers such as the USA, China, India, and Türkiye, and also with international organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the United Nations

(UN), the G8, NATO, and the EU. Before the events of 9/11, Russia was already aware of imminent terrorist threats. In 1992, Russia initiated the Collective Security Treaty, a regional security structure with CIS members. Initially its purpose was to create a mutual defense alliance amongst CIS members. However, it remained relatively ineffective and unproductive. Later in 2002 the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS was renamed the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) with the stated focus on preserving the territorial integrity as well as seeking closer cooperation with multilateral institutions such as the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to support the efforts of the CSTO to combat international extremism and terrorism and to start developing coordinated practical measures aimed at preventing global threats (Ivanov, 2002: 38).

Already in 2000, the CSTO warned the international community of the growing threat posed by the Taliban. On October 11, 2000 the presidents of the CSTO member states adopted a statement in which they clearly stated that the main source of instability in the region was the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, which had become one of the world centers for international terrorism and drug trafficking. To combat this new threat, Putin in 2000 proposed the creation of an International Center for Combating Terrorism. Russia also requested countries and international organizations to stop supporting “terrorists” in the crisis of Chechnya. Some European countries refused to extradite those requested by Moscow and criticized Russia’s method of combating terrorism (Sapmaz, 2013: 13). Western countries did not support Putin’s ideas, since the events in Chechnya, which Putin linked to the problem of terrorism, had nothing to do with terrorism. But the 9/11 attacks became a turning point in the policies of the parties (histerl.ru).

Following the attacks of 9/11, Western politicians and analysts were surprised by the Russian leadership’s swift response and willingness to cooperate with Washington on the “war on terror”. The leadership of Russia not only expressed solidarity with the American people, but also supported the United States by voting in favor of the UN Security Council resolution 1373. Moscow also agreed to the deployment of Western troops in Central Asia, an area that Moscow considers a special sphere of its influence

(Thorun, 2009: 111). Evidence suggests that Moscow hoped to use the 9/11 attacks and the USA's reaction to bolster its interests (Thorun, 2009: 132.)

For the first years of the war on terror, Russia pursued a balanced and non-confrontational foreign policy. However, Russia soon after changed its strategy towards the US, since US policies strengthened Washington's influence in Asia and the Middle East and undermined Russia's sphere of influence and national interests. To limit Washington's influence in these regions, Moscow began creating anti-American organizations and regional counter-terrorism units.

Nevertheless, Russia consistently upheld the priority of international law and the central role of the UN in solving major world problems, which managed to avoid a split in the ranks of international antiterrorist activities caused by the unilateral military operation of the USA and its allies in Iraq. Largely as a result of Russia's policy, the UN Security Council resolutions were developed and approved, which helped to find a way out of the most complicated Iraq crisis and restored the doubtful unity of the international community, including questions of combating international terrorism. Russia supported the unanimous adoption of the UN Security Council resolution 1535 (2004) on the reform of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). The Committee improved the UN Security Council's organizational capacity and the effectiveness of the practical work of states in the fight against international terrorism. Russia contributed to strengthening the cooperation of the CTC with the main regional and international organizations, including the CIS, the CSTO and the SCO (Uranian, 2016: 45). The fight against terrorism, of course, was not limited to Afghanistan or Iraq alone. Russia aimed to create "a global, integrated system of counteraction against international terrorism" (Ivanov, 2002: 38), which could become a kind of model for the collective management of international relations in the globalization era.

Russia took other important steps in the area of international cooperation against terrorism. Russia, as a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, participated in numerous regional counter terror exercises. It also advanced counterterrorism agendas for the regional organizations. The government held consultations and signed formal anti-terrorism

agreements in 2017 with countries such as Belarus, China, India, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Tajikistan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan (refworld.org).

Ethnic and religious conflicts: Beginning in the 21st century, following the end of the Cold War, inter-state conflicts have decreased, while intra-state or ethnic and religious conflicts have increased. These conflicts have reached dangerous levels for the national security of states, but they have also played an effective role in reshaping global relations.

To understand Russia's policy on ethnic and religious conflicts, it is necessary to mention two main characteristics of this country. First, Russia has a society that is ethnically and religiously diverse. As Lovelace reports, "Russia is a multi-ethnic state with over 100 nationalities and a complex federal structure inherited from the Soviet period that includes regions, republics, territories, and other subunits" (Lovelace, 2017: 49). For this reason, Russia is pursuing a national security policy to prevent possible conflicts within the country and to ensure national stability. The second important feature of Russia is that it is a global power. Hence, it has a multi-faceted foreign policy approach to ethnic and religious conflicts in regions near and far.

Russia's policy on ethnic and religious conflicts is shaped by many policies such as security, energy, arms sales, economic impact, and regional domination. Therefore, Russia does not always adhere to the same policy about ethnic and religious conflicts that arise in neighboring countries and more remote regions. For example, Russia perceives the conflicts in Transcaucasia and Central Asia from the perspective of national security and regional dominance concerns. In the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa however, Russia views ethnic and religious conflicts from the mindset of a global actor that responds in the context of energy security, arms sale, economic impact, and global political balances. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that Russia, as a global actor, behaves without a specific framework towards ethnic and religious conflicts occurring in the world. To understand the diversity of Russia's foreign policy responses, the remainder of this section first examines Russia's intervention in the "far abroad" and then in the "near abroad" countries.

The Bosnian War: The Bosnian War, which took place between 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, represented

the Russian Federations first test of Russia's policy on ethnic and religious conflicts. Bosnia and Herzegovina, a former republic of Yugoslavia, is a multiethnic country consisting of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Croats (Catholic) and Serbs (Orthodox). In response to the ethnic-religious conflict, Andrei Kozyrev, the former Russian foreign minister, warned against making the Orthodox religion a determinant of Russia's foreign policy since he understood that such a policy could backfire in Russia between Orthodox and Muslim believers causing internal strife. Furthermore, the Orthodox Church has a deep-rooted tradition of protecting co-religionists in the Middle East, the Balkans and other places outside Russia. Nevertheless, due to the nationalist sentiments, the Yeltsin government limited its participation in international sanctions and military actions against Serbia (Curtis and Leighton, 1998: 220).

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: In the 1990s, Russian-Israel relations initially went from so good under Yeltsin (1991-1999), especially in terms of trade, to too bad with the Russian Foreign Minister Primakov (1996-1999) who took a pro-Arab stance in Russian foreign policy and tended to side with the Palestinian camp. However, when Putin became Prime Minister in 1999, Katz argues Russian foreign policy "pursued an evenhanded" policy toward Israel on the one hand and radical regimes in Iraq, Iran, and Syria on the other (Katz, 2005: 51). This was reflected in Russia's involvement in the Road Map peace process in 2003, initiated with the USA, the countries of the EU and the UN, referred to as the "Quartet" with the aim of reaching a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The road map built was similar to the Oslo Accord Agreements (1993 and 1995), and additionally drew from US Senator George Mitchell's former efforts in 2001 to get the peace process back on track. The Road Map consisted of three phases that prioritized security before the final settlement as a confidence building measure: first it required support from both sides for the two-state solution, second the creation of provisional borders for the Palestinian state, and third, the final agreement for implementation. Unfortunately, to-date, the Road Map has not been implemented due to events that later unfolded.

Russia's "evenhanded" foreign policy approach in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in large part due to Putin's domestic concerns over Chechnya and fears about terrorism. Putin came to see the similarities of the fight against the Chechens as the

same as Israel's fight against the Palestinians. Furthermore, former Prime Minister Sharon and Putin shared similar attitudes about their Muslim opponents, perceiving them as terrorist you cannot negotiate with. Both agreed a strong handed approach was the only way to quash the terrorist, which the West vilified them for. Additionally, Russian-Israeli arms trade provided another incentive for Russia to maintain a good working relationship with Israel (Bogaturov, 2017: 462). However, Russia refrained from taking an openly pro-Israeli position, and had to tread lightly. On the one hand, Russian people accounted for a quarter of Israel's population and the violence inflicted on them in the Middle East, was considered as the same as those in the North Caucasus. Yet on the other hand, Russia wanted to refrain from upsetting Russia's millions of Muslims and Palestinian friends by taking an openly pro-Israeli position.

Syrian Conflict

Syria serves as a third and more recent example of Russia's foreign policy response to ethnic-religious conflicts in the "far abroad". There are three suggested reasons why Russia entered the Syrian conflict. First, is Russia's fear of terrorist activities by ISIS and other fundamentalist groups and their effects on the large Muslim population in Russia (Piet, 2014: 174). This fear is not unfounded as Russian Muslims have left and joined ISIS and other Anti-Assad forces. Second, is Russia's desire to reclaim its status as a global power after having lost its influence following the end of the Cold War. A third, and related reason, is Russia's goal to reemerge as a regional power. Previously, the Soviet Union had gained influence in Syria in the 1970s, supplying the country with aid and arms. However, after the Cold War, Russia's influence declined. It was not until the mid-2000s that Assad and Putin began to develop a closer relationship due to the strong ties they shared during the Cold War. As the Syrian crisis became worse, Assad requested Putin to send a group of Russian air forces and navy to Syria September 2015 to support the Syrian armed forces in the fight against ISIL and other so-called Islamist terrorist groups. Russian military has not only destroyed terrorists located in a region far away from Russia but also has prevented the possibility of restarting and even intensifying Islamic extremism in the Muslim regions of the Russian Federation (Nazarov, 2017: 31).

These different examples show us that Russia will only intervene in an ethnic or religious conflict in the far abroad if it poses as a threat to Russia's national security. It has also demonstrated Russia's careful calculations to not upset its Muslim majority, while at the same time appeasing Russian nationalist. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, these three examples have progressively shown how Russia has reasserted itself as a global power and be recognized as one.

When however, ethnic-religious conflicts take place in Russia's near abroad, such as with the "frozen conflicts" between the Abkhazians and Georgians, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and the conflicts in Chechnya, Russian foreign policy responses are different, yet consistent as the remainder of this section exhibits.

In Russia's near abroad, Russia's foreign policy responses to ethnic-religious conflicts focuses on its national security concerns and maintaining regional dominance. During the clashes between Georgians and Abkhazians in the Caucasian region, Russia played a role in supplying weapons to the Abkhaz. Russia also sent troops to the Turkish-Georgian border during the crisis period. The main reason for Russia's support of Abkhazia was to ensure the entry of Georgia into the CIS. Georgia is a key country in the transition route of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, which Russia considers as its rival in the transport of Caspian oil. Russia was perturbed by both Georgia's support for the Baku-Ceyhan project and the policy of President Shevardnadze's close relations with the West. Russia wanted both Kazakhstan's and Azerbaijan's oil to be transported from the Russian port of Novorossiysk to international markets (Kasim, 2001: 56-57). For this reason, Russia has transformed this ethnic conflict into an opportunity to control the region economically and have military bases in the region.

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia intervened the region to increase its influence. During Elchibey's presidency in Azerbaijan, Russia supported Armenian forces in order to play a role in the control of the Caspian oil and ensure Azerbaijan's membership in the CIS. However, in 1994, when Aliyev became a president, Russia began to pursue a more balanced policy in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Kasim, 2001: 58-59). Both of these conflicts in the Caucasus demonstrate

Russia's determination to continue its policy of efficiency in the region with its military might.

Chechen War: The conflict that has affected Russia the most in the Caucasus, was in Chechnya. This conflict began in December 1994 and lasted 21 months. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chechnya declared its independence. However, Russia refused to accept Chechnya's secession, fearing it would cause a dominion effect of other independent movements within the RF and former President Yeltsin hoped to recover Chechnya's valuable oil resources. For these reasons, the Russian army entered Chechnya December 10, 1994 to "restore Constitutional Order". Despite the Russian military's initial gains, they suffered huge losses after two years of fighting. Finally, in 1997 a cease-fire was declared. A peace agreement was signed May 12, 1997 and Chechnya became de facto independent, although officially it would remain part of Russia. However, after terrorist bombings in Moscow and other cities connected to Chechen militants, Yeltsin called for the Russian military to invade and occupy Chechnya in October 1999. Russia was heavily criticized internationally for its disproportionate use of force and roll back on the democratic freedoms introduced after the 1991 Soviet Union collapse. Fighting ensued till 2009 until another cease-fire was declared and de facto independence restored. Although Putin succeeded to pacify and bring stability to Chechnya, two decades of fighting has created a new hotbed in the region for radical Islamism. At the same time, it has revived Russia's external expansion ambitions in the former Soviet territories.

Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential: When it comes to Russia's foreign policy in Central Asia, it has attempted to solve issues through the framework of international cooperation and avoided the possibility of direct intervention in ethnic and religious conflicts. This has been the case in Uzbekistan and its eastern neighbors, where unresolved territorial disputes and water issues, have created regional concerns for Russia, with its potential to trigger international conflicts in Central Asia (Ziegler, 2011: 162-163).

Environmental Problems

Although globalization has brought many positive benefits to the world, it has also been responsible for global ecological

imbalances including environmental, global warming, and climate change. Each of these is a direct result of human economic activities. Although Russia is a country that contributes to these problems, it also participates in many international cooperation initiatives to solve global ecological problems.

Russia's environmental is globally significant for many reasons. First, Russia is the largest country in the world, playing a huge role in rapid decline of regional and global environmental problems. Russia the fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, and responsible for most of the air and water pollution affecting people living in Russia and neighboring countries. Secondly, Russia is a country rich in natural resources. For this reason, other countries and international actors, particularly the EU, have sought to engage Russia in global environmental politics and help it facilitate the development of domestic environmental policies (Korppoo and et al., 2015: 2).

