Throughout history, the region of Central Asia – encompassing Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – has played a leading role in navigating the crossroads connecting Europe and Asia vis-à-vis trade, energy, and infrastructure. Nevertheless, the region’s post-independence connections with the majority of the key actors in the international arena started gaining momentum shortly following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Sullivan, 2019). Over the last several decades, Central Asian states have become a crucial driving mechanism of present-day Eurasian geopolitics. The introduction of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiative in 2013, the retreat of the United States from Afghanistan during the summer of 2021, and the commencement of the Russian-Ukraine war in February of 2022 have all contributed to the dynamism of Central Asian regional security complex by re-calibrating the corresponding relations between leading regional actors. Hence, it might be interesting to have a brief look at the somewhat perplexingly fluid dynamics of Central Asian complex geopolitics, and more importantly, the mechanisms of engagement adopted by the Republic of Kazakhstan in fostering state cooperation both inside and outside of the regional framework.
To begin with, Russia has always sought to act as a primary security guarantor in Central Asia, predominantly via Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan on board, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Shanghai Treaty Organization (SCO) comprised of all the Central Asian states; with Turkmenistan acting as an associated member/guest attendee. Russia’s presence in Central Asia, however, is not limited by a strong military factor but is reinforced by the Eurasian Economic Union (EUEA) – comprised of the majority of Central Asian states – that catalyzes the further consolidation of Russia involvement in the region’s affairs (Pål and Blakkisrud, 2021).
China, on the other hand, mostly views Kazakhstan as a crucial trade focal point, albeit not bereft of soft policy considerations including education, of its BRI – a connectivity strategy aimed at developing several land and maritime routes with a final goal of connecting China’s market with those in Europe, thereby solving its pressing overcapacity issues (Rangsimaporn, 2020). The start of the Russian-Ukraine war and associated sanctions have impeded the speed of BRI’s development, yet it also allowed both China and several Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, to enrich regional infrastructural development with new opportunities, such as bypassing Russia via the Middle Corridor (MC).
The European Union (EU) has previously shown an interest in the Central Asian region via the concept of ‘neighbours of its neighbours,’ which implicitly places Central Asian states in its wider European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), yet it somewhat faded given the associated implications of the associated European issues. Over the last couple of years, the EU has facilitated a turn towards deeper integration with Central Asian states, and especially Kazakhstan, by signing the Memorandum of Understanding in November 2022 and endorsing the Operational Partnership Roadmap for the period of 2023-2024 (European Commission, 2023).
The US attempted a rather ‘sudden’ and perhaps, even ‘surprising,’ re-engagement with Central Asian states during the ‘C5+1’ summit in September 2023 where the leaders discussed the prospects for cooperation on a range of levels, particularly concerning the infrastructural build-up around the MC (McGraw, 2023). In addition, the ‘US Strategy for Central Asia 2019-2025’ aims at engaging Central Asian countries more closely with the American economic and diplomatic agendas (Eurasianet, 2024).
All combined, this creates a ‘melting pot’ of overlapping geopolitical and economic interests and agendas both deep within and without the Central Asian regional security scheme. What of Kazakhstan, however? Since Kazakhstan ended up ‘sandwiched’ between two regional dominant actors following the associated end of the Soviet Union in 1991, exemplified by the newly emerged Russian Federation and rising China, it has to tailor its foreign policy considerations accordingly (Vanderhill et al., 2020). Almost immediately, at least in practice, the country’s leadership came up with a ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy approach – a future guiding principle of Kazakhstan’s foreign relations with other countries. The core working principle of Kazakhstan’s ‘multi-vector’ policy consists of two primary vectors: bilateral and regional.
On a bilateral level, Kazakhstan seeks to engage in cooperative and mutually beneficial state-to-state relations with ‘everyone who wishes to do the same’ to both pursue economic and diplomatic cooperation and shift the asymmetry in the bilateral relations via securing timely concession so as to increase its own profitability (Kassen, 2018).
Meanwhile, on the regional level, Kazakhstan seems to be mirroring those practices adopted by smaller Southeast Asian states in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The logic here is a focus on versatility and flexibility as opposed to the typical hard-balancing prevalent in a realist international relations discourse. Just like several Southeast Asian states, Kazakhstan and its multi-vector policy abstain from challenging the status quo in a straightforward manner. Instead, it pursues the policy of developing closer and deeper political, social, and economic relations with as many regional actors as possible, thereby facilitating the security, economic, and diplomatic dialogues on the broader regional level. In other words, Kazakhstan seeks to include as many regional actors as possible in the associated regional framework so every actor involved would have a certain portion of interest in maintaining the stable and peaceful regional dialogue aimed at fostering cooperation and mutually beneficial agreements (Vanderhill et al., 2020).
Such an approach allows Kazakhstan to negate the persistent asymmetry in power capabilities and create a stable regional interplay, which serves, first and foremost, Kazakhstan’s interests. There are several ways Kazakhstan utilizes this approach. Proactivity is one with Kazakhstan taking an active part in several regional economic and security integration initiatives, including the CSTO, EAEU, SCO, and several others. The other concerns the country’s diplomatic flexibility depending on the contextual situation surrounding the phenomenon.
