Future of Climate Migration in Kazakhstan

Climate migration refers to the movement of individuals or groups driven by changes in climate conditions, such as extreme weather events, rising sea levels, prolonged droughts, or other environmental disruptions caused by climate change. Climate and environmental factors are expected to be increasingly important factors for population movement and distribution in the future all across the world. It is expected that by 2050 around 216 million people will need to move within their countries due to climate-related reasons if immediate steps are not taken to cut current global greenhouse gas emissions [Clement et al. 2021]. Climate migration is a very complex phenomenon and tends to disproportionately affect developing nations compared to developed ones, primarily due to differences in vulnerability, adaptive capacity and resources, and resilience.

According to recent estimates by the International Organization for Migration, somewhere between 3.1% and 4.6% of the projected population in Kazakhstan (0.9-1.2 million people) will have to migrate internally in 2050 due to climate change by the middle of the century [International Organization for Migration, 2023]. Kazakhstan is believed to be highly sensitive to the adversities of projected impacts of climate change. Due to its vast geography, Kazakhstan is likely to face different climate challenges such as increased temperature and aridity in the country, and changing patterns of precipitation, which will increase the frequencies of heatwaves, droughts, and floods. Water scarcity and aridity are among the most pressing challenges the country is likely to face, with 98% of its total water balance comprising surface water resources, particularly river streams [International Organization for Migration, 2016].

Mountain regions across the globe are also believed to be susceptible to the effects of climate change. Since a significant share of the population of Kazakhstan lives in mountainous regions, this risk is relevant for Kazakhstan. In particular, a projected global temperature rise of 1.5ºC or more is expected to severely impact mountainous areas, leading to glacier shrinkage, heightened risks of natural hazards, and significant biodiversity loss [International Organization for Migration, 2023]. Consequently, these adverse effects of climate are expected to create push factors making people want to leave certain areas and thus contributing to climate migration.

These projections are usually made and updated on a global scale, covering the entire globe. However, one of the most visible limitations of these projections is that they are highly generalized and often overlook non-climatic and environmental factors, such as socio-economic conditions, demographics, changes in policymaking mechanisms, and more. One of the most overlooked factors is the spatial distribution and current trends of population movement in Kazakhstan, which is particularly relevant taking into account the country’s vast territorial size. Currently, Kazakhstan is an urbanizing nation with 62.8% of its population living in urban areas [Bureau of National Statistics, 2024]. However, the pace of migration of the population is highly inconsistent with a significant share of urban-to-urban migration and most of the urban population concentrating mostly in a few large urban centers. Thus, the three largest urban areas Almaty, Astana, and Shymkent currently account for nearly 40% of the urban population and almost one-quarter of the total population of the country. Moreover, these three urban areas contribute to more than three-quarters of the total urban population growth in the country [City Population, 2024].

From the climate migration perspective, the current population trends would imply greater risks in small areas with large cities with their suburbs and smaller reduced risks for rural areas with high depopulation. In other words, adverse climate effects in densely populated areas would pose a much higher risk and require priority in resilience building and resource allocation, while areas experiencing significant depopulation would face a smaller risk in terms of climate migration. Aligning these current trends with future climate projections allows us to better assess and predict the challenges of climate migration that Kazakhstan will face in the future. Interestingly, one of the recent UN reports on climate projected that the northern parts of Kazakhstan could become hotspots for internal climate migration. In particular, cities like Karagandy, Astana, and Kostanay, along with the surrounding rainfed croplands in northern Kazakhstan, are expected to see significant increases in water availability [Clement et al., 2021]. On the other hand, climate modeling has also shown opposite trends for the southern areas of Kazakhstan, where declines in water availability are expected to contribute to water scarcity and the expansion of semiarid areas [Clement et al., 2021]. The availability of new arable lands in the northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan is expected to be caused primarily by rising temperatures [Blondin 2019]. These forecasts based on climate modeling are somewhat contrary to the current socio-demographic trends in Kazakhstan, where population growth is heavily skewed toward the southern region due to higher natural population growth rates and significant net immigration from other regions of the country. Despite a short-term “runoff dividend” from glacial loss, the climate models project increased water scarcity in the long-term in densely populated southern areas of Kazakhstan [Clement et al., 2021] creating a push factor. Therefore, we can expect an increase in climate-induced internal migration in Kazakhstan in the upcoming decades. Moreover, considering the current spatial demographic trends, future internal migration is likely to be directed toward relatively less populated areas in the north and east of Kazakhstan [Clement et al., 2021]. Hence, the recent efforts by the government of Kazakhstan to promote the resettlement of the population from the southern regions to the north are likely to occur naturally in the future due to climate changes, without the need for government assistance.

