The current global geopolitical transformations have given new rise to narratives centered around the Global South. With the US struggling to maintain its position as the world’s superpower, China’s expanding economic and political power as well as Russia’s challenge to the current international order through its conflict in Ukraine have stimulated discussions on the importance of the Global South in international relations. The paper unpacks the ongoing debates around the role of the Global South, including its relevance for Central Asian region.
The term “Global South” is subject to a variety of interpretations. Although geographically it usually refers to the regions in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Oceania, it is difficult to identify certain countries in the so-called Global South [Dados and Connell, 2012]. There are no established methods of categorizing those who belong to the Global South. Global South does not refer to the geographical south since it also covers the regions in the northern hemisphere. Rather, it is defined based on the socio-economic and political features of countries [Chenoy, 2022].
There have been several attempts to categorize it, such as those made by Mahler [2017]. She distinguished three definitions of the Global South: a post–Cold War alternative to the “Third World” for the economically underdeveloped countries; a “deterritorialized geography of capitalism’s externalities” where the South is referred to as “internal periphery and subaltern relational position”; and a “resistant imaginary… of subjugation under contemporary global capitalism”, that is connected to the times of decolonization. Other scholars also agree that the concept of the Global South is related to the history of imperialism and colonialism that was challenged during the Cold War years with the solidarity movements of the Third World, such as the ‘Bandung Spirit’, and the Non-Aligned Movement, and facilitate further discussions on the global inequality due to economic and political dependence on the global North [Grey and Gills, 2016]. It also “functions as more than a metaphor for underdevelopment”, being in the periphery, “the rest,” or the “Third World” [Dados and Connell, 2012]. The concept of the Global South, which was initially introduced as a “more open and value-free alternative to the Third World” and similar potentially “valuing” terms, became related to the newly industrialized or in the process of industrializing countries [Clarke, 2018]. The concept emerged as the imaginary of struggles for decolonization and as an alternative to neoliberal globalization [Ballestrin, 2020]. Global South became a dynamic and complex term that is used for both analytical and descriptive purposes. It had evolved from different contexts and been affected by discussions in a variety of disciplines, including geography, political science, sociology, post-colonial studies, and subaltern studies [Clarke, 2018].
With the growing globalization and strengthening of developing countries, the Global South also demonstrates a shift from a central focus on development or cultural difference towards an emphasis on geopolitical relations of power [Dados and Connell, 2012]. The Global South became a political project that is disputed by progressive and regressive forces in the multipolar world [Ballestrin, 2020]. The current geopolitical tensions have given new impetus to the debates over the credibility of the Western order and the growing ambitions of emerging powers. The development patterns of the Global South, based on their robust economic, financial, and industrial stances, generate questions on whether the elites of the Global South will challenge the existing global capitalist development trajectories or will try to revise them by changing and strengthening their positions and influence within the system [Grey and Gills, 2016].
Although concerns over the existing world order and the place of the Global South in it had been debated during the last decades, the confident position of China and its assertive ambitions, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had spawned a new ‘wave’ of narratives over the role of the Global South in geopolitics. In Europe, Russian aggression had stimulated an unprecedented level of unity and the realization of the need to diversify their strategic needs, including energy, military, industry, and technology spheres. The sanctions imposed on Russia however did not meet much support from the Global South. Given that many countries of the South have trust issues with the West and doubt the possibility of getting help from the West when they need it, they are advocating for neutrality and demonstrating ‘strategic autonomy’ [Chenoy, 2022]. Moreover, the so-called Global South is leveraging the situation, which also goes in hand with Russia’s ambitions in global geopolitics.