For example, Kazakhstan seeks to preserve a delicate balance when it comes to regional conflicts such as the one unfolding in Ukraine since February 2022. Even before, understanding the thin-layered tension vis-à-vis the relatively fragile regional security framework, Kazakhstan abstained from voting on the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the ‘territorial integrity of Ukraine’ (Yuneman, 2023). This is presumed to keep Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia and the US balanced so as not to tilt the diplomatic preponderance towards one side or another.
The same happened in 2022 when President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev refused to support Russia’s decision to recognize the independence of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) (Terzyan, 2022). As for the deeper intra-regional framework, Kazakhstan continues to sustain stable diplomatic relations with other Central Asian countries in order to preserve the regional cohesiveness among those involved. Back in the day, Kazakhstan sought to make attempts at bolstering regional cooperation through various integration schemes. The exemplary in this regard is the Central Asian Union (CAU) launched in 1994, renamed to Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU) in 1998 with Kyrgyzstan joining it the same year, and later turned into the Organization of Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC), which was further integrated in the Eurasian Economic Community which turn into Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 (Lee, 2017). As for the recent events, Kazakhstan continues to play a decisive role in constructing regional cohesiveness by, for instance, fostering the dialogues between leading Western economic units, such as Germany, with Central Asian Republics, including the meeting with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Olaf Scholz on 17 September 2024 (Akorda, 2024). It is no less a ‘Pulcinella’s secret’ that Kazakhstan strives to reinforce regional trade infrastructure by taking steps towards erasing trade barriers and diversifying export routes between associated member states (Eurasianet, 2024).
The same goes for the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) with almost every Central Asian state included that aims at strengthening unity across the even broader Turkic community. Accordingly, the total trade turnover between the organization’s member states reached $42.3 billion in 2023, whereas the total trade with the rest of the world roughly exceeded $1.3 trillion (Shayakhmetova, 2024). ‘Central Asia 2040’ signed at the sixth consultative meeting of Central Asian heads of state in August 2024 is of no less importance with President Tokayev outlining the prospects for Central Asian development and cooperation. Particular emphasis was given to the facilitation of trade via infrastructural projects, a new consolidated water policy, and establishing a deeper connection between national universities and media outlets (Kushkumbayev and Nuriddenova, 2024).
All in all, Kazakhstan’s role in maintaining the regional security complex is due to its multi-vector foreign policy approach, which fosters the development of both bilateral level relations with constituent parts of the Central Asian regional framework and those outside of it and fosters the regional economic, security, and the general diplomatic dialogues with major regional actors so as to preserve a delicate balance. The major regional dialogues include those of CIS, CSTO, SCO, EAEU, and OTS, which are generally supported by Kazakhstan’s proactive responses to critical conjunctures. Nevertheless, timely step-back is of utmost importance and neutrality is nurtured when necessary for achieving the desired results. It is crucially important to analyze the future strategic maneuvers adopted by Kazakhstan both inside and outside of Central Asia to broaden the understanding of the future implications and strategies adopted.
Reference:
Akorda (2024). Joint Declaration by the Heads of State of Central Asia and the Federal Chancellor of Germany. Retrieved from https://www.akorda.kz/en/joint-declaration-by-the-heads-of-state-of-central-asia-and-the-federal-chancellor-of-germany-1781439. Accessed on 18.11.2024.
Eurasianet (2024). Central Asian states easing trade barriers: Agreements mark baby steps toward formation of a free-trade zone. Retrieved from https://eurasianet.org/central-asian-states-easing-trade-barriers. Accessed on 18.11.2024.
Eurasianet (2024). United States launches initiative to foster Central Asian connectivity: A new way of promoting rule of law. Retrieved from https://eurasianet.org/united-states-launches-initiative-to-foster-central-asian-connectivity. Accessed on 18.11.2024.
European Commission (2023). EU-Kazakhstan strategic partnership becomes operational. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2815. Accessed on 15.11.2024.
Kassen, Maxat (2018). Understanding Foreign Policy Strategies of Kazakhstan: A Case Study of the Landlocked and Transcontinental Country. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 31 (3–4): 314–43.
Kushkumbayev, Sanat and Nuriddenova, Aizada (2024). Can Central Asia Deepen Multilateral Cooperation Without Institutionalization? Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/can-central-asia-deepen-multilateral-cooperation-without-institutionalization/. Accessed on 19.11.2024.
Lee, Dmitry (2017). Central Asian integration: more real than ever? Retrieved from https://astanatimes.com/2017/05/central-asian-integration-more-real-than-ever/. Accessed on 15.11.2024.
McGraw, Marsha (2023). Out of the shadows: The C5+1 Summit. Retrieved from https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/central-asia/out-of-the-shadows-the-c51-summit. Accessed on 16.11.2024.
Pål, Kolstø and Blakkisrud, Helge (2021). Russia’s neighborhood policy and its Eurasian client states: No autocracy export. Russia in global affairs 19.2 (74): 38-62.
Rangsimaporn, Paradorn (2020). Kazakhstan and ASEAN: The Unexplored Vector in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy. Asian Affairs 51 (1): 126–45.
Shayakhmetova, Zhanna (2024). Organization of Turkic States strengthens unity and cooperation among Turkic Nations. Retrieved from https://astanatimes.com/2024/08/organization-of-turkic-states-strengthens-unity-and-cooperation-among-turkic-nations/. Accessed on 15.11.2024.
Note: The views expressed in this blog are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the Institute’s editorial policy.