Following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the destruction of lakes from the overuse of irrigation in Central Asia, Russia, since the 1990s has focused on international regulations about environmental protection to counter environmental damage done under the Soviet Union.

There are many actors involved in the development of policies that address environmental problems in Russia. The President is the leader of the entire political process, and therefore environmental policies remain dependent on his/her preferences. Putin for example, is more reluctant than his predecessor Medvedev to address environmental problems, despite the discourse in his speeches. The business community in the country also plays a critical role in environmental policymaking. However, without government approval, the business community cannot take any crucial steps to lead the country towards environmental modernization. Environmental scientists additionally play a critical role in the country, however their contribution remains marginalized by the lack of funding allocated to the scientific research community by the state. Finally, Russian public opinion can be considered another important actor. However, when compared to the West, the Russian public is less interested and concerned about environmental issues (Korppoo and et al., 2015: 9-17).

Despite the discovery of the connection between deteriorating human health and the destruction of ecosystems in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the term ‘ecocide’ was invented to summarize the environmental reports of the Soviet era (Curtis and McClave, 1998: 136), the population continues to prioritize the economy over the environment. In the post-Soviet era, environmental policy has not been central to Russian politics and authority. The population supports a policy that prioritizes the economy – income, employment and general needs such as raising the standard of living. Environmental issues and concerns are considered a secondary concern (Bobylev, 2018: 269). Russia has also been able to doge the responsibility for some of the world’s worst environmental disasters, by placing the blame on “other” countries that were previously states of the Soviet Union

In the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept, Russia finally acknowledged the ecological disasters and called international cooperation at all levels to avert them. The Concept stated Russia would follow international standards, amend Russian environmental laws, and develop a rational ecological policy at the national level (Lomagin, 2014: 126). Russia was one of the first countries to sign the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Korppoo, 2006: 24). However, Russia’s participation was mainly due to the desire to preserve the status of an industrialized country, while protecting its transitional economy (Korppoo, 2006: 15).


Since then, Russia’s role and engagement in international processes to combat global climate change has in recent years gained momentum. In 1997, Russia participated in the Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force on February 16, 2005. The event marked the beginning of a new phase in addressing climate change problems by the world community. It also came at a time when Russia was undergoing radical transformations - the collapse of the Soviet Union, the devastating economic crisis of the early 90s, the crisis of 1998 (Korppoo, 2006: 24). The signing of the Kyoto Protocol was the first major success of global climate diplomacy. The Kyoto Protocol served as the foundation for further improving the mechanisms for global regulation of climate change on our planet (Kovalev and et al., 2017: 123, Cramton and et al., 2015: 52-53).

Without Russia’s participation, there would have been no Kyoto Protocol. Russian experts have since then actively cooperated with the UN intergovernmental commission for the study of climate change (Kovalev and et al., 2017: 128). Later in 2015, under the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol was replaced by the Paris Agreement, a treaty calling for a radical reduction of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and climate change measures by 2020. Although Russia signed the Agreement, did not ratify it, because there were too many ambiguities and flaws that it felt could adversely affect its economic growth. Furthermore, Russia felt some aspects of the Agreement were unrealistic, such as the call for Russia to bring its emissions below the levels it had in the 1990 levels, a rate the Country had already exceeded at that time (Bykovsky, 2017: 101-104).

Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control: Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC) have been the subject of many negotiations and treaties between Soviet Union and the USA during the Cold War. This section examines Russia’s weapon potential, its policy on arms control and the treaties to which it is a party of.

Chart 7.1:

Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories, 2019



Source: <https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/nventoriesArsenals2019-1.png>

Table 7.1:
Arms of the USA and the Russia

Category of Data	United States of America	Russian Federation
Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers	659	517
Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers	1398	1420
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers	800	775

Source: <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/286466.htm>, (02.07.2019)

As seen in Chart 7.1 and Table 7.1, Russia is one of the two countries with the highest weapon capacity in the world. The Russian government considers nuclear weapons as a source of global prestige and a fundamental guarantor for Russia’s security. The country’s permanent place in the UN Security Council, its nuclear weapons, its membership of the G8, ensures Russia will remain a great power and continue to play a global role for the foreseeable future (Baluev, 2018: 148). However, Putin, in official statements has reaffirmed that the importance of Russian nuclear forces is more for safety than prestige (Oliker and et al., 2009: 163). As the world becomes less predictable and more dangerous, Karaganov suggests, “Russia must continue to rely on a rapidly renewable, albeit downsized, nuclear arsenal as a guarantee of its national security” (Karaganov, 2005: 457).

The emphasis in military thinking about nuclear weapons has been continued under Putin’s rule. This approach was first introduced in the major security document - the National Security Concept (NSC) of 2000. The NSC states all forces and facilities available, even nuclear weapons, will be used if necessary, to reflect armed aggression, in case other means are exhausted. It also declares that Russia must have nuclear forces for use against any aggressor state or coalition of states. At the same time, in the interests of preventing aggression of any scale, including when nuclear weapons are used against Russia and its allies, a deterrence

capability should be maintained (Haas, 2010: 62). The Russian Military Doctrine of 2015 claims Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and or its allies, as well as in response to aggression against Russia that threatens the very existence of the state (Article 27). The Doctrine also discusses an “escalation to de-escalation” strategy, which provides for the limited use of nuclear weapons to end a large-scale conflict on favorable terms for Russia (armscontrol.org).

Although the Cold War ended and the Warsaw Pact evaporated, the USA has always had a special place in Russia’s foreign policy. The only thing that has not changed in this process is the precision of Russia to the relations with the USA. The current view of the Russian military doctrine on nuclear weapons is as outlined above. However, because of the international conjuncture since the Cold War, Russia has signed many arms control agreements with the USA and other members of the international community. Some of the most relevant agreements are listed in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2:

Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements and Treaties

	Signed	Ratified
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty	1968	1970
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	1996	2000
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)	1980	1983
CPPNM 2005 Amendment	---	2008
Chemical Weapons Convention	1993	1997
Biological Weapons Convention	1972	1975
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	2005	2007

Source: <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/286466.htm>, (02.07.2019)

Each of the major multilateral arms control agreements and treaties are defined as follows:

- Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: “The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have

joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States.” (un.org).

- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: “The Conference on Disarmament (CD) began its substantive negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in January 1994 within the framework of an Ad Hoc Committee established for that purpose. Although the CD had long been involved with the issue of a test-ban, only in 1982 did it establish a subsidiary body on the item. Disagreement over a mandate for that body blocked tangible progress for years” (un.org).
- Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM): “The CPPNM (1987) provides for certain levels of physical protection during international transport of nuclear material” (state.gov).
- CPPNM 2005 Amendment: “A Diplomatic Conference in July 2005 was convened to amend the CPPNM and strengthen its provisions. The amended Convention makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport” (iaea.org).
- Chemical Weapons Convention (CWP): “The CWP (1997) aims to eliminate an entire category of weapons of mass destruction by prohibiting the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer or use of chemical weapons by States Parties. States Parties, in turn, must take the steps necessary to enforce that prohibition in respect of persons (natural or legal) within their jurisdiction” (opcw.org).
- Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): “The BWC (1975) the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the development, production and stockpiling of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction” (un.org).
- International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism: “The Nuclear Terrorism Convention’s (2007) main objective relates to the criminalization of a number of nuclear and radioactive material related offences, the establishment of jurisdiction over these offences and the co-operation among states parties, with the UN and with the International Atomic Energy Agency in specified matters” (oecd-nea.org).

In addition, Russia has also signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, New START, Nuclear Security Summits, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (For further information visit: armscontrol.org) with the USA.

For Russia, there are several reasons for participating in arms control negotiations with the United States. The first reason is for the prestige that emphasizes the status of Russia as one of the two leading world nuclear powers and the capacity to lock the USA into further nuclear reductions. The second reason is the concern about the USA's missile defense plans and prospects (Oliker et al., 2009: 170). With the new crises of today, the debate on nuclear weapons and missile systems between the USA and Russia has again begun to occupy the agenda.

Energy Supply and Security: The rise in production with the globalization process has increased the need for energy. Having energy resources and ensuring energy security have become important goals for international actors. Energy is at the core of Russia's national security strategy and a bi-directional factor for Russian policies. First, Russia is one of the most important energy suppliers in the world. Selling energy produced in its territory to the outside world provides Russia with enormous profits. Secondly, Russia wants to control energy resources in different parts of the world, especially in Central Asia. Thus, it competes with other global players in the control of energy resources. In both respects, the energy issue has a direct connection with other foreign policy goals of Russia. In this section, the situation of Russia's energy resources will be examined, then its policies related to energy resources in other countries will be discussed.

Besides the many geopolitical interests of Russia in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, economic priorities occupy an important place. Russia's geo-energy interests are met by transporting Caspian oil to the world market through its territory. The Energy Strategy of Russia approved in 2009, and projected until 2030, states one of the most important strategic directions of the foreign economic activity of the oil complex of the Russian Federation is the transit of oil from neighboring countries through Russian territory. At present, Azerbaijan's oil is transported through transit pipelines of Russia. Russian export routes for "black gold" are the northern sea route for the transport of Caspian oil. Geo-energy interests of Russia are also met by the possibility

of full control over the export of Caspian gas. On October 14, 2009, a contract for the sale and purchase of natural gas was signed between Gazprom and the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic. Territorial proximity, the absence of transit zones and the presence of an already existing gas transportation infrastructure make an expansion of gas cooperation between the Transcaucasian Republic and Russia the most commercially viable option for both partners. Russia is trying to intercept the “blue fuel” sent to the Nabucco gas pipeline, which supplies natural gas to Europe by bypassing Russia and directly competing with the Russian “South Stream” (the project was closed at the end of 2014) (Muhametov, 2015: 47-48).

A complex network of pipelines connects “production regions with virtually all of Russia’s centers of population and industry. Pipelines are especially important because of the long distances between Siberian oil and gas fields and Russia’s European industrial centers as well as countries to the west” (Cooper, 1998: 364). During the presidencies of Putin and Medvedev, the country renationalized its energy sector and began to introduce the practice of receiving rents for transporting energy through its territory. Russia sometimes uses the “tap weapon” to punish recalcitrant states, as demonstrated by the gas wars with Ukraine (and to a lesser extent with Belarus) in 2005 and 2008. The use of energy as an instrument of strategic policy is consistent with the common goals of Russian foreign policy. On the other hand, the West occasionally punished Moscow for this reason (Sussex, 2014: 215).

Map 7.1:*Oil and Gas Pipelines from Russia to Europe*

Source: <https://media.nationalgeographic.org/assets/photos/000/297/29748.jpg>, (07.06.2019)

Not surprisingly, Russia's economy is profoundly dependent on energy exports, as the country has the world's largest conventional natural gas reserves, the second largest reserves of coal and the ninth largest reserves of crude oil. A significant amount of Russia's energy resources are exported to European countries, giving it an extensive influence on these countries. For example, Ukraine receives 51.6% of its domestic natural gas supplies from Russia, CIS (37%), Eastern Europe (31%), Germany (27%), Türkiye (14%), Italy (10%), France (8%) and others (10%) (Simmons and et al., 2014: 52).

As demonstrated, Russia is a critical country for global energy. Its energy resources provide large amounts of export revenue. This income also increases the economic development and prosperity of Russia. With the energy resources, Russia serves as an economic and geopolitical power in Europe, the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. For this reason, Russia's energy security is also part of the energy security of these regions.

Socio-Economic Problems

In the post-Soviet era, Russia has inherited a range of socio-economic problems. This section focuses particularly on three areas: migration, sustainable development, and human rights.

Migration: Globalization has facilitated the mobility of people around the world for many reasons, such as finding a job, living in a safer place or living in greater economic comfort. Migrants change the cultural, demographic and economic structure of a country where they move. Many countries are positively and negatively affected by migration and Russia is one of these countries. This section discusses the effects of migration on Russia and its policy to address this challenge.

Russia has a population of 144.5 million people, 11.7 million of them include international migrants which is 8.1% of the population (migrationdataportal.org). By 2050, the number of foreign migrants in the Russian Federation will exceed one third of the country's population (Garusova, 2014: 12). As these numbers indicate, the issue of international migration plays an important role in the country's population dynamics. This role can be grouped under three headings. The first and the most important is the country's need for a labor force due to the aging population of Russia. An unprecedented inflow of migrants into Russia from the periphery of the Soviet Union occurred in the early 1990s. Migrants were mainly forced to move due to poor economic conditions. Labor migration became the dominant form of migration that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1990s (Malakov and Simon, 2018: 261-262). Labor immigration to Russia has an inevitable long-term growth trend. Regardless of quotas, legislative and bureaucratic barriers, it should be expected that migration in the Russian Federation will continue for the foreseeable future. According to demographic forecasts, the processes of depopulation and aging of the Russian population will markedly continue in the next 15 years. The country is entering the most difficult period from the point of view of the demographic situation, since the reserves for increasing the level of economic activity in young and elderly are almost exhausted (Volokh, 2012: 10-11).

