The realities of the geopolitical turbulence that followed the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian War in February 2022 have orchestrated a new vector for the development of relations with the European Union (EU), one of the principal actors in Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine continues to have a considerable negative impact on the European energy sector; Russia, one of the EU’s largest energy suppliers, cut the export of energy resources to the European market in retaliation to several sets of economic sanctions imposed by Western Countries (European Commission, 2025). What followed was a reassessment of the EU’s long-standing dependence on crude oil, and hence a call to accelerate the process of ‘phasing out’ Russian gas and other Russian energy commodities out of the EU market and aiming to ensure carbon neutrality across the EU member states (European Commission, 2025). One of the ways for the EU to achieve a desirable outcome is to pave the way to Central Asia and its rare earth elements and rich uranium deposits. This article aims to provide a short overview of the last several years’ dynamics of Central Asia’s, and more specifically Kazakhstan’s, relations with the EU amidst the ever-accelerating regional geopolitical turbulence, and examine the future prospects for cooperation.
The prospects for economic development
The pre-Russo-Ukrainian war relations between the EU and Kazakhstan were mainly characterised by the EU’s assistance in establishing a sustainable environment for foreign investment and business development in Kazakhstan. One of the examples is the EU contributing to the financial development of Kazakhstan via the multiannual indicative program of 2014-2020 (EEAS, 2014); the programme was underpinned by a significant increase in financial support, which exceeded one billion euros in total at the time (The Astana Times, 2019).
From 2018 to 2021, the financial support from the EU to Kazakhstan was aimed at addressing the issues associated with the post-pandemic recovery. The ‘EU-Central Asia Dialogue on Partnership and Prosperity’ held online in 2020 is exemplary in this regard (Utebayev et al., 2024). Nevertheless, the cooperation went beyond mere assistance in post-pandemic recovery. Kazakhstan sought the EU’s assistance in strengthening the local business environment through the Ready4Trade program (The Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 2020). In 2021, both parties participated in launching the European Union-Central Asia Economic Forum, where the EU demonstrated increased interest in enhancing trade relations with Central Asian countries (European Commission, 2021).
The post-commencement period of the Russo-Ukrainian war marked 30 years of formal cooperation between the EU and Kazakhstan since the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in January 1995. The Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Kazakhstan was signed in December 2015 and ratified on 1 March 2020; a first agreement of its kind between the EU and one of the Central Asian countries, which entitled Kazakhstan to enhance cooperation with the EU in areas of justice and home affairs, culture, economics and finance, energy and transport (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023). The EU continues to be one of Kazakhstan’s most reliable and crucial trading partners amounting to 51.9% of its external trade in January 2025, with a notable increase of 10.9% compared to the same period in 2024 (Bureau of National Statistics, 2025). During this period, the EU has shifted its focus towards transitioning to a green economy, which resulted in signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Strategic Partnership on Sustainable Raw Materials, Batteries, and Renewable Hydrogen Value Chains in November 2022 (European Commission, 2022). The same goes for the Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2021-2027, which outlined the overall lines of the EU international cooperation in Kazakhstan over the corresponding time period (European Commission, 2022).
The outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war has contributed to the EU’s increased interest in cooperating with Central Asian states; it includes the EU-Central Asian Connectivity Conference, where the corresponding representative discussed the reconsideration of the infrastructural narratives. During the Investors Forum for EU-Central Asia Transport Connectivity that took place in January 2024, the European institutions allocated 10 billion euros for the development of regional trade and transport infrastructure (European Council, 2025). In general, the EU’s economic approach towards Central Asia, and Kazakhstan in particular, is focused on increasing its role as a reliable trade partner and ensuring better prospects for trade and transport infrastructural connectivity.
The prospects for energy cooperation development
In the energy sector, the pre-war period was characterized by the joint interests of Kazakhstan and the EU in advancing the sustainable management of natural resources and a low-carbon economy. The exemplary is the EU’s policy on Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership (EEAS, 2019) and the Low Enriched Uranium Bank, funded by the EU, both launched in 2019 (IAEA, 2019). The EU also assisted in Kazakhstan’s transition to a greener economy during the 17th EU-Central Asia Ministerial Meeting and the EU-Central Asia Economic Forum in 2021 (EEAS, 2021).
The 2022-2024 period featured the acceptance of the Versailles Declaration in March 2022, which emphasized the EU’s somewhat unified agenda to reduce dependence on Russian energy resources. In May 2022, the corresponding countries participated in the Central Asia Water, Environment and Climate Change Cooperation (WECOOP) program workshop to discuss and exchange experience vis-à-vis solar and wind power generation (WECOOP, 2022). The corresponding transition is not devoid of challenges; the rise in prices of oil and gas stimulates higher inflation and transportation issues, especially since the start of the Russia-Ukraine War (Martínez-García et al., 2023). The same approach has been largely followed by Kazakhstan in the aftermath of the Crimea crisis; Kazakhstan strived to reduce its dependence on Russian energy resources by strengthening energy sector collaboration with outside actors, including China and the EU (Vanderhill et al., 2020). This leads to a general agreement that Kazakhstan’s and the EU’s interests in the energy sector are largely driven by the same concerns and considerations, and thus are somewhat complimentary towards each other (Utebayev et al., 2024). It is particularly evident given that Kazakhstan is the single largest supplier to the EU nuclear energy industry. As of 2023, Kazakhstan covered 21% of the EU’s uranium demand (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023).