The US is capitalizing on geopolitical challenges caused by Russia’s aggression. By advocating the weakening of Russia, the US tries to recalibrate its global political aspirations while strengthening relations with its allies, the majority of whom are from the Global South. The US’s rivalry with China, after the trade wars, has been continuing to escalate with ‘chip wars’. The gap between the US and China’s establishment widens as a result of China’s neutrality towards Russian aggression and Xi Jinping’s sympathy for Russia’s desire to oppose the West and particularly the US. At the same time, both the US and China are attempting to win over more nations in the Global South. As a result, we are seeing the narrative become more active and the Global South’s footprint is growing.
In this context, attention to African states is growing, especially given the intensification of Russia’s interaction and the established influence of China on the continent. While China is expanding its multilateral and bilateral engagements with African states within its BRI projects, along with applying its South-South cooperation rhetoric while claiming itself as part of the Global South, Russia is also pushing its agenda with the help of African states. The boost in African countries’ support for Russia, in particular, is seen in the fact that most abstentions (51%) in the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion come from African countries [Chatham House, 2023]. The interests of the US and European countries are also growing, as seen in the statement of the US Secretary of State Blinken that ‘Africa is a major geopolitical force’. Only in the two first months of 2023, foreign ministers of China, Russia, Germany, France, the US Treasury Secretary, and the EU’s high representative paid visits to fourteen African countries [Hout, 2023]. Hence, African states being part of the Global South attract more geopolitical attention nowadays and stimulate broadening interest in African affairs.
The growing attention to the Asia-Pacific region, boosting engagement with ASEAN countries, India’s efforts to position itself as the leader of the Global South, and the lifting of the Indo-Pacific security agenda are all positioned with the participation of the Global South. The countries of Latin America as part of the Global South are also gathering heightened interest with the rising interests of all competing powers such as China, Russia, the EU, India, and of course the USA.
The BRICS grouping, which in its early days was perceived with skepticism, is now earning more political confidence and positioning itself among the new actors of the Global South. Given that the BRICS countries have officially overtaken the G7 economies in terms of PPP GDP and project further growth, the consolidation of voices within the BRICS adds not only political weight but also economic power in the global governance structures [Devonshire-Ellis, 2023]. In addition, we cannot ignore the fact that the population of the BRICS nations (3.2 billion) is 4.2 times greater than the population of the G7 nations (770 million) taken as a whole [Sachs, 2023].
Nonetheless, while the various platforms on global governance and media narratives are advocating growing attention to the Global South, the countries of Central Asia seem to be not participating in these discussions. The reason might be hidden in the question of belonging to the Global South. Although Central Asian countries among the developing countries and at the periphery of global geopolitics, Central Asia had missed the discussions of the emergence of the ‘Southern’ pattern such as the Third World and colonialism since, as part of the USSR, they were not among the Third World countries. While some scholars include Central Asia in the Global North due to their non-belonging to the Third World before 1991 [Pop-Eleches and Robertson, 2015], Dzhuraev [2021] believes Central Asia could be considered as a legitimate part of the Global South. He argues that the geopolitics of Central Asia highlight the subaltern nature of the region and have multiple facets of Central Asia’s “southerness”. Indeed, Central Asian states, being developing states, except Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (which are in the upper-middle income group due to their oil exports), are included in the category of the lower-middle income countries in the World Bank’s classification. All five Central Asian states are struggling with their development challenges, including the issues of socio-economic well-being. The role of Central Asia as a region and separately as countries in global politics are rather in the peripheral area. Despite such factors, Central Asian states, probably due to not positioning their colonial past like other countries of the Global South, are not sharing the closeness to the Global South.
Central Asian states, whether perceived as part of the Global South or not, need to reconsider the importance of South-South cooperation. Especially in the current geopolitical transformations, when the agenda of South-South cooperation has heightened its importance in combating global issues. Cooperation within the South-South format gives new priority directions and strengthens the multi-vector approach of Central Asian states. Global issues that need a collective approach, such as climate change, are among the topics that allow for enhanced South-South cooperation. Given that the relations between the Global South and North swung towards geopolitical relations of power, Central Asia could also gain additional leverage from geopolitical games as part of the Global South.
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