Second, migration is made up of those who want to live a safer life due to security problems in the immediate vicinity of

Russia. A significant number of people have migrated to Russia following the crisis in the Caucasus, Crimea, and Ukraine. For example, over 1 million Ukrainians, as of 2017, have sought asylum or other forms of legal stay in the Russian Federation since the outbreak of the conflict in southeastern Ukraine in April 2014 (unhcr.org). The third role migration has played is based on the integration process of Eurasia, which is one of Russia's important foreign policy approaches. Russia has “demonstrated its readiness to allow free movement on its territory for capital, goods, services, and people from participating foreign countries, having agreed upon the course of creating a new political and economic union—the Eurasian Economic Union” (Malakov and Simon, 2018: 263-264). Lomagin identifies “2012 was a turning point in integration trends in post-Soviet space. The Belarus-Kazakhstan-Russia Customs Union (CU) expanded into the Single Economic Space (SES), bringing into operation a set of 17 agreements ranging from the coordination of macroeconomic and fiscal policies to labor migration, energy, and technical regulation” (Lomagin, 2014: 115). The integration process in the region encourages people to emigrate and Russia.

Additionally, Russia has made some international and national regulations against the immigration problem. Russia contributes to the work carried out by the UN on migrants. In this respect, the years 1992 and 1993 have been the scene of very important developments. Firstly, the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) office in Moscow opened in 1992. Secondly, Russia was reclassified as a “country of first resort” for foreigners fleeing countries outside of the CIS by the UN Convention on Refugees, which it signed in 1993. This status entails an international obligation to care for such individuals following the 1951 UN convention. At the same time, illegal immigration in many areas grew along with declining border security after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Curtis and McClave, 1998: 162). In Russia, the function of control, supervision, and compliance with legal norms are vested in the structural unit of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs - the Federal Migration Service (FMS). This executive body accumulates all data, including the data given in the collections of the Federal Service of State Statistics (Rosstat), on migrants passing through border and visa checkpoints, regulates and controls the setting and removal of foreigners from migration records, provides state services in the field of migration

and keeps current records of migration flows (Rybakovsky and Ryazantsev, 2005: 4).

Poverty, Hunger and Sustainable Development: The political geography of Russia has considerably changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite this, Russia remains the largest and an important state in terms of the global ecosystem. Russia has experienced a complex and difficult transition making the future uncertain for not only for Russia, but also the world economy. In addition, problems such as income inequality, poverty, and hunger, which have emerged with globalization, have become critical for Russia. In this section, the problems of poverty and hunger in Russia will be examined, and then Russia's approach to sustainable development will be discussed.

An official 2018 Report says, "22 percent of Russians fall into the 'poverty zone', meaning they are unable to buy anything beyond basic staples needed for subsistence. This study places nearly 36 percent of Russians in the 'consumer risk zone,' with incomes that allow them to buy decent food and clothes" (rferl.org). These numbers show that poverty is a very important socio-economic problem in Russia.

The Russian Federation ranks 21st out of 119 candidate countries in the 2018 Global Hunger Index (globalhungerindex.org). Oxfam reports, "20.6 million people earn less than the minimum subsistence level, and struggle to meet the basic needs of daily life in Russia." (oxfam.org). The government needs to make efforts to transform the country, as many people still do not have access to basic social services, such as health care.

Sustainable development is a popular concept in the political language of the West. The Russian word that is used as its equivalent is the concept *ustoichivoerazvitie*. It however excludes the notion of "sustainable" but rather "stable development". The Russian interpretation of "sustainable development" can also be compared with the country's environmental policy, which emphasizes "the rational use" of natural resources, rather than "environmental regulation" (Korppoo and et al., 2015: 12). Russia's approach to sustainable development influences the future of both its country's and the world's economy. Within this framework, important steps have been taken by Russia for sustainable development. Oldfield and Shaw note, "The Russian government has approved a series of legislative acts with the stated

aim of implementing the provisions of Agenda 21 and applying the concept of sustainable development domestically, after Russia was a participant at the 1992 Earth Summit and a signatory to the conference's main policy documents, including Agenda 21 and the Rio Convention" (Oldfield and Shaw, 2002: 392).

Russia makes a significant contribution in strengthening global financial and economic stability, including the participation in the so-called Cologne Initiative, a program to reduce the debt of the least developed countries of the world. Russia supports the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The amount of financial assistance provided to these countries by other creditors and the degree of their participation in this Initiative largely depends on the size of the Russian "discount". Russia's contribution to the struggle against poverty and the socio-economic development of the Third World states is not limited to large-scale assistance in reducing their external debt. Russia provides the least developed countries with broad trade preferences. Virtually all goods produced in these states are imported into Russia duty-free (Ivanov, 2002: 26).

Economic aid traditionally occupies a prominent place in the arsenal of foreign policy. One of the main forms of such Russian assistance to neighboring countries is the provision of loans with low-interest rates and for long periods. The main form of Russian assistance to the CIS countries is the supply of energy resources (especially oil and natural gas) at preferential prices. Their main recipients are Ukraine and the Republic of Belarus. Price subsidies from the Russian Federation for the supplied gas and oil allow the neighboring countries to re-export them to Europe at market prices, making a profit on the difference in value, which is a hidden form of economic assistance (Muhametov, 2015: 78-79).

With the help of international norms on the one hand and the legal changes made in the country on the other, Russian assistance in the framework of good-neighborliness to near-abroad countries illustrates how Russia assumes some of the responsibility of global economic problems. But, given its economic power and place in the global ecosystem, Russia will need to provide more active support for sustainable development efforts.

Human Rights, Global Ethic, and Global Justice: After the collapse of the Soviet Union, political, economic and social disarray arose in Russia. However, it was hoped that human rights

in Russia would improve in the post-Soviet era. The slowdown in the democratization process in the country has impeded the development of human rights. Corruption, lack of transparency, inadequate public participation in politics and increasing government pressure on the media, has made the country's claims of transition towards democratization questionable. Russia's problems in the field of global ethics and global justice are also tied to human rights issues. Although Russia is a party to many international conventions, it will continue to fall short in global ethics and global justice as long as it ignores human rights problems in its country and other countries.

The problems of human rights in the Soviet period remain practically unchanged today. Although the government denies this allegation, reports prepared by various international organizations confirm that significant human rights violations in this country continue. For example, the Human Rights Watch 2018 World Report listed nearly 13 pages of human rights violations in Russia (Human Rights Watch, 2017: 440-453). Freedom of assembly, freedom to access the Internet, freedom of expression, restricted activities of non-governmental organizations, violence against people and discrimination represent just a few examples of the human rights violations in Russia. In addition, Russia is responsible for human rights abuses in crisis areas such as Ukraine, Chechnya, and Crimea (US Department of State, 2018: 1).

Violations of rights, concerning other civilian entities other than individuals, can be grouped under four headings: the media, non-governmental organizations, religious institutions, and the business world. Suppression of freedom of the press and governmental influence on media production, as briefly discussed in Chapter 3 are two aspects that must be considered in terms of the media. As for non-governmental organizations, they face violent harassment, intimidation and bureaucratic threats that the executive branch does little to dissuade. Religious groups are no exception in this situation. The business world faces different problems. The executive branch of the government forces them to open themselves up to government intervention. The business community has no choice, because if they refuse, they may face nationalizing and prosecution (Bonneville, 2007: 4).

As mentioned earlier, it is impossible to separate human rights problems in Russia from democratization problems in this

country. The OSCE has observed nine elections since 1996, and most recently the 2016 State Duma elections (osce.org). However, there is no significant progress in the Russian human rights report. Putin has created a highly centralized, authoritarian political system. Even bicameral Federal Assembly depends on the executive. The 2016 Duma elections and the 2018 presidential elections were marked by charges of government intervention and manipulation of the election process, including the exclusion of essential opposition candidates (US Department of State, 2018: 1). According to Amnesty International Report of 2017-2018, migrants and refugees were denied protection of their rights in Russia. It came to the point that some forms of domestic violence were decriminalized. Harassment, prosecution, and intimidation of human rights defenders, representatives of religious minorities and independent NGOs have continued. Amnesty International reports, “Systematically the right to a fair trial was constantly violated. Serious human rights violations continue unabated in the North Caucasus. Moreover, Russia used its veto to block UN Security Council resolutions on Syria. And to top it all in Russia there were further restrictions to the rights to freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly” (Amnesty International, 2018: 310).

International law is the result of the Westphalian system based on the socio-cultural norms and values of the West. For this reason, Russia remained far from Western values in the Cold War era. In the post-Soviet period, Russia has adopted international law because it has needed to change its political position in the world. Russia’s situation is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, the opening of Russia to international law means a radical break with the traditional isolationism of this country. Secondly, this process started many years ago but progressed slowly. For the first time in its history, Russia adopted a constitutional principle incorporating the generally recognized international norms concerning human rights into its domestic law in 1992. The 1993 Constitution confirmed the trend of giving a prominent place to international legal standards in the domestic legal settings. Article 15 of the new Constitution confirms that “the generally recognized principles and norms of international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation shall constitute part of its legal system” (Danilenko and Stein, 1997: 295-296). Lawmaking within the country and the internal political activities of the

Russian government are carried out according to international norms (Bogaturov, 2017: 463-464). According to the UN Charter, the Final Act of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Declaration of the Helsinki Summit in 1992 and other international documents, Russia has the right to develop humanitarian cooperation with other states at bilateral and multilateral levels, despite the many humanitarian problems that continue to exist in the country. Melville and Shakleina suggest that “over time, this will help create a global community of states and the effective realization of human rights” (Melville and Shakleina, 2005: 61).

Technological Problems: Over the past 50 years, technological developments have exponentially grown throughout the world. These developments significantly affect the behavior and actions of individuals, groups, companies, states, and other international actors. While there are many benefits of technology (e.g. greater access to information, saves us time, give us greater mobility, and enables us to communicate and work more efficiently), there are also many drawbacks (e.g. creates dependencies on technology, endangers our individual freedoms, creates data security concerns, technology addictions, and social disconnection). In this section, the effects of artificial intelligence, robotics, and internet technology on Russian politics will be examined.

Artificial Intelligence and Robotics: In the post-Soviet period, Russia has prioritized scientific innovation, allocating 70% of the federal budget to scientific studies. Russia recently, along with many other foreign countries, has followed the trend of developing robotics, in the case of Russia it is referred to as the Fundamental Robotic Systems Research Program (FASO). This program targets the coordination of researches related to robotics in the partner organizations. Six areas of basic research have been formed: mechanics, control algorithms, medical robotics, marine robotic technology, aerospace robotics, and agricultural robotics. The development of robotics is included in the list of the priority areas of technological development in the field of information technologies that are defined by the government (Raevskaia and Stogonova, 2018: 112). It is widely agreed that robots are automated programmable devices designed to perform production or other tasks aimed at partial or complete replacement of human labor. In Russia, however, the market volume for industrial

robots has been insignificant and demands have decreased for several reasons including limited demand, obsolete facilities, and resources along with poor scientific background, economic difficulties, insufficient government support, etc. Therefore, this market remains underdeveloped. To fill this void, private companies and research organizations have successfully engaged in robotics by holding different kinds of conferences, exhibitions, and educational projects. One area however that the actively developed at the professional and state level is military robotics (Raevskaia and Stogonova, 2018: 111).

Internet: Internet in Russia only begun to be used 20 years ago. In 1994, the InterNIC international network center officially registered the national domain ‘.ru’ site for the Russian Federation. Now Russia has three domain names: ‘.ru’, ‘.rf’, and ‘.su’ (Tregubova et. al., 2014: 101). Russia uses internet technology to improve the national economy. In 2002, the 9-year Electronic Russia (e-Russia) Federal Program for the period 2002–2010 was adopted by the government. This program includes the “provision of the right to free search, access, transmission, production and distribution of information, and the expansion of specialist training and national information, and communication technology capacity” (Simachev and Kuzyk, 2018: 186). National enterprises based on internet technologies have also recently increased. The main goal of these new initiatives is economic development. In this regard, The National Technology Initiative (NTI) is an important step because it “is oriented towards the creation of the technology markets of the future and seeks to develop future Russian leaders in these markets, emphasizing collaboration among present generations of Russian students and specialists-in-training in order to foster new, future-oriented technological teams” (Simachev and Kuzyk, 2018: 191).

In Russia, the state limits the access of civilians to the Internet and the use of it. Gorbunova attests, “the government effectively controls most of the traditional media in Russia and has taken steps to bring the internet under greater state control, while prosecuting social media users and adopting highly regressive legislation on data storage localization, encryption, and cyber security” (Gorbunova, 2019: 1). In addition, the new Russian counterterrorism legislation prohibits “preaching, praying, or disseminating of religious materials outside ‘specially designated places,’ such as officially recognized religious institutions, as well

as unnecessarily expand its oversight, undermining human rights and cyber security” (hrw.org).

Cyber Problems: Although no one would deny the benefits the Internet has brought humanity, it has however proven suitable for malicious use. Individuals, groups, social organizations, terrorist organizations, advertising companies, and states can and have abused the use of the internet, resulting in cyber problems referred to as cyber conflicts. Cyber conflict can be defined as the use of computational technologies in military interactions, political (diplomatic) or economic affairs in the realm of the international system (Valeriano and Maness, 2014: 348-349).

States, such as Russia, can and have used computational technologies for their purposes as a tool of conflict. For Russia, cyber conflict is a strategy, which is used from time to time against an enemy to achieve desired ends. In this context, Russia has been involved in three important cyber conflicts were against Estonia, Georgia, and the USA. The Russian government has never admitted to supporting or committing these attacks. However, research suggests that Russia supported these attacks.