Another significant factor missing from the equation when projecting future climate migration in Kazakhstan is understanding how exactly the climate will change. The difficulty in answering this question lies in the simple fact that specific projections vary greatly and are subject to frequent revisions and updates. One approach that can provide a rough understanding of climate trends without relying on climate modeling is to analyze the historical climate trends in Kazakhstan up to the present with the assumption that these patterns will hold to some extent in the future. Table 1 below illustrates changes in some key climate indicators for the ten largest cities in Kazakhstan covering the period from 1981 to 2022. The combined population of these ten cities accounts for 37.6% of the total population of the country.

Table 1. Climate Data from 1981 to 2022 for the 10 Largest Cities in Kazakhstan

Source: Power Project, 2024.

First of all, it is quite interesting to note that there has been no significant change in average yearly temperature in practically all large cities of Kazakhstan since the 1980s. Despite minor variations from decade to decade, the average yearly temperatures in the ten largest cities of Kazakhstan have remained relatively unchanged, which is quite unexpected given the global trend of rising temperatures due to climate change. On the other hand, the climate data show very significant changes in patterns of cloudiness and precipitation in most of the large cities in Kazakhstan, which is intuitive since clouds are a prerequisite for most types of precipitation. For example, the average yearly cloudiness in the city of Almaty shows a clear gradual increase from 56.1% in the 1980s to 65.5% during the period 2011–2022. Similarly, the average yearly precipitation in Almaty increased from 305.9 mm to 407.3 mm over the same period. The trends are quite similar in most other large cities in Kazakhstan. In Shymkent, for instance, the amount of average yearly precipitation fell from 203.0 mm in the 1980s to 445.3 mm in recent years [Power Project, 2024]. Interestingly, the increase in cloudiness and precipitation rates over the last four decades in Kazakhstan is observed in cities located across different parts of the country except for the southeastern parts of Kazakhstan. For instance, the cities of Aktau and Kyzylorda are the only major cities that haven’t seen an increase in precipitation and the sky’s cloud cover (coudiness) over the last forty years. While these climate records provide some insight into past urban climates, they cannot be directly applied to rural areas due to differences in the ability of urban and rural regions to shape local climate conditions. However, considering major cities as part of the internal climate migration framework is important, as the demographic share of the urban population continues to increase.

Internal climate migration in Kazakhstan is a complex interplay between urban and rural climate conditions. Existing projections of future climate change for Kazakhstan are expected to become a significant driver of internal migration. While climate projections indicate a notable increase in average temperatures in Kazakhstan, past climate observations for its large cities do not show a significant rise in temperatures. Instead, there have been noticeable increases in cloudiness and precipitation rates, which are likely limited to urban areas due to the specific weather conditions that cities can create. One of the most significant challenges associated with climate change and migration is that future projections suggest a major reorientation of current internal migration patterns. Future migration flows are expected to shift toward the northern and eastern regions of the country, as these areas are likely to have better climate and environmental conditions. On the other hand, the southern regions are projected to face climate-related challenges, potentially leading to outmigration from these areas. At the same time, climate monitoring becomes increasingly important as the majority of the population continues migrating to a few large urban areas. Climate-related disasters in these highly urbanized regions pose significant risks, particularly from the perspective of climate-induced migration.

References:

Blondin, Suzy (2019). “Environmental Migrations in Central Asia: A multifaceted approach to the issue.” Central Asian Survey 38 (2): 275–92.

Bureau of National Statistics, Agency for Strategic planning and reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2024). Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan by Gender and Type of Locality (as of October 1, 2024). Retrieved from https://stat.gov.kz/ru/industries/social-statistics/demography/publications/184901/. Accessed on 20.12.2024.

City Population (2024). City population, Kazakhstan. Retrieved from https://www.citypopulation.de/en/kazakhstan/cities/. Accessed on 19.12.2024.

Clement, Viviane, Kanta Kumari Rigaud, Alex de Sherbinin, Bryan Jones, Susana Adamo, Jacob Schewe, Nian Sadiq and Elham Shabahat (2021). Groundswell Part II: Acting on Internal Climate Migration. The World Bank.

International Organization for Migration (2016). Assessing the Links between Migration, Natural Hazards and Climate Change in Kazakhstan. Publisher: International Organization for Migration.

International Organization for Migration (2023). Meeting of the IOM Project Steering Committee “Addressing human mobility in a changing climate in the mountainous areas of Kazakhstan”. Retrieved from https://kazakhstan.iom.int/news/meeting-iom-project-steering-committee-addressing-human-mobility-changing-climate-mountainous-areas-kazakhstan#:~:text=As%20a%20result%2C%20the%20number,the%20middle%20of%20the%20century. Accessed on 20.12.2024.

Power Project (2024). Climate data. Retrieved from https://power.larc.nasa.gov/data-access-viewer/. Accessed on 18.12.2024.

Note: The views expressed in this blog are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the Institute’s editorial policy.