The EU has aimed to import gas and oil from Central Asian countries, thereby bypassing Russia. It ultimately highlights the role of Kazakhstan as a transit country for energy export. To this end, it is highlighted by the above-mentioned Strategic Partnership on Sustainable Raw Materials, Batteries, and Renewable Hydrogen Value Chains signed during the COP27 in Egypt (European Commission, 2022), and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Tau-Ken Samruk (TKS) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) signed in June of the next year at the Astana Mining and Metallurgy Congress (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023). More specifically, the cooperation between Kazakhstan and the EU continues to be focused on energy transport-infrastructure projects, including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the ‘Middle Corridor’ (MC) (Muratova et al., 2023) and the EU’s ‘Global Gateway’ initiatives (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2025). All in all, the prospects of cooperation between Kazakhstan and the EU in the upcoming years will probably be largely focused on transitioning to renewable energy technologies and diversifying away from the energy dependence on Russia via means of energy transportation infrastructure.
The prospects for political/diplomatic cooperation
The EU’s general approach towards Central Asia, and with it, Kazakhstan, focuses on developing the resilience of the respective countries towards internal and external challenges. It is vividly demonstrated by Joint Communication with the European Parliament and the Council: The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership (EEAS, 2019). The EU’s main concern is with human rights violations. During the Subcommittee Justice and Home Affairs and the Human Rights Dialogue in 2019, the representatives of the EU and Kazakhstan discussed the importance of addressing the obstacles to freedom of expression and information (EAAS, 2019). Over the next years and several more Subcommittee meetings, the EU acknowledged Kazakhstan’s attempts at moving towards tailoring the human rights issues (EAAS, 2020; 2023; 2024). During the following year, the EU included Central Asian countries in their COVID-19 Crisis Response Solidarity Programme; a two-year-long program and an associated 3 million loan to address the needs of Central Asian countries with a particular emphasis on Kazakhstan (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2020).
After 2022, the EU has enhanced its efforts in increasing cooperation with Central Asian countries and Kazakhstan through, for instance, the annual High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the EU and Central Asian countries held in Astana in 2023 (EEAS, 2023) and in Brussels in 2024 (EEAS, 2024). On a more regional level, on 27 March 2025, the Foreign Ministers of Central Asian countries and the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy held the 20th European Union-Central Asia Ministerial meeting in Ashgabat. During the meeting, the representatives discussed the prospects for future cooperation and the preparation for the April First EU-Central Asia Summit (European Council, 2025). Over the years, the EU representatives expressed concern about Kazakhstan becoming a platform used for sanctions circumvention and encouraged Kazakhstan to enhance joint collaboration in tailoring the respective concerns (Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023). In 2025, the EU Sanctions Envoy emphasized the general optimism about the joint efforts in tailoring the sanctions circumvention concerns and the prospects for the development of deep partnership relations between the EU and Kazakhstan (The Astana Times, 2025).
Overall, apart from stressing the joint efforts and commitment to battling organized crime, violent extremism, radicalization, terrorism, drug trafficking, the situation in Afghanistan as well as addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and pollution, water issues, the EU representatives are vocal in voicing their concerns about human rights violations and preventing sanctions circumvention labelling it a significant impediment to the strengthening of regional and bilateral cooperation with Central Asian Countries (European Council, 2025). Nevertheless, the joint efforts in dealing with both issues appear to be bringing about some positive developments.
Conclusion
The prospects for cooperation between the European Union and Kazakhstan, as well as the broader Central Asian region, are increasingly promising across key sectors such as economic development, energy, and diplomacy. Economic collaboration will likely deepen through trade diversification, infrastructure investment, and sustainable growth initiatives, reinforcing Kazakhstan’s role as a key transit hub between Europe and Asia, which might help bypass Russia. In the energy sector, the EU’s commitment to green transition aligns with Kazakhstan’s potential for renewable energy development and its strategic importance as a supplier of critical raw materials, including Kazakhstan’s big uranium deposits. Diplomatically, both sides can leverage shared interests in regional stability, security, and multilateral engagement to foster a stronger partnership. As global challenges reshape geopolitical landscapes, enhanced EU-Central Asia cooperation can serve as a model for constructive engagement, ensuring mutual economic benefits, energy security, and long-term political dialogue. Strengthening these ties will further integrate Kazakhstan into global markets and bolster regional connectivity.
Chosen phrases:
- THE POST-COMMENCEMENT PERIOD OF THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR MARKED THE 30 YEARS OF FORMAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EU AND KAZAKHSTAN SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION AGREEMENT (PCA) IN JANUARY 1995
- THE PROSPECTS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN KAZAKHSTAN AND THE EU IN THE UPCOMING YEARS WILL PROBABLY BE LARGELY FOCUSED ON TRANSITIONING TO RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES AND DIVERSIFYING AWAY FROM THE ENERGY DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA
- THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS ALLOCATED 10 BILLION EUROS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL TRADE AND TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE
- THE EU REPRESENTATIVES ARE VOCAL IN VOICING THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND PREVENTING SANCTIONS CIRCUMVENTION
Chosen photos:
- https://www.nur.kz/world/1996453-kazahstan-podpisal-soglashenie-s-es-v-hode-klimaticheskogo-sammita/
- https://www.akorda.kz/ru/kasym-zhomart-tokaev-prinyal-uchastie-vo-vstreche-glav-gosudarstv-centralnoy-azii-i-prezidenta-evropeyskogo-soveta-279558
- https://vecher.kz/ru/article/glava-gosudarstva-provel-peregovory-s-prezidentom-evropeiskoi-komissii.html
- https://www.akorda.kz/ru/kasym-zhomart-tokaev-prinyal-uchastie-vo-vtoroy-vstreche-glav-gosudarstv-centralnoy-azii-i-prezidenta-evropeyskogo-soveta-254825
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Note: The views expressed in this blog are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the Institute’s editorial policy.