The Pandora’s box of global cyber war was opened by the Russians (Maness and Valeriano, 2015: 86). Russia’s cyber experiment, as discussed in chapter 4, started with an attack against Estonia in 2007. The cyber attack was intended to punish Estonia for the removal of the memorial of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn to commemorate the Soviet soldiers who helped liberate Estonia from the Nazis in WWII (Andress and Winterfeld, 2013: 12). However, as previously noted, the Estonians saw the statue as a symbol Soviet oppression for 48 years. The Estonian case was defined as the “first cyber conflict or cyber warfare” (Karatzogianni, 2009: 6). Although it remains unknown who was responsible for the cyber attack, it is generally assumed the attack derived from Russia, since the IP address originated from Russia, online instructions were in Russian, and Estonian pleas to Moscow for help were ignored (Maness and Valeriano, 2015: 101). Then in August 2008, Russia launched cyber operations at the same time as its physical/military intervention against Georgia. Substantial evidence also suggests Russia was responsible for cyber intervention in the American presidential election in 2016, which has caused friction between Russia and the USA growing potentially into “new cold war” (Shuya, 2018: 2).

Conclusions

Russia has taken some measures against terrorism within the framework of national laws and institutions. Due to the international character of terrorism, Russia also accepts that combating terrorism requires international cooperation. Although some legal steps have been taken, it will not be possible to get rid of the terrorist threats without stronger international cooperation. However, Russia also needs to ensure policies do not jeopardize the freedoms of its population, neighboring countries. In response to contemporary conflicts, Russia's policies are shaped by many policies such as security, energy, arms sales, economic impact, and regional domination. Therefore, Russia does not always adhere to the same policy about ethnic and religious conflicts that arise in neighboring countries and more remote regions.

Russia was one of the first countries to sign the UNFCCC in 1992. Russia's role in international processes to combat global climate change include the Kyoto Protocol 1997, which entered into force on February 16, 2005 after being ratified. Without Russia's participation, there would be no Kyoto Protocol. Russian experts actively cooperated with the UN intergovernmental commission for the study of climate change. Following international standards, the amendment of Russian environmental laws and the development of a rational ecological policy at the national level were envisaged. To solve the most acute environmental problems, Russian leaders believed that international support would be provided, and Russia, in turn, would fulfill all its international obligations in this area.

Although the Cold War ended and the Warsaw Pact evaporated, the USA has always had a special place in Russia's foreign policy. The only thing that has not changed in this process is the precision of Russia to the relations with the USA. The current view of the Russian military doctrine on nuclear weapons is as outlined in this chapter. However, because of the international conjuncture since the Cold War, Russia has signed many arms control agreements with the USA and other members of the international community.

Energy is at the core of Russia's national security strategy. Energy is a bi-directional factor for Russian policies. First, Russia is an important energy supplier in the world. Selling energy produced in its territory to the outside world provides substantial

profits for Russia. Secondly, Russia wants to control energy resources in different parts of the world, especially in Central Asia. Thus, it competes with other global players in the control of energy resources. In both respects, the energy issue has a direct connection with other foreign policy goals of Russia.

Russia makes a significant contribution in strengthening global financial and economic stability, including the participation in the so-called Cologne Initiative, a program to reduce the debt of the least developed countries of the world. Russia supports the IMF for the poorest developing countries. The amount of financial assistance provided to these countries by other creditors and the degree of their participation in this Initiative largely depends on the size of the Russian “discount”. Russia’s contribution to the struggle against poverty and the socio-economic development of the Third World states is not limited to large-scale assistance in reducing their external debt. Russia provides the least developed countries with broad trade preferences. Virtually all goods produced in these states are imported into Russia duty-free

In Russia, national enterprises based on internet technologies have recently increased. The main goal of these new initiatives, as in previous ones, is economic development. But in Russia, because the state uses the Internet for its national purposes, the state limits the access of civilians to the Internet and the use of it. For Russia, cyber conflict is a strategy, which is used from time to time against an enemy to achieve desired ends.

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RUSSIA AND TÜRKİYE: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN RELATIONS¹

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Introduction

The relationship between Russia and Türkiye spans over six hundred years. Although they share some common features e.g. strong state tradition and a long imperial past, their relationship historically has not been a friendly one. Until very recently, they did not approach each other as a friend or an ally, but as a rival, if not an enemy. Despite a few historical turning points that created conditions for cooperation in the past e.g. Russian Revolution and Turkish war of independence, they have generally fought each other since Russia's emergence as a nation after the sixteenth century. Turks, otherwise referred in Russia as *Turoks* or *Tatars*, played the role of dominant other in the construction of the Russian national identity. The image and the meaning of *Turok* in Russia is not much different from the word *Moskof* which has been used in Anatolia for three centuries since the time of Sultan Mustafa III (Mısırođlu, 1970: 28-58). Beyond a doubt, both nations have shared ontological concerns about each other for centuries.

To understand Russia's relationship with Türkiye today, it is important to analyze their relationship historically from different perspectives. Until the 15th century, Russians remained under the control of the Turkic nations, including Huns, Avars, Pechenegs, Tatars and the Ottomans in the Euro-Asian region. The Russian existence emerged by wars waged against the Turks or Turkic communities in general. After the emergence of the Russian knez (prince), the Russians expanded against the Turkish territories. They occupied a great part of the Ottoman territories up to Yeřilköy-İstanbul in the East, up to Erzurum in the West. Apart from a few minor wars e.g. the Crimean War in 1856, Turkic

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nations were unable to defeat them. If the Soviet Revolution did not erupt in 1917 in Moscow, there is no doubt that Russians would have occupied Istanbul and most of Anatolia after the First World War. Russian claims for the leadership of the Orthodox and Slavic world, tsarist expansionist policies in Euro-Asia, and traditional Russian ideals of reaching out to warm waters, always created troubles for the Turks. The Cold War period did not only help but also exacerbated this situation. Until Putin in Russia, and Erdoğan in Türkiye came to power, relations between the two nations constantly fluctuated.

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the continuity and change in relations between Russia and Türkiye in various historical settings. Beginning in the Middle Ages, the first section focuses on their relationship primarily during the periods of the Ottomans and the Tsarist Russia. In the second section, it evaluates their relationship from the fall of the Tsarist Russia to the end of the Soviet Union. The third part of the chapter examines developments in their relations since the end of the Cold War. After this historical analysis, this chapter discusses current issues, points of cooperation and conflict between Türkiye and Russia such as Cyprus, Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria and S-400 missile system. This chapter closes with a brief appraisal, to underline logical reasons behind the continuity and change in these relations and suggests a conceptual framework for further discussions on the subject matter.

The Tsarist Period and the Ottoman Empire

The origins of the Russian nation come from the Eastern Slavs, as we have seen in the chapter one. Linguistically, Slavs refers to a group of people who speak Slavic languages in the Northern part of the Euro-Asian region, stretching from North, Central and South-eastern Europe Caucasus and Northern Asia. However, the Slavs as an ethnic entity, represent different and diverse ethnic communities including Germans, Goths, Turks (Tatars mostly) and Mongols. The word Rus began appearing in history after the sixth century AD and then the Russian-Varegs and the Kievan Rus were established as the first Russian principalities. (Kluchevsky, 1911: 2; Curtis, 1996: 5-6; Meram, 1969: 10).

Another important development in Russian history was the acceptance of Orthodox Christianity and the Cyrillic alphabet in

988 by Prince Vladimir I of the Russian-Vareg. Orthodoxy played a decisive role in the development of the Russian identity and considered a critical turning point in the separation of Russians from the rest of Europe after adopting the Slavic language. Political unity also began under the Kievan Rus Principality and then later by the Muscovy Knez. As the first and second chapters of this book discusses, the region occupied by the Muscovits had no natural barriers to prevent people from coming from the East or West. Consequently, the history of the Muscovits was influenced by the Turkic and Central Asian people who invaded this region. The Tatars for instance, took control of the Knezes of Russia for a period in the twelfth century.

The transfer of the head of the Orthodox Church from Kievan Rus to the city of Muscovy in the 14th century marked a turning point in the history of Moscow, because the city would become the capital of the Russian states including the Russian Federation established in 1991. In 1380 when the Moscow Great Knez won a great victory against the Mongols in the Kulikova battle, the Russians began to extend their territories towards Nizhni-Novgorod. After Ivan III (The Great) became the Great Knez in 1462, he took over first the dominion of Novogorad in 1478 and then he defeated the army of Kazan Khanate in 1487 (Meram, 1969: 10-20; Kurat, 1993: 91-109).

The Kulikova battle marked the beginning of Russia as a free nation. However, the Ottomans did not accept nor recognize the Rus Knez as an independent state until the Karlowitz Agreement in 1699. After the Ottoman Empire's defeat at the Battle of Vienna in 1683, the Tsardom of Russia joined the Holy League in 1686. After, Tsarist Russia continued occupying the Volga and Caspian region which was the under control of Tatar Khanates. Having realized the Russian threat, Istanbul supported Devlet Giray, Khan of Crimea. Khan won a great victory against Russians, but they restored all what they lost against the Khanate and became one of the powers that fought against the Ottomans. Making the situation much worse was the Russian attack on the Azov Castle in 1695. Later, the Ottomans made the Istanbul Agreement in 1700. With this agreement, the Russians had a diplomatic victory for the first time against the Ottomans. Azov and Taganrog were left to Russia and the Ottomans also provided permission by a Russian ambassador to stay permanently in Istanbul (Riasanovsky, 1993: 221; Meram, 1969: 26-28, 71; Kurat, 1993: 256).

Meanwhile, Russia had destroyed a Swedish army in the battle of Poltava in 1709 and after the war, the King of Sweden and Mazepa of Ukraine escaped to the Ottomans. Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire because the Sultan Ahmed III rejected expelling them from his territories. Despite the fact that the Ottoman Army was in a better position against the Russians in the war, Baltacı was persuaded by Peter the Great to sign the Pruth Peace Agreement in July 1711 without a considerable gain for the Ottomans (Riasanovsky, 1993: 224; Meram, 1969: 88-89; Kurat: 1993, 260-262). Russia soon after, aligned with Austria to fight against the Ottomans in 1736 and they defeated the Ottomans. Following the war, the warring parties signed the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739. The Treaty enabled the Ottomans to recover the lands of Serbia and Oltenia, but Istanbul lost Azov to Moscow. Nonetheless, it provided the Ottomans with a period of peace for some thirty years (Lale Devri-Tulip Era) since Austria and Russia had to deal with Prussia as a new emerging power in Europe (Meram, 1969: 112-113; Kunt, 1997: 63-65; Kurat, 1993: 276).

The Ottomans closely followed European politics and what was happening between Russia and Poland. When Russia intervened in the domestic affairs of Poland in 1768, Istanbul warned Moscow which led to another war (Riasanovsky, 1993: 265). This war had a devastating effect on the Ottoman Empire since it lost all its territories from Wallachia and Bogdan to Crimea. Russia continued invading Ottoman territories up to Bulgaria. At the end of these wars, the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji (Küçük Kaynarca) was signed in July 1774 (Kunt, 1997: 69-70; Meram, 1969: 127; Kurat, 1993: 290).

Despite of the Küçük Kaynarca Agreement, Russia did not give up imperialist policies towards the Ottomans and formed a new alliance with Austria. Together the alliance restarted another war by attacking the Ottomans to implement the Greek Plan. For Princess, later Embress Catherine II (the Great), she pursued assistance from the great powers but persuaded only the Emperor Joseph II of Austria to go to the war against the Ottomans in 1787. However, Joseph II's sudden death in 1790, prevented the Empress from pursuing her plans, despite the Russian Navy and Army's advances against the Ottomans after invading the city of Yaş (Jassy) and capturing Bogdan in 1780. The defeat forced

the Ottomans to accept the Yaş Agreement in 1792 and lose both the Crimea and Özü (Ochakov) castles (Meram, 1969: 143-144; Kurat, 1993: 291).

At the beginning of the 19th century, Russia continued its imperialist and expansionist policies in Europe and the Balkans not only by war, but also through diplomacy and propaganda machines against the Ottomans. They continued annexing or occupying the cities and lands once under the control of the Ottoman empire (Meram, 1969: 168-170). The Ottomans attempted to fight back by declaring war on Russia, after Russia refused to give back Wallachia and Bogdan territories. After six years of war, the Ottoman Army suffered huge losses and was forced to accept defeat with the signing of The Treaty of Bucharest in May 1812, bringing an end to the Russo-Turkish War. The Treaty included the annexation of Bessarabia and access to the entire northern coasts of the Black Sea by Russia in return for Wallachia and the remainder of Moldavia to the Ottoman Empire (Kunt, 1997: 100). This encouraged Russia to follow more aggressive policies against the Ottomans, sending in more troops to invade the Balkans, Caucasus and even in Anatolia. Russia also supported and encouraged ethnic uprisings by the Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians and Armenians in the nineteenth century against the Sublime Porte. Russia was also supported by English and French squadrons that destroyed the Ottoman fleet in Navarino in 1827. Russia with a large army of 225,000 soldiers marched towards Istanbul from the Balkans in the West, and invaded many towns and cities up to Erzurum, from the Caucasus front. The Ottomans were forced to accept the Adrianople (*Edirne*) Agreement in 1829 that granted Greece independence and greater autonomy to Serbia (Riasanovsky, 1993: 330; Meram, 1969: 177).

As the Ottoman Empire began to weaken, the Eastern Question came up amongst European powers as they contemplated on what to do to safeguard their own military, strategic and commercial interests in the Ottoman sphere. Tsar Nicholas reportedly warned the British envoy in St. Petersburg, Sir George Hamilton, “Türkiye seems to be falling to pieces ... We have a sick man on our hands, a man gravely ill, it will be a great misfortune if one of these days he slips through our hands, especially before the necessary arrangements are made” (Temperly, 1936: 272). However, European powers could not reach a consensus on whether to heed

to Tsar's advice as they had different aims on the Ottoman Empire.

