On May 30, 2022, The President of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon arrived in Tehran on an official visit. President Rahmon was accompanied by a large delegation that included advisers for foreign relations, prosecutor-general, ministers of foreign affairs, energy and water resources, economic development and trade, transport, and finance, heads of the state committee for land management, environmental protection, the tourism development, as well as several province governors. The official visit of the Tajik President was preceded by a meeting of Tajikistan’s deputy foreign minister with the Iranian foreign minister [ASIA-Plus, 2022]. The visit included the meeting of the Presidents of the two countries Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi and Emomali Rahmon, as well as bilateral meetings of ministers and heads of relevant committees. This event certainly could be described as a landmark visit because the previous visit of Emomali Rahmon to the Islamic Republic of Iran was made nine years ago. At the end of a high-profile meeting co-chaired by Presidents Sayyid Ebrahim Raisi and Emomali Rahmon, it was concluded that the sides had signed 17 documents on cooperation in a wide range of fields. The signed documents entailed cooperation between Tehran and Dushanbe in political and economic relations, transportation sector, investment activities, new technologies, environmental issues, the energy sector, strengthening cultural, humanitarian ties and other topics [Tasnimnews.com, 2022a].
In recent years, the two states have been practically engaged in an active revival of bilateral cooperation in all fields. For instance, on June 13, 2022, authorities of the two countries organized a Tajikistan-Iran Tourism Forum [Mfa.tj, 2022] aimed at developing tourism between the two countries. On June 21, 2022, Iran and Tajikistan held a Joint Security Task Force in Dushanbe which was attended by officials from the interior ministries of both countries. The joint security task force is meant to coordinate actions of the two states against terrorism, organized crimes, and drug trafficking and help counter the threats from common enemies [Tasnimnews.com, 2022b].
When we look closer at the reasonings for this recent cooperation motivation we see that both countries are trying to expand their regional connectivity with different countries. On top of that, it could be said that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also contributed to this initiative of searching for new cooperation areas with countries they have good relations. The unprecedented sanctions that Russia has faced within a short period of time after it started its military invasion of Ukraine created an atmosphere that discourages other countries from any intensification of cooperation with Russia. Despite the fact that having strong relations with Russia in security, trade and migration-related issues and the distance of Tajikistan to the European political agenda, the effects of the sanctions on Russia could push Dushanbe to strengthen its relations with its other partners.
The two countries are engaged in close cooperation practically in all areas and therefore Russia’s current losses incurred as a result of sanctions by western countries carry significant risks for Tajikistan. Sharply reduced opportunities for Tajik labor migrants in Russia due to sanctions would definitely lead to the accumulation of a surplus labor force which would become a factor of significant socio-economic tension in the country. In order to find its way of reducing the current political and economic risks, Dushanbe seems to strengthen its relations with Iran. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the ethnocultural and linguistic similarities between Iran and Tajikistan also play a significant role in ensuring close ties between the two nations.
Heavy sanctions imposed on Russia by western countries within a short period of time are causing enormous shifts in the oil market. Since the beginning of the war, the gradual removal of Russia from western oil markets has become a common political consensus reached by the political establishment of Europe, which is the main export market for Russian oil. With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the oil prices shot up above $100 per barrel, which hugely contributed to global inflation that had already been there as a result of the post-COVID economic recovery. Within this context, many western countries think of the EU oil embargo removal from Iran, which is thought to help stabilize the oil market and bring the prices down by creating additional supply in the market. Within this context, Iran might be anticipating at least a partial possible removal of sanctions on oil sales, which would definitely strengthen Iran’s position in the Eurasian region.
Another factor that stimulates the cooperation between Tajikistan and Iran is the growing importance of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) connecting Russia and India. The INSTC is meant to help Russia provide access to Asian markets (primarily India) because the sanctions make it difficult for Russia to rely on other routes. Iran has recently initiated multi-sided transit of goods from Russia to India via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) [Irna.ir, 2022]. Due to its landlocked position, Tajikistan as well as other countries in the region are interested in using the transport corridor.
Regional security is also one of the important areas in which Tajikistan seeks to cooperate with Iran. In this regard, the security concerns on the Afghan border are the primary issue for Tajikistan in which it seeks the involvement of Iran in the mediation of any unexpected events or at least, accounts for finding common grounds in the vision of security in the region. Tajikistan’s interest in cooperation with Iran in the field of security is also caused by Russia’s current focus and overconcentration of military resources on Ukraine, which might lead to the debilitation of the CSTO regional security architecture. Therefore, Tajikistan’s security cooperation efforts with Iran can be viewed as its attempts to fill the gap in regional security along its border with Afghanistan in order to seek alternatives to Russia. The security cooperation between Iran and Tajikistan has quite tangible dimensions as well. For instance, In May 2022, Iran inaugurated its first drone production facility in Tajikistan which will manufacture and export the Ababil-2, a multipurpose drone with reconnaissance, combat, and suicide capabilities that have recently been used by Russian troops in the Russo-Ukrainian war. The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit held in Samarkand on September 15-16, 2022 opened new cooperation opportunities for Tajikistan and Iran as the latter signed a memorandum of accession to the organization. The SCO then can serve as an additional framework for cooperation between Tajikistan and Iran.
In conclusion, it could be said that cooperation between Tajikistan and Iran would continue to grow as the former seeks to bring a balance to its needs from border security to economic relations matters where Russia is its main partner. However, it would be wise to think that Iran cannot become an strong alternative to Russia in a short period of time, for instance trade volume between Tajikistan and Russia in 2020 almost reached $1 billion while its trade with Iran was only $57.7 million. The similar situations could be observed in other areas as well where Russia is one of the strongest partner of Tajikistan. However the ongoing sanctions against Russia keep Moscow’s agenda busy with Ukraine and its relations with the Western countries in addition to that the heavy burden of sanctions reduces Russia’s economic soft power capabilities which Tajikistan depends on it for many years. Therefore strengthening relations with Iran could be considered a good start for Tajikistan to seek balance in its relations among its major cooperation partner countries.
References
Asiaplustj.info (2022). Rahmon pays official visit to Iran. Retrieved from https://asiaplustj.info/en/news/tajikistan/politics/20220530/rahmon-pays-official-visit-to-iran. Accessed on 24.06.2022.
Irna.ir (2022). Tajikistan president expresses interest in using Iranian seaports. Retrieved from https://en.irna.ir/news/84773482/Tajikistan-president-expresses-interest-in-using-Iranian-seaports. Accessed on 27.06.2022.
Mfa.tj (2022). Tajik-Iran Tourism Forum. Retrieved from https://mfa.tj/en/main/view/10546/tajik-iran-tourism-forum. Accessed on 24.06.2022.
Tasnimnews.com (2022a). Iran, Tajikistan Sign 17 Agreements. Retrieved from https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/05/30/2719350/iran-tajikistan-sign-17-agreements. Accessed on 24.06.2022.
Tasnimnews.com (2022b). Iran, Tajikistan set up joint security task force. Retrieved from https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/06/21/2732025/iran-tajikistan-set-up-joint-security-task-force. Accessed on 27.06.2022.
UN Comtrade (2022). Trade data. Retrieved from https://comtrade.un.org/data/. Accessed on 27.06.2022.
Note: The views expressed in this blog are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the Institute’s editorial policy