Eventually the indecisiveness led to the Crimean War in 1853 when the Russian Tsar Nicholas I insisted on further concessions from the Ottomans as a pretext for being the sole guardian of the Greek Orthodox and Patriarchate. Behind these demands however, Russia had greater ambitions to control the Balkans and the Straits. The Tsar's demands however were rejected by England and France that sided with the Ottomans against Russia. Although England was aware of the "sicknesses," London was not ready to let the Ottoman Empire die since this would risk the security of Eastern Mediterranean region located on the way to the British dominions in India. In addition, all powers in Europe were also aware of the fact that Russia's policies disrupted the balance of power in the continent. To counter Russia's aggression towards the Ottomans, European powers helped the Ottomans to force Russia to engage in negotiations, resulting in the Treaty of Paris signed in 1856. Russia agreed to surrender Bessarabia to Moldavia and give Walachia autonomy under the Ottoman rule. The Black Sea was declared as a neutral and demilitarized zone, and shipping in the Danube River became free for all nations (Meram, 1969: 189-190).

After the Treaty of Paris, the hostile policies of the Tsarist Russia continued as well as support for separatist, sectarian and violent uprisings against the Ottomans for over twenty years until the start of the 1877-78 war, otherwise referred to by Turks as *93 Harbi*. Before the war, Russia and its ally Serbia begun supporting the rebellions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1877, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire and marched towards Istanbul through Bulgaria, capturing Plevne, Edirne and then Yeşilköy, now a part of Metropolitan Istanbul city center. Russians also started a massive attack from the East, coming from the Caucasus region, capturing Aziziye Bastion in Erzurum where people created a public resistance and defense front. However, Russia defeated the Ottomans and imposed the Treaty of San Stefano (Ayastefanos-Yeşilköy) in March 1878. Türkiye was forced to recognize the independence of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and provide autonomy to Bulgaria, and Bosnia. Kars, Ardahan and Batumi however, were entirely left to the Russians. This agreement confirmed Russia's success in pan-Slavic policies particularly in the Balkans, re-confirmed the sick man image of Türkiye, and made Russia a more powerful actor

in European politics (Meram, 1969:196-200; Karal, 2007: 28-34, 64-67; Riasanovsky, 1993: 386-387).

Cooperation between the Bolsheviks and the Kemalists

As the Ottoman Empire began to disintegrate, Tsar Nicholas I sought to fill the power vacuum left behind. European powers, while not exactly on friendly terms with Turks, wanted to avoid Russia disturbing the balance of power and therefore followed pro-Ottoman policies at critical times such as in the case of Crimea. When World War I began in 1914, Russia perceived it as an opportunity to finish off the Ottoman Empire. However, the Turks proved in the Dardanelles that they were not ready for defeat, victoriously defending the Straits and weakening Russia's position. The position of the Tsar was further weakened by the domestic opposition led by the Bolsheviks who succeeded in dethroning the Tsar and declared the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917. After the revolution, Russia withdrew from World War I in November 1917 (Riasanovsky, 1993: 475). At the request of the Bolsheviks, peace talks were launched in Brest-Litovsk in December 1917, joined by the Ottoman Empire and members of the Alliance, consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. In March 1918, Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk Agreement losing all territories in Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Ukraine and the Baltic coasts. Upon the insistence of the Ottoman government, the Bolsheviks also agreed to remove Russian troops in Ardakhan, Kars and Batum. After the Russian troops left, the lands fell, however, under the control of Armenian and Georgian forces until 1920, when the Turkish army commanded by Kazım Karabekir, retook and declared them as part of Türkiye.

In the meantime, the Russian Democratic Labor Party was renamed as the Communist Party of Russia under the leadership of Lenin. In April 1918, a civil war began, and the Red Army of the Bolsheviks took control and declared the establishment of the State of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), in place of Tsarist Russia (Armaoğlu, 2002: 182). Then, the Bolsheviks leaked Russian secret agreements during the WWI. One of them included the Constantinople Agreement, which took place in March 1915 between England, Russia and France (The Triple Entente), discussing the partition of the Ottoman Empire after the War. According to the Agreement, Russians would take control of

the Straits, invade Istanbul, some parts of Thrace, and Asia Minor (Üre, 2018).

The October Revolution however, prevented the Tsarist Russia from implementing any of secret agreements. Nevertheless, the Ottomans were still forced to surrender after the Armistice of Mudros in 1918. However, the Turkish nation did not accept this and started a national struggle for liberation under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (*Atatürk*) in 1919. The Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA) was established in April 1920 in Ankara to carry on the liberation war, and one of the first foreign contacts made was with the Bolsheviks. Therefore, the success of the Bolsheviks in Russia coincided with the start of the National Liberation War by the Kemalists in Türkiye. This coincidence represented a historical moment for both nations to come together because they were alone and needed friends in the world. On the one hand, the West was suspicious about Mustafa Kemal and had not yet been sure about the intentions and directions of the Kemalist movement. Mustafa Kemal was seen either as a Bolshevik, or an Islamist or a nationalist separatist at the best. In a similar vein, the liberal world totally rejected the Bolsheviks as communists from the very inception of their revolt. Therefore, Lenin and Kemal as the leaders of the movements had in fact no option than coming together against their common enemies. The Bolsheviks discussed this subject in depth, but Lenin decided to support the Kemalists as a partner of the struggle against imperialists (Benhür, 2008: 278). They wanted to demonstrate that “they were not alone” in the world. As far as the Bolsheviks were concerned in this rapprochement, they did not in fact give up their ideological concerns. They, especially Lenin, expected a communist or socialist revolution in Türkiye as their correspondence with Türkiye at the beginning of their relation implied.

Therefore, historical coincidences pushed the two nations into direct contact. The first foreign policy decision of the Turkish Assembly accepted in May 1920 was to send a delegation to Russia. Carrying a letter from Mustafa Kemal to Lenin (Benhür, 2006: 44; Şen, 2008: 8), the Turkish delegate reached Moscow in July 1920. The aim of the delegate was to ensure financial and military support from the Bolsheviks (Atatürk, 2006: 318; Karhan: 2012: 93; Benhür, 2008: 280). The delegate and the Bolsheviks agreed on general principles, however the signature of the agreement was delayed due to some points related to concessions demanded

by the Bolsheviks concerning some Eastern cities of Türkiye (Atatürk, 1984: 619). Nevertheless, the agreement was signed in September 1920 and the Bolsheviks provided the Kemalists with some financial assistance and military equipment (Zenbilci, 2014: 114).

In a time of need, this vital gesture opened a new chapter in relations between the two states. In addition, Türkiye and Russia established embassies by mutual agreements in Ankara and Moscow (Karhan, 2012: 94). Despite such positive developments, the Bolsheviks did not welcome the advancement of the Turkish national forces towards the Caucasus. Türkiye was seen as violating the conditions set out by the Brest-Litovsk Agreement by starting a new military campaign to retake some places in the region. Türkiye justified its new military campaign to thwart Armenian attacks on Turkish villages in the Eastern part of Türkiye in June 1920, after the Russian troops left the region. To keep Türkiye united as stated in the National Oath, the commander of Eastern Front Troops Kazım Karabekir Pasha entered Sarıkamış on September 30 and Kars on October 30, and captured the East of Arpaçay River on November 7, including Gümrü. After this military campaign, Armenians made peace with Ankara and signed the Treaty of Gyumri (Gümrü) in December 1920.

However, the Soviet Union had reservations about signing the Lausanne Treaty in July 1923, since it did not change the Soviets status in the Turkish Straits but rather it maintained the status quo. For the Kemalists, the Lausanne Treaty was paramount since it documented the official recognition and acceptance of Türkiye as a new and independent state by the international community. In addition to Russia, Kemalists sought to establish peaceful relations with former archenemies including France, the United Kingdom and the USA.

The Bolsheviks, however, were suspicious of Türkiye's rapprochement policy with "imperialist powers", and perceived Kemalists as "petit bourgeois leaders" whose aim was to change the country but do nothing more for socialism. Fortunately, Soviet diplomats in Türkiye offset the growing tension and distrust between the two countries, suggesting to Moscow "to accept the 'New Türkiye' as it is" for collaborative and peaceful relations with the Soviet Union for decades to come (Somel, 2018: 13).

Following the Lausanne Treaty, Soviets and the Kemalists once came together because of the reports of the Soviet diplomats and international developments, necessitating the two countries work closely together. The Mosul question in particular, which was mishandled by the League of Nations under the influence of Britain against Türkiye, played a great role in this process for the side of the Kemalists. The political situation in Europe led to the signature of the Locarno Pact, leave little room for the Soviets. This pact consisted of a set of agreements initiated in Locarno in 1925 to provide a framework for peace in Europe, but the Bolsheviks regarded it as a movement to the detriment of the Soviet security interests. The successor of Lenin, Joseph Stalin who came power in 1924, had a different leadership profile and his policies, including foreign policy, affected his relations with other countries including Türkiye (Benhür, 2008: 298).

After Türkiye decided to withdraw its delegation from the League in response to its Mosul policy, the Foreign Minister of Türkiye, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, met his Soviet counterpart, Georgy Vasilyevich Chicherin in Paris, where they signed the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality on 16 December 1925. The Treaty consisted of only three articles and three protocols. By this treaty, both of the countries agreed that they would be free to cooperate with any other state, provided that they would not take part of any agreement against each other. They also undersigned that any problems not anticipated in the agreement, would be solved by bilateral negotiations between the two countries. (Kinross, 1999: 477; Yüceer, 2011: 85-86; Karhan, 2014: 95).

Deteriorating Relations: Stalin, Montreux and WWII

Until the end of the 1930s, mutual interests and international developments kept the two countries together. In April 1932, Prime Minister İsmet (İnönü) Pasha paid an official visit to the Soviet Union, where he met leaders and some officials, including President Stalin and Prime Minister Molotov. The visit proved to be extremely important, as it provided İsmet Pasha with additional opportunities to observe the Soviet style development model and industrial facilities (Benhür, 2008: 171-173). He was also able to convince the Soviets to provide Türkiye with additional financial support (Ertan, 2011: 216-218). As a result, thanks to the Soviet

money and know-how, Kayseri cloth, Ereğli and Nazilli textile factories began production in 1936 and 1937. The Soviets also provided many experts in order to run these factories, in addition to training Turks in workplaces (Kamalov, 2011: 229; Benhür, 2006: 699; Karhan, 2014: 98-99).

However, the Montreux negotiations caused a major setback between Ankara and Moscow in 1936, when Türkiye aimed to revise the Lausanne Convention of 1923. According to the Convention, Ankara's full sovereignty on the Straits was denied, posing a great risk for Türkiye's national security, not only for the Straits, but also for the entire country. The international climate of that time, with the support of the British government, enabled Türkiye to conclude the Montreux Treaty with the participation of relevant states including Russia (Çalış, 2017: 17-23). Yet the Soviets maintained a different idea about the Straits from Türkiye, favoring a policy of control and keeping the Black Sea closed to the navies of any other powers which contradicted the expectations of other participants at the Convention. To address the Soviets concerns, Türkiye tried to follow a policy that kept all conflicting interests in balance. Despite Türkiye getting participants to agree to the Soviets point of forbidding the navies of non-bordering countries to enter the Black Sea, Moscow's attitude towards Türkiye nevertheless began to change. Maxime Litvinoff, the Soviet foreign affairs commissar, made contact with delegations from Romania and Bulgaria in order to convince them to set up a common defense alignment dealing only with the Straits. Likewise, the Soviet press during the Conference accused Türkiye as a country of "playing the game" of the imperialist powers. These actions heightened Türkiye's concerns about the Soviet intentions. Following the signing of the Montreux Convention in July 1936, the Soviets continued suggesting to Türkiye a new agreement for the fortification of the Straits. However, Ankara meanwhile regarded the Convention successful and refused to accept establishing another pact dominated by the Soviets. Türkiye meanwhile gradually improved its relations with European countries including Britain, enabling Türkiye to become a member of the League of Nations in 1932, but further increased tensions between Russia and Türkiye. Moscow began to believe "Türkiye could not talk with Russia without the consent of the British" (Çalış, 2017: 22-23).

At the beginning of the Second World War, the Soviet Union unexpectedly approached Germans and signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression in August 1939. Türkiye however suspected the two countries sought to partition of Türkiye, including the control of the Straits, changing the Montreux Treaty, and invading some parts of Anatolia as was later confirmed in a disclosure by Hitler in June 1941, after he attacked the Soviets. To counter this threat, Türkiye launched negotiations with Britain and France for a tripartite agreement for security which would be based on mutual assistance and friendship on the one hand. Ankara did however attempt to restore relations with the Soviets, but they turned Türkiye's proposals down and repeated their historical demands (Oran, 2001: 418-424). In the meantime, Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939. In response, France and Britain declared war on Germany, while the Soviets remained neutral. Shortly after, Germans also attacked the Soviet Union, but Türkiye was able to stay out of the war thanks in part to the Tripartite Agreement which provided an escape clause in the agreement preventing Türkiye from entering an armed conflict with the Soviet Union. Thanks to this clause, Türkiye was able to declare neutrality during the war. (Çalış, 2017: 24-25; Ertem, 2010: 252-255; Benhür, 2008: 294).

When the Red Army attacked Finland, it confirmed Türkiye's fears of Russian imperialist policies. Under the presidency of Stalin in particular, the Soviet Union continued following expansionist policies in the region. Stalin's approach reawakened, if not exacerbated, Türkiye's historical Russian phobia. Ankara nevertheless decided to remain neutral which placed the Allies in a strategic position, as neutrality created a more stable and reliable environment for the defense of the Straits and the southern borders of Russia. It also served as a "protective pad" against German penetration into the Middle East. Understanding the importance of Türkiye's position, Allies jointly declared that if any European country attacked the Country, they would help it with any possible means. However, 15 days later, the Soviet and British troops invaded Iran, and the Soviet policy in the Azeri occupied parts of Iran deepened Turkish suspicions about the intentions of the Russians (Deringil, 1989: 128). It was also not a groundless suspicion since during Stalin's talks with Anthony Eden in December 1941, he proposed to suggest to Türkiye the Dodecanese Islands, some parts of Bulgaria and Northern Syria if

it would join the war. The Turkish government regarded Stalin's gestures as a carrot to enter the War, while concealing real plans about the future of the Straits. In the meantime, Türkiye's domestic politics and international contacts with the Axis including the Germans caused a great concern for the Russians. Some developments, such as Türkiye's reluctance to go war at a time of urgent need, its foreign trade with and chromium export to the Nazi Germany, and its anti-Soviet ideological and popular discourse which was supported by some official circles in Ankara, irritated Stalin. After 1943 Stalin brought the case of Türkiye to all conference tables and persuaded Churchill and Roosevelt that Türkiye should remain under the Soviet sphere of influence, and that the Soviets should have certain rights over the Turkish Straits when the war was over (Çalış, 2017: 27-55).

Although Türkiye had a big army in terms of manpower, the army contained outdated equipment and arsenal which was no match to fight modern armies like Germany. This is in part why Türkiye refused to accept the idea of occupation first by Germany and then a salvation by the Red Army. Nonetheless, seeking to appease the Allies and offset the German and Soviet threats, Türkiye gradually transitioned away from its neutral stance in the war. In order to demonstrate this, in 1944 Türkiye cancelled all chromium trade and broke off all relations with Germany, and declared all pan-Turkist movements as illegal in Türkiye. Türkiye also allowed the Allies to use the Straits for transportation to the Soviet Union and closed it off for any ships from the Axis powers. Finally, Ankara declared war on Germany and Japan on February 23, 1945 (Deringil, 1989: 154-157; Oran, 2001: 396-397; Çalış, 2017: 52-53).

Despite Türkiye's attempts to appease the Soviet Union, Stalin instead sought to push Türkiye to the corner, reminding Allies at the Yalta Conference of Türkiye's reluctance to be sided with them during the war and voiced his continued disdain of Türkiye's control over the Straits. Not surprisingly, a few weeks later from the conference, the Soviets declared they would not renew the Turkish-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1925 unless the parties came together and solved their problems bilaterally. In June 1945, Molotov disclosed details of the Soviet intentions on Türkiye, stating the borders between the two countries must be changed, the Soviets needed bases, and the Montreux Treaty must be redesigned to meet Russian interests. Again, to drum up support

for the Soviet's proposed policies, the Soviet media revamped its anti-Turkish campaign accusing Türkiye of being an opportunist, failing to declare war when the Allies needed the country most and instead helped Germany. Georgia and Armenia as the puppet states of the Soviet Russia joined in on the campaign soon after (Kuniholm, 1980: 40-42; Weisband, 1973: 197-198)

Despite Moscow's mounting pressure on Türkiye to renegotiate the Straits, Britain and the USA refrained from getting involved in this issue until the beginning of the Cold War. Although the Western countries gradually tilted their policies in favor of Türkiye, the Soviet Union did not change their stance until the death of Stalin and the start of Khrushchev's presidency in 1953.

The Cold War Episode: Neighbors at Different Camps

The Truman Doctrine in March 1947 represented a critical turning point for Türkiye. Thanks to the doctrine, Türkiye now had become part of the Western world, while at the same time radically separating from the Soviets. During the Cold War, Türkiye was shielded from the Soviet Union after becoming a member of key Western clubs such as the Council of Europe in 1949 and NATO in 1952. Alongside of this, Ankara adapted its domestic and international policies to align with the general patterns required from any member of the Western camp. Despite the rise of the Cyprus problem after the second half of the 1950s, the Johnson letter, the Cuban missile crisis, the Optimum issue, the Cyprus War in 1974, and the American military embargo on Türkiye, at no point did the Turks consider leaving the camp. Instead, Türkiye always defended Western interests in all organizations including the Bandung conference and took a leading role in the establishments of the Balkan and the Baghdad pacts in the region (Çalış, 2017, 71-132).

Indeed, after 1946, Ankara's growing relations with the West hindered developing closer relations between the two countries. Some Soviet diplomats began complaining about Türkiye's Western connections. When Türkiye became a NATO member, Moscow declared it how it confirmed and demonstrated "an aspiration on the part of the imperialist states to utilize Turkish territory for the establishment on the USSR frontiers of military

bases for aggressive purposes” (Çalış, 2017: 107-108; Scot, 2001: 629; Kurban, 2014: 258).

Following the death of Stalin, as previously discussed in this section, the outlook of the Soviet Union towards Türkiye gradually changed with the start of *détente*. In May 1953, President Khrushchev attempted to start a new rapprochement and Molotov now declared that they would give up any territorial claims on Türkiye including demands on the Straits and the insistence of Türkiye’s withdrawal from NATO and any other organization as a condition for developing relations in any field. Türkiye interpreted these declarations as a mere show of goodwill and did not give up its reservations about the Soviets. The Soviets in fact did not change their position completely towards Türkiye. For instance, the establishment of the Baghdad Pact led Moscow to accuse Türkiye of making plans to invade Syria and Iraq to appease the West. The Lebanon Crisis and the installation of American bases and missiles in Türkiye further deteriorated relations between the two neighbors (Çalış, 2017: 107-117).

Towards the end of the 1950s, the impact of *détente* for Türkiye became much more visible with the re-emergence of the Cyprus crisis. The Menderes government signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union and Poland, announcing the possibility of an official visit to Moscow. However, the military coup in May 1960, and subsequent events such as the Cuban missile crisis, the removal of Jupiter missiles from Türkiye, and the U-2 incidence prevented any high-level visit until former Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in September 1967 (Armaoğlu, 2002: 735; Best et al, 2012: 301-302). Demirel’s visit indicated a new-multi-dimensional understanding of foreign policy which was a direct result of Türkiye’s isolation by the Western countries in the Cyprus crisis in the 1960s. Although both countries kept ideological beliefs intact, they nevertheless came together, shared opinions with each other on international politics, and made agreements to develop economic relations. Thanks to Soviet investments, training, technical and educational assistances, Türkiye built iron and steel plants in İskenderun, aluminium factory in Seydişehir, oil refinery in Aliağa and sulphur acid factory in Bandırma within ten years after 1967 (Gençalp, 2014: 327).

In the same period, Cevdet Sunay, as the first president, visited the Soviet Union in 1969. This was followed by a visit

of Alexei N. Kosygin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, upon the invitation of Demirel in order to attend the opening of the İskenderun Iron and Steel Factory in December 1975. Despite some problems, including the Soviet support of Greek Cypriots, the cooperation continued after Bülent Ecevit. During his visit to the Soviet Union in June 1978, Ecevit met the Secretary General of the Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev resulting in an important agreement “Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation” for more economic cooperation (Gençalp, 2014: 330-341; Tellal, 2000: 332-343).

However, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets caused a new tension and stirred up painful memories in Türkiye about the Russians. Beside of this, the Ecevit government was replaced by Demirel which was supported by an anti-communist, nationalist and conservative party bloc. Many millions in Türkiye protested the Soviet invasion and began supporting Afghan Mujahideen in their fight against communists. Domestically, Türkiye also faced political problems and entered a period of terror by paramilitary groups who fought and killed each other in the streets. Using the domestic problems as an excuse, the pro-NATO Turkish army staged another coup and did not allow any political parties to be established until the election of 1983 (Tellal, 2000: 348). The anti-Soviet, anti-socialist and anti-leftist policies of the military worsened relations, because the Soviets in return called the coup makers fascist dictators.

However, the Soviet Union also experienced domestic problems after the death of Brezhnev in 1982, followed by the consecutive deaths of Yuri Andropov in 1984 and Konstantin Chernenko in 1985 as presidents, creating a power vacuum in Moscow until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. His *perestroika* (reconstruction) and *glasnost* (openness) policies were also unable to save the Soviet Union from disintegration, but they did manage to slow the process down. Until the disintegration, Gorbachev tried developing friendly and peaceful relations with the rest of the world including Türkiye. He also decided to withdraw the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. This radical change in the Soviet policies also affected and improved relations with Türkiye (Çalış, 2017: 192-193; Oran, II, 2001: 158-161).

This change coincided with a political change in Türkiye. In 1983, Turgut Özal came to power. Özal was a pragmatic leader,

who initiated export-oriented policies in accordance with his liberal philosophy. Strategically Özal attempted to change Türkiye's foreign policy understanding that had been dominated by security concerns as well. He was open to the idea for developing trade with any country including the Soviet Union. Yet until Gorbachev, hard-liners in Moscow did not approach Özal sympathetically, accusing him of being a fascist and dictator who took orders from generals. They also condemned Özal's recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, since Moscow believed that this would result in the incorporation of Cyprus into NATO. When Gorbachev was elected president in 1985, the language of diplomacy began to change and the substance of the relations with Türkiye improved gradually. Both Gorbachev and Özal sought economic cooperation rather than competition in international relations. Özal visited Moscow in July 1986 and signed several agreements for cooperation in commercial, technological and scientific fields. Gorbachev also agreed on financing Ankara's hydroelectric plants in Türkiye. In return, Türkiye bought natural gas and employed more Turkish contractors in the Soviet Union. Özal's relations with Gorbachev also bore fruits in the political field. In March 1991 for example, they came together to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighborliness which had remained untouched since 1950s. Unfortunately, this agreement was never put into practice with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. On December 25, 1991 Gorbachev resigned, and all other republics of the Union declared their independence, most however indicating a willingness to form a Commonwealth of Independent States. Boris Yeltsin became the new leader of the Russian Federation (RF), as the heir of the Soviet Union (Oran, 2001, II, 161-166, 372-379; Çalış, 2017: 192-193; Tuncer, 2016: 51).

Relations after the Russian Federation

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ankara quickly adapted to the new circumstances and recognized the independence of new states established after the Soviet Union including the Russian Federation (RF). In 1992 Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin and Prime Minister Demirel went to Russia and Demirel returned to Türkiye with "the Treaty on the Principles of Relations Between the Republic of Türkiye and the Russian

Federation,” which established the foundations of the two countries current relations. President Boris Yeltsin later that year participated in the Istanbul Summit of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (Oran, 2001, II: 546-550).

During this period however, there were two significant problems that hindered relations: the rise of pan-Turkist and Islamist movements in Türkiye and the emergence of new Turkic states in the Central Asia and Caucasus following the dissolution of the Soviet Union which awakened nationalist and religious feelings towards the Turkic world. Türkiye felt responsible to lead the newly emerged states and integrate them into the new world order. The West also encouraged Türkiye to serve as a role model of a secular state against the rival religious models of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Turkish politicians such as Necmettin Erbakan, Alparlan Türkeş, Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel took a leading role in developing strong and intimate relations with these newly emerged states, countries and communities all over the world. Özal declared the twenty first century as a century of the Turks, while Demirel believed in the rise of “a Great Turkish World from the Sea of Adriatic to the China Wall.” Türkiye used soft power instruments such as “the Great Student Exchange Program” projects of Demirel which aimed at providing higher education in Turkish universities for more than ten thousand students from Turkic states. TİKA (Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansı) also led many economic, social and cultural projects to support the development of these countries and communities, and to sustain their independence (Oran, 2001: 543-546; Altunışık, 2017: 161-180).

The Russian Federation watched with unease what was happening in the region and followed Türkiye with great concern. Some neo-Euro-Asian intellectuals and politicians such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Aleksandr Dugin harshly criticized Türkiye. The ideas of Zhirinovsky, for instance, illustrate the meaning of ontological concern some Russians have towards the Turks (Service, 1998: 184-185). However, the RF did not want to create any official problems in their relations so refrained from saying anything directly. Instead, the RF used Türkiye’s relations with the Turkic world and the connections of some of its citizens with Islamic groups fighting in the Chechen war as an excuse for their support of the PKK. Some politicians, such as Deputy Minister Samsurov Yart, participated in a conference which was

organized jointly by the RF Ministry of National and Regional Policy and PKK's mouthpiece Kurdistan Information Office in Moscow in February 1994. Despite Türkiye's objections, the RF allowed the so-called Kurdish Parliament to hold a meeting in the Russian Duma (Çelikpala, 2007: 274).

Foreign policy strains continued until the change of leadership in both countries at the beginning of 2000s. In Russia Vladimir Putin took power from Boris Yeltsin in 2000. Türkiye also experienced a change in power when the Justice and Development Party (*AK Parti*) won elections in November 2002. In March 2003, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became prime minister who strongly believed in developing closer relations with the RF. When the two leaders first met in Moscow, Erdoğan discussed the blue-stream project, producing attack helicopters, financial cooperation, trade and commerce, and anti-terrorism (Milliyet, 25.12.2002). Later in December 2004, Putin came to Ankara, representing the first Russian president to visit Türkiye in 32 years. It was indeed a turning point in the history of cooperation between Russia and Türkiye. During the visit, Putin signed with Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was the Turkish president at that time, "A Joint Declaration on the Intensification of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership" stressing the advancement of their bilateral relations to a "multidimensional partnership". Putin declared that the two countries shared similar opinions on many issues including Iraq, Caucasus, Middle East and terrorism (Özbay, 2011: 76; Çelikpala, 2007: 281-282; Erşen, 2011: 103).

However, the relationship between the two countries since then has been tested several times and come to often critical junctures such as the shutdown of a Russian aircraft in 2015 and the assignation of the Russian Ambassador in Ankara in 2016. For the remainder of this chapter, we will analyze current issues, cooperation and conflict areas which have deeply affected Russia-Türkiye relations.

Current Issues, Cooperation Points and Conflict Areas

The Cyprus Issue: From the inception of the issue, Russia has supported the Greek Cypriots for historical, cultural and religious reasons. Furthermore, the Soviets had a strong connection with the Greek leftist movements during the Cold War which further

cemented a pro-Greek understanding. Soviet foreign policy also did not support the idea of the Republic of Cyprus taking part in the Western block (Kamel, 2014: 205). However, when Türkiye reacted to the Johnson letter concerning the Cyprus problem, a rapprochement with the Soviet Union began in the second half of the 1960s, as we have touched upon in the previous pages. During this process, the Soviets did not reject Türkiye's first operation to save the Turkish Cypriots from a massacre in 1974. However, they reacted to the second one, protesting Türkiye's further operations in the Island (Tellal, 2000: 320-343; Gençalp, 2014: 341).

The Soviets also found it unacceptable when the Turkish Cypriots declared independence in 1983. The Turkish military coup in 1980 did not help, but furthered tensions with Russia, as the Greek side deepened their relations with the Russians including security and defense. In addition, the Greek Cypriots made an agreement with the RF for the acquisition of the Russian S-300 missiles in December 1996 (Celikpala, 2009: 277; Ozbay, 2014: 47). Then in 2004, Russia vetoed the Annan Report on Cyprus in the UN Security Council which Türkiye as well as the Turkish Cypriots supported since it sought to find a solution to the problem.

In sum, while Türkiye's relations with Russia have grown, the Russian position on the Cyprus issue remains a contentious issue that has remained unchanged since it first arose in the 1950s. Russia continues to support the Greek Cypriots against the thesis and policies of the Turkish Cypriots and Türkiye including maritime zone disputes.

Central Asia and Caucasus: The demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Turkic republics in the Central Asia and Caucasus region created problems related to economic competition and ideological rivalry in the region. The RF seeks to remain influential in the region, however views Türkiye as a threat since it has succeeded to develop influence and closer relations with the Turkic republics in the Central Asia and Caucasus region. Therefore, the RF wants to avoid Türkiye as becoming "a big brother" or new "rival" to take over Russia's role in the region (Büyükkacıncı, 2004: 17). Therefore, any initiative made by Türkiye towards the independent Turkic states and Muslims and Turkic communities within and outside of the Russian Federation has remained closely monitored.

As an export-oriented country, Türkiye aims to increase its economic policies and trade with the Central Asia and Caucasus region. As of the end of 2021, however, Türkiye's trade with the five Turkic states has reached just over 7 billion US dollars (Kazakhstan 1.28 billion dollars; Azerbaijan 2.34 billion; Uzbekistan 1.84 billion; Turkmenistan 984 million and Kyrgyzstan 749 million (Turkish Statistical Institute/TUIK, 2022). To counter Türkiye's efforts, Putin started a very aggressive economic policy towards the same countries when first coming into power. He also intensified political and military cooperation in the region. The RF for example, opened in 2003, a military base in Kyrgyzstan. In 2015, the RF took a leading role in establishing the Euro-Asian Economic Union (EAEU) as a Russian project, aiming to integrate economies of the old Soviet republics. After coming into power, Putin began visiting these countries and signed agreements which helped Russia to keep them under control. In return, the leaders of the region have become very sensitive to Moscow who have paid great respect to Putin. To illustrate a recent example, Kasım Cömert Tokayev, the new president of Kazakhstan, made his first foreign visit to Moscow in April 2019, declaring the aim to increase relations with the RF. This example highlights a policy pattern that many other countries in the region are following. The Turkic leaders of the region, in a similar manner, have been careful not to irritate the RF when establishing any relation with Türkiye. On the other hand, the invasion of Ukraine has the potential to change their attitudes towards Russia, despite the fact that Putin sent troops to Kazakhstan to empower Tokayev in 2022 to take the control of public demonstrations in the country.

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh Problems: Another contentious issue is about Armenians, which has negatively affected Türkiye's relations with Russia since the Ottoman Empire. Although the historical roots of the problem have already been noted, it is worth discussing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in more detail at this point. The region of Nagorno-Karabakh came under Russian control after the Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of World War I. However, the Soviets provided the region autonomy in 1923 and attached it to the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Russia also supported Armenian migration to the region and this policy changed its demographic composition in favor of Armenians, a population that had previously been dominated by Azeris of Turkic descent. Prior to the

demise of the Soviet Union, the Armenians requested the region of Nagorno-Karabakh be attached to the Republic of Armenia in 1987, but the request was rejected on the grounds that the borders of the Soviet Republics could not be changed. Following this rejection, Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh *oblast* (district) unilaterally took a decision to unite with the Republic of Armenia and this decision was endorsed by the Armenian Parliament in December 1989. This unilateral declaration started a war in the region between the Turkish Azeris and Armenians. To make the situation worse, the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh soldiers committed a massacre against the Azeris in Khojaly (Hocali) in February 1992. As a result of this conflict, more than one million Azeri had to migrate from their homeland mostly to Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union and Armenia supported the Armenians and the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh troops occupied seven nearby provinces belonging to the Azeris until May 1994, when a ceasefire was declared by the Minsk group which was established by the OSCE to solve this problem in March 1992 (Kamel, 2014: 193).

In response to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Ankara has criticized the involvement of Armenia and Russia. Also, Turkish people from all segments of society have organized demonstrations in favor of the “Azeri brothers”. The new Russian Federation which openly supported the Armenians, are not content with this kind of declarations and demonstrations, and they reject accusations of any involvement in the killings and massacres. At this critical stage, Heydar Aliyev, the father of the current president, İlham Aliyev, returned to power in place of the pro-Turkish and anti-Russian Ebulfeyz Elchibey in Azerbaijan with the support of the Russians. Aliyev had been known as one of the most influential men of the communist era, therefore it is unsurprising that he has kept strong connections with the RF as well. In the eyes of the Turks, this involvement from the side of the RF has demonstrated that traditional Russian policy towards the Turks remains the same as it was in the past. Nevertheless, Aliyev as an experienced politician was able to manage both of Türkiye and Russia in order to reduce growing tension in the region (Celikpala, 2009: 273; Yapıcı, 2014: 130).

Until 2021 no progress was made on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue mainly because none of the parties changed their positions essentially, despite some minor border clashes between Armenia

and Azerbaijan. However, the Armenian attacks on Azerbaijan territories on 27 September 2020 sparked another war in the region. On the same day, Azerbaijan declared a martial law in order to respond it and on 14 October Azerbaijani army began fighting back to save all the occupied territories from Armenia. During the war, Russia and Türkiye had closely followed developments while keeping their previous positions on the support of warring factions unchanged essentially. Ankara supported Azerbaijanis with all means including providing military equipment such as unmanned air vehicle (UAV) and unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV). It is believed that this military support greatly helped Azerbaijan to win this war which lasted for 44 days. Ankara also played its role in diplomacy to keep Russia not making interventions to the side of Armenia despite the fact that at the beginning of the war Russian Foreign Ministry had declared to provide “all necessary assistance” to Armenia if the war spilled over into Armenian territory since Erivan is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The fact that the UN’s thought about the rights of Azerbaijan in the region were usurped by Armenia according to international law prevented the global and regional actors from intervening in this conflict. Mainly due to the Türkiye’s position, Russia did not directly intervene in the war which was ended on 10 November with an interim peace deal under the patronage of Russia. Accordingly, Armenia accepted to leave all occupied Azerbaijan territories except for Nagorno-Karabakh region, with Russian peacekeepers guaranteeing safe passage through the region of Lachin (Semercioğlu, 2021: 58). Since then, the future of the peace in the region is not yet clear enough to reach for a final peace agreement. However, it is still possible to say that the positions of both Türkiye and Russia remain essentially unchanged in the region. As Türkiye is developing stronger relations with Azerbaijan, Russia keeps its pro-Armenian stance in diplomacy at the least.

Chechnya, Georgia and Other Conflicts in the Caucasus: The military intervention of the RF in Chechnya has been another hard issue affecting relations between Russia and Türkiye since the end of the Cold War. When Chechnya declared independence in 1991, as discussed in Chapter 6 in detail, the RF launched a massive and brutal military operation against the Chechnyan nationalists in December 1994 (Kamel: 183-185). Moscow believed that if the movement was not suppressed, it would create a “bad example”

for other ethnic minorities waiting for separation from “mother Russia”, and this would jeopardize its national unity and security. Moscow was aware of the strategic importance of the Caucasus not only for military, but also for the security of energy resources and supplies. Additionally, the RF deployed its 58th Army in the region in June 1995 that violated openly the Conventional Armed Forces Agreement (CAFA). Until 2007, when Putin appointed Ramzan Kadyrov as the president of Chechnya, the conflict caused many casualties, including Chahar Dudayev, Aslan Mashadov and Ahmad Hadji Kadyrov, the father of Ramzan Kadyrov, the current president. When other problems related to the countries and peoples of the region such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia were added to the Chechnyan and Armenian conflicts, the RF became more critical about Türkiye’s policies towards the region (Uyar, 2018: 296-304; Kanbolat, 2001: 167-169; Kamel, 2014: 186-197).

In the case of Georgia, it has the right to follow an independent foreign policy, and to establish any kind of relations free from the intervention of any country. The Republic of Georgia has found Türkiye supportive of its effort and transition to a liberal economic and political system, encouraging its integration with the Euro-Atlantic institutions and organisations including the European Union and NATO. In addition to economic and political partnerships, Georgia is of an exceptional importance to Türkiye’s energy security, since it is located in the route of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan natural gas pipeline. Therefore, not only the Georgians but also the Turks have been very sensitive to any intervention from the Russian side to the region. NATO and the EU’s involvements in Georgia has likewise closely been followed by the RF with great concern (Yılmaz and Yakşi, 2016: 38) not less than in the other cases.

The Annexation of Crimea and the Occupation of Ukraine: As a peninsula on the Northern coast of the Black Sea, Crimea which is legally an autonomous republic of Ukraine, is another point of conflict with the Russians. In the 13th century, Crimea was a part of the Golden Horde and two hundred years later the Crimean Khanate became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century. The Russians invaded it in 1783 and took over control. Following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, Crimea became an autonomous republic attached to Ukraine on the condition that the RF Black Sea Fleet continue using Crimea’s port of Sevastopol as a base.

After the turmoil and chaotic events, which started in 2013, the Russian troops once again invaded Crimea. In March 2014, The RF annexed the Crimea, following a referendum only the Russians in Ukraine participated in and voted in favor of the Crimea joining “mother Russia”. Although the international community rejected the referendum, and some countries decided to impose sanctions on Russia, Moscow did not step back from the annexation. However, for the security of the Black Sea, the autonomous Crimea attached to Ukraine created a new status quo that favored Türkiye, therefore its annexation by the RF destroyed the strategic equilibrium and made the RF a hegemonic power in the Black Sea. Immediately after the referendum, Türkiye protested Moscow’s decision with the support of public demonstrations both inside and outside of Türkiye. The problem of Crimea still carries a great potential of future conflicts for the region and runs the risk of ruining the recent rapprochement between the two countries (Aktürk, 2016: 2).

Despite the fact that Türkiye does not change its Crimean policy concerning the Russian annexation, the war on Ukraine which was started by Russia on 24 February 2022 puts Türkiye’s relations with Moscow in a more fragile position. As a NATO country Türkiye tries hard to comply with the embargo policies of the western world against Russia, Erdoğan’s government has so far succeeded in neutrality policy in this war while keeping relations with both of the warring countries. On one hand, Ankara has applied the Montreux convention on the passage of warships against Russia but on the other it has not yet stopped selling unmanned air vehicle (UAV) and unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) to Ukraine, despite of Russian discontents. However, Türkiye still has closer relations with Russia and has not yet joined most of some embargo decisions including closing airspace to the Russians and natural gas pipelines from Russia. Türkiye officially follows a policy of balancing between Kiev and Moscow, but Erdoğan’s recent declarations have more pro-Putin ingredients. In addition, Erdoğan’s direct personal contacts with Putin can be justified with the hope that Ankara plays a peace-maker role in this war. However, Türkiye’s anti-western and anti-NATO discourses continued without any change as Erdoğan’s declarations concerning the enlargement of NATO demonstrate it particularly. On the membership applications of Sweden and Finland, Türkiye’s reactions which are essentially related to the

terrorism policies of the Nordic countries have the potential to further question Türkiye's credentials in the NATO if not managed successfully. The coming days will show whether this policy produces a result that is in line with Türkiye's economic and political expectations from Russia. However, there is no doubt that Putin must have been very pleased with this policy in the short run.

Problems in Syria: Since the start of the Syrian crisis in 2011, it remains one of the most critical issues affecting relations between the RF and Türkiye. Both countries share different historical connections with Syria. After the end of the Ottoman Empire, France occupied Syria and established a mandate regime in Damascus soon after the First World War. The question of Syria's borders therefore remained unsolved until 1938 when Hatay (Alexandretta) decided to join Türkiye with the help and pressure of Ankara. The Syrian nationalists however never accepted this unification. After the Baath Party came to power, the Hatay region became a hot issue between Ankara and Damascus.

Yet, the Soviets took advantage of Syria's estranged relationship with Türkiye and extended a powerful hand to the Baathist Hafez Assad (the father of Bashar) who preferred a pro-Soviet policy in the region in return. In addition, the Syrian army was designated and donated by the Soviets. Following the Soviets, Hafez also supported the PKK and its terrorist activities against Türkiye. Scarcity of water in the region created another point of conflict between Türkiye and Syria, and the Soviets continued to support the Hafez Assad regime on this subject as well.

Later, when Bashar Assad became his father's successor, he attempted to improve policies between Syria and Türkiye. However, the start of the Syrian uprising created a rift between Türkiye and Syria, causing Bashar Assad to once again shift Syria's allegiance towards Russia. Assad and Putin became close allies in the region when Moscow unconditionally supported the current Syrian regime and rejected any solution without Bashar Assad. Nevertheless, this did not prevent Türkiye from joining the RF and Iran in seeking to find a sustainable solution at the Astana Accord made in 2017.

Additionally, two major incidents related to the Syrian crisis has worsened relations between Moscow and Ankara. The first one was related to the destruction of the Turkish Air Force F-4 in

June 2012 and the bombs that killed five civilians dropped by the Assad forces in October 2012 in the Akçakale district of Şanlıurfa (Milliyet, 2012). Türkiye reacted by protesting the involvement of both Syria and Russia in these bombings and tightened up “the rules of engagement” for its security on its borders (Yeltin and Işık, 2017: 43-44). There have been many other incidents where Türkiye’s air space has been violated by the Syrian and Russian forces that claim they are fighting against the terrorist groups of the DAESH/ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). However, Ankara knew Syria and Russia were more concerned about attacking anti-Assad forces than ISIS, observed in Assad’s attack of anti-Assad Turcoman civilians living in the Bayırbucak area next to the borders of Türkiye. Despite Türkiye’s warnings, the Russian and Syrian forces have ignored the Turkish “rules of engagement” further aggravating their conflict with Türkiye.

The second major incident which caused tension with Moscow, was the Russian warplane that was shot down in November 2015, that violated several times the Turkish air space, despite warnings. Vladimir Putin called the incident a “stab in the back” and responded promptly by a group of sanctions against Türkiye including imports, building contracts, chartered flights, holiday packages, and visa-free travel. He also instructed tighter control over Turkish air carriers in Russia (The New York Times, 28 November 2015). In addition, Russia also made some other changes in his policies towards Türkiye, such as intensifying bombings on Turcoman groups, introducing a pro-Armenian bill to not deny the 1915 events as genocide, supporting pro-PKK Kurdish organizations like YPG, PYD and SDG in Syria, deploying more S-300F missiles positioned off Latakia, breaking off all military communications and any contact with the Turkish side, and even blaming Türkiye of trading oil with the ISIS militants.

Despite these huge problems and growing tensions, Türkiye and Russia were able to come together and solve their problems and misunderstandings with the start of Astana Process in 2017. The presidents of both countries have played a large role in restoring their relations. The first step was initiated by President Erdoğan with a diplomatic letter directly to President Putin in June 2016, expressing sympathy and “deep condolences” to the Russian family of the victims who died after the shutdown of the Russian aircraft in 2015. After the July 15th coup attempt by the

FETO terrorist organization, Al-Jazeera reported from Erdoğan that the two pilots who shut down the aircraft were arrested on suspicion that they had links to the FETO as a further gesture of goodwill towards Russia (Al-Jazeera, 2016).

Understanding Türkiye's position, Putin also has played a positive role in attempting to restore relations and eventually lifted most of the sanctions related to the aircraft incident. Although many serious problems left unsolved in Syria, the Astana process has proven effective in restoring cooperation between Türkiye and Russia along with Iran.

S400s, Military Technology and Scientific Co-Operation: One significant point of cooperation between Russia and Türkiye, has been Türkiye's purchase of the S-400 Long Range Air Defense Missiles from the Russian Federation. The contract made in 2017 states a total of two S-400 systems (one is optional) will be supplied from Russia, starting with the delivery of its first part in the first quarter of 2020. In addition to the missiles, Russia has agreed to transfer technology and make scientific cooperation on the subject matter (TRT Haber, 2017). This agreement however has caused some unease for the USA, who think that the Russian missile system is incompatible technologically and with the interests of Türkiye and its NATO allies. However, Türkiye asserts that it needs the S-400 Russian missiles and the Patriots missiles from the USA to have an effective and deterrent defense system in the fragile region. Initially, Türkiye sought the Patriot missiles from the USA on many occasions, however the US government failed to offer Türkiye any substantial offer as an ally. Therefore, Türkiye decided to move forward with the S-400 deal. The subject of F-35 fighter jets further complicates the issue, and instead of persuading Ankara to go along with the USA and NATO allies, critics of Türkiye have had the reverse effect of pushing Ankara towards Moscow. President Erdogan believes that "Türkiye's purchase of S-400 missile defense system from Russia has 'nothing to do' with NATO, F-35 fighter jets or security of the US. Hopefully, we will deal with this issue with common sense, logic and interests, the same way we dealt with issues in the past" (TRT World, 2019). At this point, it is possible, however, to say that the S-400s will be continue to remain a hot issue, testing relations not only with the US but also with the RF in the upcoming days.

Economic Relations, Foreign Trade, Investments and Tourism: The policy of establishing a high level of economic partnership began well before the end of the Cold war. Already in the 1960s, as previously discussed, Demirel and Özal sought to expand economic development with the Soviets until its demise in 1991. After the Cold War, the new Russian Federation declared in 1992 that it accepted all agreements previously made and signed in “the Agreement on the Principles of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Türkiye”. Following this agreement, The Joint Economic Commission (JEC) was established and since then, foreign trade between these two countries has increased at an unprecedented speed from about 1.5 billion US dollars in 1992 to over 32 billion in 2021, as is shown in the table 8.1.

Table 8.1:
Türkiye’s Foreign Trade with the RF (1992-2021) as of \$

YEAR	EXPORT	IMPORT	BALANCE
1992	441.886.236	1.040.816.301	-598.930.065
1993	504.665.010	1.542.329.837	-1.037.664.827
1994	820.229.744	1.045.389.027	-225.159.283
1995	1.238.224.503	2.082.376.492	-844.151.989
1996	1.510.005.326	1.921.139.118	-411.133.792
1997	2.056.547.228	2.174.258.117	-117.710.889
1998	1.348.002.243	2.155.006.116	-807.003.873
1999	588.663.804	2.374.132.817	-1.785.469.013
2000	643.902.938	3.886.583.276	-3.242.680.338
2001	924.106.727	3.435.672.619	-2.511.565.892
2002	1.172.038.590	3.891.721.401	-2.719.682.811
2003	1.367.590.908	5.451.315.438	-4.083.724.530
2004	1.859.186.551	9.033.138.484	-7.173.951.933
2005	2.377.049.944	12.905.619.879	-10.528.569.935
2006	3.237.611.322	17.806.238.758	-14.568.627.436
2007	4.726.853.152	23.508.494.288	-18.781.641.136
2008	6.483.003.596	31.364.476.862	-24.881.473.266
2009	3.189.607.392	19.450.085.570	-16.260.478.178
2010	4.628.152.963	21.600.641.439	-16.972.488.476
2011	5.992.633.393	23.952.914.321	-17.960.280.928
2012	6.680.777.245	26.625.286.056	-19.944.508.811

2013	6.964.209.480	25.064.213.832	-18.100.004.352
2014	5.943.014.110	25.288.597.271	-19.345.583.161
2015	3.588.330.986	20.401.756.568	-16.813.425.582
2016	1.733.218.007	15.160.962.297	-13.427.744.290
2017	2.734.315.893	19.514.093.954	-16.779.778.061
2018	3.401.194.206	21.989.776.017	-18.588.581.811
2019	3.852.993.806	22.453.026.441	-18.600.032.635
2020	4.164.184.889	17.086.212.040	-13.922.027.151
2021	5.289.848.440	27.598.784.620	-22.308.936.180


Source: <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/disticaretapp/menu.zul>, (23.06.2022)

As Table 8.1 reveals, foreign trade works in favor of Russia. The reason behind the deficit of trade comes from Türkiye’s need for energy, mostly dependent on Russian natural gas. The consumption of gas, which was only 3 billion m3 in 1990, reached approximately 60 billion m3 in 2017 and increased by 20 times within 31 years (Yardımcı, 2011: 160-161; Republic of Türkiye Energy Market Regulatory Authority/EPDK, 2022). Looking only at the numbers of foreign trade is misleading. To understand the RF and Türkiye economic relations as a whole, it is important to take into consideration a range of other factors. In addition to foreign trade for example, there are many Turkish companies in Russia with a large share of the contracts and investment of money in several sectors with a considerable amount of turnover. As of 2019, the number of Turkish companies exceeded 1500 in total that invested more than 10 billion US dollars in this country.

Turkish contracting firms have also completed 1,946 projects worth approximately 68 billion US dollars in the RF (Turkish Embassy in Moscow, 2019). Also, the numbers of Russian tourists who visited Türkiye increased from 477 thousand to over 7 million in 19 years from 2000 to 2019 as it is shown in Graphic 8.2. Despite the temporary drop in the numbers of the tourists in 2015 and 2016, because of the aircraft crisis in November 2015 and Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, Türkiye has had a steady flow of visitors from Russia since the end of the Cold War. Russian visitors and Turkish companies have caused historically conditioned stereotype images concerning both of these nations to change and forced their leaders to think twice before making any drastic political decision.

Graphic 8.1

Tourist Numbers (2000-2021)



Source: <https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/turizmapp/sinir.zul?>, (23.06.2022)

Conclusions

Relations between Russia and Türkiye goes back to the rise of the Russians as a distinct ethnic community. When the Russians began appearing in history, Turkic peoples dominated Euro-Asian steppes. The first and most important reason behind the historical Russian policies towards Turks was because of their dominance in the region. Another important reason is related to their religious identities. For many centuries, this difference was used to justify the wars taking place between the two nations. Russia's relations with the Ottomans was mostly characterized by conflicts and wars, simply because the Ottomans created a barrier on the way of expanding towards the South, reaching warm waters, reviving Byzantium in Istanbul, and realizing a greater unity among Slavic peoples. Then, Russia caused the destabilization of the Ottomans until the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917.

The October Revolution and the success of the Bolsheviks in Russia coincided with the start of the National Liberation War by the Kemalists in Türkiye. This coincidence pushed both leaders to come together to struggle against imperialist powers. The Soviet Union and the new Türkiye needed to demonstrate that "they were not alone" in the world. As far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, they expected something from the Kemalists ideologically, but they established cooperation between the two states at the beginning of 1920s and the Bolsheviks supported

the Kemalists financially and militarily. Although they had some problems in practice, the historical understanding which was based on anti-imperialist coalition would help both countries to sustain peaceful relations with each other for a decade up to the second half of the 1930s.

The Soviet Union's relations with Türkiye deteriorated for several reasons. First, Türkiye's relations with Britain and its membership in the League of Nations was perceived by Russia as Türkiye's waltz with the imperialist system and powers. Second, the Montreux Treaty did not please the Soviets since they wanted to set up a common system which would be established by the Black Sea states to deal with the defense of the Straits. The Soviets accused Türkiye of "playing the game" of the imperialist powers. They also demanded in the conference to be given full freedom to cross their ships across the Straits for coastal states and to limit the passage of non-coastal states as far as possible. The third reason was the Tripartite Agreement between Türkiye, Britain and France just before the start of the Second World War. Fourth reason was related to Türkiye's wartime policies including its neutrality, relations with Germany and letting pan-Turkist circles attempt some anti-Soviet activities.

During the Cold War, the relations between the Soviet Union and Türkiye had many highs and lows. No doubt, the Soviet Union's imperial attitude hindered these relations. Secondly, ideological approaches from both sides shaped their foreign policies and this caused conflicts between them. In a bipolar international system, Türkiye chose the liberal western side, participated in all western organizations including NATO, and became a staunch ally of the USA. The Soviet Union regarded western organizations as a threat, who conspired against its own existence, and the US was perceived of as their arch enemy. In the second half of the 1960s, when the Cyprus issue became a point of conflict with the West, particularly the USA, Türkiye was left alone in international affairs. After the Cyprus issue and the Johnson letter, Türkiye attempted to follow a more multi-dimensional foreign policy and approached the Soviet Union to develop particularly economic relations.

Türkiye was one of the first countries to recognize the new Russian Federation following the collapse of the Soviet Union and with whom it started economic relations. Political and

economic instabilities of both nations and the region left behind by the Soviet Union however hindered the progress until the beginning of 2000s, when Vladimir Putin in Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Türkiye came to power. Since then, they have faced problems, but they have solved them, as much as possible, through leadership and summit diplomacy, and by focusing on issues that mutually benefit both nations.

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Foreign policy is a complex phenomenon that must be understood as the outcome of many factors, many of which have roots in the past, but are also connected to the present and the near future. Russian foreign policy in particular illustrates this reality. The aim of this book is to underline the four major factors that affect Russian foreign policy. First, Russia is the state of tsars since the Middle Ages with grandiose expectations and expansionist policies. Second, Russia is the largest country in the world with huge natural resources. Three, Russia still keeps its great power status in international politics, mainly due to its nuclear weapon capabilities. Four, Vladimir Putin, as the president of the Russian Federation, attempts to re-construct a new Russia not far away from that of the heritage and image of the tsars and Soviet leaders.